This legal opinion concerns whether a claimant is ineligible to receive survivor's benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (Act) on the NH's record based on her criminally negligent homicide resulting in the NH's death.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

The number holder P~ died on November XX, 1995, while domiciled in New York. On June XX, 2025, S~ (the claimant), the widow of the NH, applied for widow's insurance benefits, and the agency subsequently awarded benefits effective September 2025. After the benefits were awarded, the agency became aware that the claimant had been convicted in New York of criminally negligent homicide in connection with the NH's death.

ISSUE

You asked whether the claimant is ineligible to receive survivor's benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (Act) on the NH's record based on her criminally negligent homicide resulting in the NH's death.

SHORT ANSWER

We believe that the claimant's conviction for criminally negligent homicide under Section 125.10 of the New York Penal Code does not constitute a conviction for felonious and intentional homicide of the NH, as required for a finding of non-entitlement to survivor's benefits under 20 C.F.R. 404.305(b). Under New York law, a conviction for criminally negligent homicide does not require that the individual expect death or be aware of the nature of the crime or the probably consequence of death. Accordingly, the agency should continue to pay survivor's benefits to the claimant.

SUMMARY OF ADVICE

A claimant may not become entitled to, or continue to receive, survivor's benefits on the earnings record of any person if the claimant has been convicted of a felony for intentionally causing that person's death. 20 C.F.R. 404.305(b); see also POMS GN 00304.060A.1.

For purposes of 20 C.F.R. 404.305(b), agency policy^[1] defines "intent" as:

A wish or expectancy that an act will have a certain result (regardless of the actual likelihood of such a result). The presence of will in the commission of a criminal act where the individual is fully aware of the nature and probably consequences of the act that he or she plans to commit. This applies whether the individual desires that such consequences occur or is indifferent as to their occurrence. Seldom intent is established by direct proof, but must be inferred from facts.

POMS GN 00304.060B.1 (emphasis added).

Under New York law, a person commits the felony of criminally negligent homicide if, with criminal negligence, they cause the death of another individual. See N.Y. Penal Law 125.10. Criminal negligence is defined as "fail[ing] to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that such rsult described in the statute would occur or that the circumstance described in the statute exists. N.Y. Penal Law 15.05.

Criminally negligent homicide under N.Y. Penal Law 125.00 does not meet the agency's definition of intent. New York cases that have examined criminal negligence observe that the actor is unaware that their actions would cause death or the actor fails to perceive the risk. See People v. Asaro, 998 N.E.2d 810, 813 (N.Y. 2013); People v. Heide, 644 N.E.2d 1370, 1371 (N.Y. 1994); Myers v. State, 667 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1013 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1997). A criminal negligence analysis does not focus on whether the underlying act is intentional. See Heide, 644 N.E.2d at 1371; see also People v. Samuel N., 503 N.Y.S.2d 114, 115 (N.Y.App. Div. 1986) (observing that defendant accused and convicted of criminally negligent homicide was "not charged with intentional criminal conduct."). Under the agency's definition of intent, the person must expect the act will have a certain result or be fully aware of the nature and probable consequences of the act that they plan to commit. See POMS GN 00304.060B.1. Accordingly, the agency should conclude that a conviction for criminally negligent homicide under New York law--which does not require awareness of the result or circumstances--does not satisfy the agency's definition of intent for purposes of 20 C.F.R. 404.305(b).

The following question was presented to the Office of the Regional Chief Counsel:

Can the conviction in New York of S~, (Claimant) for the second-degree manslaughter of her husband E~, the number holder (NH), disqualify her from receiving widows benefits on the account of her deceased husband, and if so, whether SSA is permitted to reopen her initial determination of eligibility.

The Regional Counsel ruled that under New York law, Claimants conviction for the second-degree manslaughter of the NH is a felonious and intentional homicide, and Claimant is therefore ineligible for widows benefits on the NHs account. SSA is permitted to reopen Claimants 2014 eligibility determination at any time.

QUESTION PRESENTED

You have asked whether the conviction in New York of S~, (Claimant) for the second-degree manslaughter of her husband E~, the number holder (NH), disqualifies her from receiving widows benefits on the account of her deceased husband, and if so, whether SSA is permitted to reopen her initial determination of eligibility.

