QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether D~ (the claimant) is entitled to survivor’s benefits when she was convicted
of first-degree manslaughter in Oregon for the death of C~, the deceased number holder
(NH).
BRIEF ANSWER
No. The claimant’s Oregon State felony conviction of first-degree manslaughter precludes
her entitlement to survivor’s benefits on the NH’s record.
BACKGROUND
The claimant married the NH in 1973. In July 1999, the NH died in Oregon. The State
of Oregon charged the claimant with murdering the NH, and, in 2000, she pleaded guilty
to the lesser-included offense of manslaughter in the first degree. The claimant was
sentenced to 120 months in prison.
DISCUSSION
A. Federal Regulations – Circumstances disqualifying claimants from benefits
20 C.F.R. § 404.305 prohibits an otherwise qualified claimant from being entitled
to survivor’s benefits under certain circumstances. As relevant here, 20 C.F.R. § 404.305
provides that a claimant may not be entitled to a benefit when:
(b) Person’s death caused by intentional act. You may not become entitled to or continue
to receive any survivor’s benefits or payments on the earnings record of any person,
or receive any underpayment due a person, if you were convicted of a felony or an
act in the nature of a felony of intentionally causing that person’s death.
20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b).
B. Oregon State Law – Manslaughter in the First Degree
Under the laws of the State of Oregon, criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter
in the first degree when:
“It is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
the value of human life;”
“It is committed intentionally by a defendant under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance;” or
“A person recklessly causes the death of a child under 14 years of age or a dependent
person as defined in ORS 163.205.”[1]
ORS § 163.118(1); 1997 Oregon Laws Ch. 850 (S.B. 614).
Under Oregon law, “intentionally” means that an individual “acts with a conscious
objective to cause the result or to engage in the conduct so described.” ORS § 161.085(7).
“Recklessly” means that an individual “is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists.”
ORS § 161.085(9). “The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof
constitute a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe in the situation.” Id.
C. Analysis
The applicable agency regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b), has an ambiguous intent
requirement. See Davis V. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 867 F.2d 336, 339 (6th Cir. 1989) (“The language of the regulation taken as a whole
is ambiguous, to say the least, in that it is unclear whether the word ‘intentionally’
in the phrase ‘intentionally causing that person’s death’ refers only to the voluntary
performance of a life threatening act or requires a death-desiring state of mind.”).
The introductory phrase states, “[p]erson’s death caused by intentional act," suggesting
that the act, rather than the death, must be intentional. However, the next sentence
of the regulation stresses the result, suggesting the death must be intentional, when
it states that benefits will be withheld from those “convicted of a felony or an act
in the nature of a felony of intentionally causing that person’s death.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.305(b).
When an agency’s regulation is ambiguous, the agency’s interpretation of the regulation
is entitled to deference. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-63 (1997); see also Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 529, 588 (2000) (explaining that Auer deference is warranted when the language of the regulation is ambiguous). The Program Operations Manual System (POMS) explains the meaning intended by terms appearing within the regulations. In
discussing the policy for forfeiture of entitlement because of homicide, the POMS
defines intent as a “wish or expectancy that an act will have a certain result” or
the “presence of will in the commission of a criminal act where the individual is
fully aware of the nature and probable consequences of the act that he or she plans
to commit . . . [and] applies whether the individual desires that such consequences
occur or is indifferent as to their occurrence.” POMS GN 00304.060. In other words, when it comes to homicide, the intent requirement is satisfied if
the claimant intended the NH’s death or intended to commit an act knowing that it
may result in the NH’s death. For some murder convictions, the POMS presumes intent,
but for voluntary manslaughter, there is no presumption. POMS GN 00304.065. Instead, the agency looks to the facts of the particular case, and the “decision
[regarding intent] depends on the laws of the State in which the charge is preferred.”
POMS GN 00304.065.
Here, we do not know how the claimant killed the NH, so we turn to the laws of the
State of Oregon to determine whether the claimant’s conviction establishes the requisite
intent to preclude her entitlement to benefits.[2] In Oregon, first-degree manslaughter requires the criminal homicide to be (1) committed
intentionally, or (2) committed recklessly. ORS § 163.118(1)(a)-(c); 1997 Oregon Laws
Ch. 850 (S.B. 614); State v. Downing, 276 Or. App. 68, 83 (2016). Thus, by pleading guilty to first-degree manslaughter,
the claimant admitted that she killed the NH either intentionally or recklessly. Oregon
law (ORS § 161.085(7) & (9)) defines the terms “intentionally” and “recklessly” in
a way that is consistent with the agency’s intent requirement at 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b),
as explained in POMS GN 00304.060. Thus, the claimant’s first-degree manslaughter conviction for killing the NH precludes
the claimant’s entitlement to survivor’s benefits on the NH’s record.
Case law further supports the conclusion that both (1) acts that intentionally result
in death and (2) intentional acts that recklessly result in death satisfy the requirements
of 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b). In Davis v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., the Sixth Circuit held that a claimant’s conviction for second-degree manslaughter
in Kentucky, which involves death resulting from reckless or wanton conduct, fell
within 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b)’s definition of an intentional homicide. 867 F.2d at
340, 336; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507.040. By comparison, first-degree manslaughter
in Oregon requires at least recklessness. See ORS § 163.118(1). Thus, per Davis, the claimant’s conviction of first-degree manslaughter in Oregon falls within 20
C.F.R. § 404.305(b)’s definition of an intentional homicide.
In sum, both the POMS and relevant case law indicate that the claimant committed a
felonious and intentional act that resulted in the death of the NH pursuant to 20
C.F.R. § 404.305(b). Accordingly, the claimant is not entitled to survivor’s benefits
on the NH’s record.
CONCLUSION
The claimant’s conviction of the felony of first-degree manslaughter in Oregon precludes
her entitlement to survivor’s benefits on the NH’s record.