The claimant, Michelle D. M~ , was born on December 16, 1974, to Cora M~ (D~). No
father's name was listed on Michelle's birth certificate. Ms. D~ has filed a claim
for child's insurance benefits on Michelle's behalf on the account of Michael D. S~,
who died on March 29, 1979. Cora has stated that Michael orally acknowledged Michelle
as his daughter to their friends and relatives. The oral acknowledgement was verified
by the deceased wage earner's mother, sister, and brother. At the time of Michelle's
birth, the wage earner was married to another woman, Mary S~ (M~ ). According to statements
in the claims file, their marriage had not been stable for some period of time before
Michelle was born. After her birth, the wage earner left his wife for good. He moved
in with Cora and Michelle and lived with them as a family for two to four years following
Michelle's birth (although some statements indicate that this living arrangement may
have been temporarily suspended a number of times during that period). Sometime in
1977 Michael moved to California, while Cora and Michelle remained on the east coast.
He died domiciled in California. (One statement from Cora indicates that he may have
returned to live with Michelle and her for a few months in 1979; however, no one disputes
that his domicile at the time of his death was California.) No written acknowledgement
by Michael of Michelle's paternity has been located.
You sought our advice as to whether Michelle might be entitled to benefits on the
decease wage earner's account on either of two theories: (1) on the basis of a parent
and child relationship under California law, even though Michelle was never in California;
or (2) under Massachusetts' legitimation statute, although the wage earner died a
California domiciliary. You correctly pointed out that under section 216(h) (2) (A)
of the Social Security Act, California law would be applicable to this claim, because
the wage earner died a California domiciliary. The issue, therefore, is whether California
probate courts would apply California substantive law or would look to the substantive
law of another jurisdiction in determining whether Michelle was the deceased wage
earner's "child."
Your first question is whether, as a matter of law, actions which the wage earner
undertook exclusively in another state will suffice to establish a parent and child
relationship for purposes of intestate succession in California. California courts
have consistently held that acts performed by a father outside of California, which
acts would not have the effect of conferring the status of legitimacy upon the child
under the laws of the jurisdiction where the acts occurred, will nonetheless confer
upon the child a de facto status of legitimacy if the acts meet the California law
test for such status, and will thereafter ripen into the legal status of legitimacy
upon the father's establishment of a California domicile. See, e.g., In re Lund's Estate, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 159 P.2d 643 (1945); Blythe v. Ayres, 96 Cal. 532, 31 P. 915 (1892); Estate of Bassi, 234 Cal. App. 2d 529, 44 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1965); Wolf v. Gall, 32 Cal. App. 286, 163 P. 346 (1916); see also Kaliski v. District Director of Immigration and Nationality Service, 620 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1980); GC Opinions re Clem J~ , C-6637, December 1, 1948,
and Ramon P~, August 4, 1965. The courts distinguish between the immediate legal significance
of the acts, which is dependent upon the laws of the jurisdiction where they occurred,
and their factual significance, which remains forever and may later become controlling
for purposes of California law. In California's view, the factual significance of
the acts continues unabated wherever the man may go; if he subsequently becomes domiciled
and dies in California, that factual basis may blossom into the child's acquisition
of a certain legal status for purposes of sharing in his estate as his "issue." (In
adopting this perspective for purposes of California law, the courts have acknowledged
that California is not espousing the "general rule," as embodied within the Restatement
of Conflicts of Laws. See, e.g., In re Lund's Estate, cited above, at 649. That "general rule" apparently is reflected in POMS.)
Although all of these cases were decided under former Civil Code section 230 (governing
legitimation of children), there is no reason to believe that adoption of the Uniform
Parentage Act in California would cause the courts to alter their rule of law. The
premise of the courts' holding is in no way dependent upon the particular elements
of the state's standard for legitimating a child or establishing a parent and child
relationship. The courts were resolving a conflicts of law question: whether the legal
effect of the facts would be adjudged under California law or under the law of the
jurisdiction where the acts occurred. Once that conflicts question is resolved, the
courts would simply apply the appropriate local law.
Because the wage earner died in 1979, and considering that at least some of his actions
vis-a-vis Michelle occurred during (and perhaps after) 1976, California courts would
apply the Uniform Parentage Act (Civil Code section 7000 et seq.) in determining whether
Michelle would have intestate succession rights to the deceased wage earner's estate.
20 C.F.R. § 404.354(b); Cal. Probate Code § 255(a), (d); GC Opinion re Joseph M. C~,
September 6, 1983. Because the wage earner and Cora neither married nor attempted
to marry, the only rebuttable presumption of paternity potentially applicable to this
case is found in section 7004(a) (4) of California's Uniform Parentage Act. That presumption
requires that the man have received the child into his home and openly held her out
as his natural child. You have already determined that, factually, the wage earner
met this standard with respect to Michelle, a conclusion which we believe is amply
supported by the evidence you have gathered. Therefore, Michelle would be entitled
to child's insurance benefits on the deceased wage earner's account. [1]