OPINION

Under New York State law, a conviction for second-degree manslaughter constitutes a felony and an intentional homicide within the meaning of SSAs regulations. Accordingly, Claimants conviction for the second-degree manslaughter of the NH makes her ineligible to receive benefits on the NHs account. SSA is permitted to reopen Claimants 2014 initial determination of eligibility at any time.

BACKGROUND ^[2] Claimant married the NH in June 1970 in Syracuse, New York. The NH died in December 1975 in Syracuse, New York. Claimant was convicted of second-degree manslaughter in New York State for the death of the NH in September 1977, and incarcerated from that date until June 1980. Claimant was on placed on parole until June 1983

Claimant filed an application for Social Security widows benefits on the record of the NH on April 24, 2014. Claimants application was approved on June 11, 2014. Subsequently, the Victorville, California Field Office discovered Claimants prior conviction and suspended her widows benefits.

Claimants daughter informed an SSA Claims Representative that Claimant and the NH had been involved in an altercation at the time of the homicide. She stated that her mother did not kill the NH intentionally, but rather as an act of self-defense.

Claimant has not been cooperative with providing further evidence regarding her prior conviction.

ANALYSIS

1. 1. 

   Claimant is Ineligible for Benefits on the NHs Account Because She Was Convicted of the Felonious and Intentional Homicide of the NH

   1. a. 

      SSA Regulations and Policy

      The widow of an individual who died a fully insured wage earner is entitled to widows insurance benefits if she is not married, has attained the age of 60, and has filed an application for widows insurance benefits. Social Security Act (Act) 202(e)(1), 42 US.C. 402(e)(1); 20 C.F.R 404.335; Program Operations Manual System (POMS) RS 00207.001(A)(1)(b); see Act 216(c), 42 U.S.C. 416(c) (defining the term widow). Claimant satisfies these requirements for entitlement to widows insurance benefits on the NHs earnings record.

      SSA regulations and policy provide that a claimant may not become entitled to or continue to receive any survivors benefits or payments on the earnings record of any person if he or she was convicted of a felony or an act in the nature of a felony of intentionally causing that persons death. 20 C.F.R. 404.305(b). An adult convicted of the felonious and intentional homicide of another person cannot be entitled to monthly benefits . . . on the earnings record of that person. PMS GN 00304.060(A)(1). Thus, for purposes of satisfying 20 C.F.R. 404.305(b), Claimant must have been convicted of a felony and an intentional homicide in order to be deemed ineligible to receive widows benefits on the NHs account.

      The classification of a conviction for manslaughter as an intentional homicide under 20 C.F.R. 404.305(b) depends on the laws of the state in which the claimant was convicted. POMS GN 00304.065. When determining whether the manslaughter conviction constitutes an intentional homicide, under the regulations, the Agency must first consider whether the conviction was for involuntary or voluntary manslaughter. Id. In the event that state law does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, the Agency must not presume intent, but rather must develop the facts relative to the slaying to determine if intent was present. Id.

      SSA defines intent to mean:

      A wish or expectancy that an act will have a certain result (regardless of the actual likelihood of such result).

      The presence of will in the commission of a criminal act where the individual is fully aware of the nature and probable consequences of the act that he or she plans to commit. This applies whether the individual desires that such consequences occur or is indifferent as to their occurrence.

      Seldom intent is established by direct proof, but must be inferred from facts.

      POMS GN 00304.060(B)(1). SSA excludes homicides where the killing is the result of self-defense from its definition of intentional homicide. POMS GN 00304.065.

   2. b. 

      New York State Law

      New York State law classifies manslaughter in the second degree as a class C felony. N.Y. Penal Law 125.15 (McKinney 1965). Thus, second degree manslaughter in New York constitutes a felony for purposes of satisfying 20 C.F.R. 404.305(b) and POMS GN 00304.060(A)(1).

      As noted above, whether manslaughter in the second degree is classified as an intentional homicide under the regulations depends on the laws of the state in which the claimant was convicted. POMS GN 00304.065. Under New York State law, [a] person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when he recklessly causes the death of another person. . . . N.Y. Penal Law 125.15. ^[3] A person acts recklessly under New York law when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. N.Y. Penal Law 15.05(3) (McKinney 1965). ^[4] New York courts have held that a person is chargeable with recklessness when he is aware of a designated risk and consciously disregards it. People v. Licitra, 393 N.E.2d 456, 458-59 (N.Y. 1979) (holding that a defendants conviction for manslaughter in the second degree was proper because a jury could have properly concluded that defendant acted recklessly in creating and disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk) (citing People v. Montanez, 359 N.E.2d 371 (N.Y. 1976) (if he was aware of the grave risk of death and acted in disregard of it, he acted recklessly and is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree) (additional citations omitted). [T]o establish manslaughter in the second degree, the prosecution must prove three elements: the creation of a substantial and unjustifiable risk; an awareness and disregard of the risk on the part of defendant; and a resulting death. Licitra, 393 N.E.2d at 459.

   3. c. 

      Analysis

      A homicidal act is intentional if the actor is fully aware of the nature and probable consequences of the act that he or she plans to commit. POMS GN 00304.060(B)(1). Thus, if a person commits an act which he or she wishes or expects will result in the death of another person, he or she would be considered to have committed an intentional homicide, regardless of whether or not the resulting death was actually desired. Id.; See SSR 89-6c (noting that the POMS expand[s] on the traditional meaning of an intentional state of mind . . . [to] include an act which [the actor] knows could result in death of the [wage earner] even though the [insureds] death is not actually desired.) (adopting the holding of Davis v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 867 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1989).

      The definition of second-degree manslaughter in New York State comports with the definition of intent found in the POMS. Furthermore, in Davis, the Sixth Circuit held that a claimants conviction of second-degree manslaughter in Kentucky satisfied the Agencys definition of an intentional homicide for the purposes of applying the regulation. 867 F.2d at 340. In 1982, the Kentucky penal code defined second-degree manslaughter as wanton killing. Kentucky defined wantonly as follows: [a] person acts wantonly . . . when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. Davis, 867 F.2d at 337. With the exception of the use of the word wanton instead of reckless, Kentuckys definition of second-degree manslaughter is virtually identical to New York States definition of second-degree manslaughter. See N.Y. Penal Law 15.05; 125.15.

      For these reasons, second-degree manslaughter in New York qualifies as an intentional homicide within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. 404.305(b). See POMS GN 00304.060(B)(1).; SSR 89-6c (citing Davis.).

      SSA excludes homicides where the killing is the result of self-defense from its definition of intentional homicide. POMS GN 00304.065A. Nevertheless, despite the statement of Claimants daughter that Claimants killing of the NH was an act of self-defense, the evidence does not establish this. Under New York State law, a person who use[s] physical force upon another person when, and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend [himself] from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other person, is justified in his or her actions. N.Y. Penal Law 35.15(1) McKinney 1968). ^[5] In any prosecution for an offense, justification, as defined [by the Statute] is a defense. N.Y. Penal Law 35.00 (McKinney 1965). ^[6] The defense does not operate to excuse a criminal act, nor does it negate a particular element of a crime. Rather, by recognizing the use of force to be privileged under certain circumstances, it renders such conduct entirely lawful. People v. McManus, 496 N.E.2d 202, 205 (N.Y. 1986) (citations omitted). Thus, if a jury determines that the use of force is justified, then the act cannot be considered criminal and the actor cannot be convicted of the crime. Here, Claimant was convicted of second-degree manslaughter, and thus, there is no evidence that her act was determined to be legally justifiable. ^[7] Because Claimants conviction for second-degree manslaughter constitutes a felonious and intentional homicide under 20 C.F.R. 404.305(b), she is ineligible to receive widows benefits on the NHs account.

2. 2. 

   SSA Regulations Permit Reopening Claimants Eligibility Determination

   SSA regulations provide that a determination may be reopened within twelve months of the determination for any reason. 20 C.F.R 404.988(a). Furthermore, a determination may be reopened at any time if that determination is incorrect because . . . [y]ou were convicted of a crime that affected your right to receive benefits or your entitlement to a period of disability. . . ." 20 C.F.R. 404.988(c)(11).

   The initial determination regarding this matter was made on June 11, 2014, and thus, may be reopened at this time for any reason. Furthermore, the initial determination that Claimant was eligible for widows benefits was incorrect, because she was convicted of a crime that rendered her ineligible to collect benefits on her deceased husbands account. We therefore conclude that the determination may be reopened at any time pursuant to 20 C.F.R. 404.988(c)(11).

CONCLUSION

Under New York law, Claimants conviction for the second-degree manslaughter of the NH is a felonious and intentional homicide, and Claimant is therefore ineligible for widows benefits on the NHs account. SSA is permitted to reopen Claimants 2014 eligibility determination at any time.