QUESTION
You asked whether the claimant, the widow of the number holder, may collect widow's
benefits, when a state court in a civil proceeding adjudicated her guilty of conspiracy
to kill the number holder.
OPINION
No. The relevant regulation requires a "conviction" of a felony or an act in the nature
of a felony of intentionally causing the wage earner's death. Claimant was not convicted
in a criminal proceeding, but rather found guilty in a civil action; that is, she
lost the action based on a civil statute governing inheritance rights and was not
convicted of felonious killing. However, the published explanatory language for the
regulation makes clear the policy of the Social Security Administration (SSA) is that
a survivor who intentionally causes the death of the wage earner may not collect payments
on that wage earner's record. Therefore, we believe the civil finding should have
the force of a conviction. Furthermore, the state court explicitly stated the claimant's
actions were a criminal as well as civil violation.
BACKGROUND
Edie P~ (Claimant) filed for widow's benefits on the wage record of her husband, Randal
P~, the number holder (NH). Claimant's son, Matthew B~, was convicted of NH's murder.
Other family members filed a civil action against Claimant to have her barred from
inheriting from NH's estate. A jury found that Claimant had conspired with her son
to feloniously and intentionally kill NH. Based on the finding of conspiracy, the
trial court ruled South Carolina inheritance law prevented her from inheriting from
NH. Claimant appealed, arguing the trial court had erroneously applied the criminal
rather than civil elements of conspiracy in the jury instructions. The South Carolina
Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict, stating that, although Claimant was sued upon
a civil statute governing inheritance rights, her actions were criminal in nature.
DISCUSSION
Generally, the widow of a fully insured wage earner may collect survivor's benefits
on his wage record. See Social Security Act (Act) § 202(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1). However, SSA regulations
limit this right as follows:
You may not become entitled to or continue to receive any survivor's benefits or payments
on the earnings record of any person, or receive any underpayment due a person, if
you were convicted of a felony or an act in the nature of a felony of intentionally
causing that person's death.
20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b) (2008). On its face, the regulation appears to require a "conviction,"
presumably in a criminal proceeding. However, giving "conviction" a literal meaning
brings the regulation into conflict with SSA policy:
This policy prohibits benefit payments to any survivor who is found to have intentionally
caused the death of the worker on whose earnings record the benefit payments are based.
It . . . is consistent with the well-established principle that an individual should
not profit directly from intentionally causing another person's death.
47 Fed. Reg. 42,097, 42,097 (Sept. 24, 1982); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 19,135, 19,135 (May 21, 1987) (expanding § 404.305(b) to prohibit an
individual from receiving any underpayment due a person whom the individual killed
so the regulation was "consistent with the well-established principle that an individual
should not profit directly from intentionally causing another person's death.").
There is no mention in these policies of an absolute need for a conviction in a criminal
proceeding, and requiring a criminal conviction would result in payments in some cases,
such as the present case, to an individual who is found to have intentionally caused
the death of the worker on whose earnings record the benefit payments are based. Thus,
giving a civil finding of criminal homicide the force of a conviction is consistent
with SSA policy; not giving such a civil finding the force of a conviction would directly
contradict SSA policy.
The Agency previously dealt with a similar problem in juvenile cases, and revised
the regulation by adding the following:
If you were subject to the juvenile justice system, you may not become entitled to
or continue to receive survivor's benefits or payments on the earnings record of any
person, or receive any underpayment due a person, if you were found by a court of
competent jurisdiction to have intentionally caused that person's death by committing
an act which, if committed by an adult, would have been considered a felony or an
act in the nature of a felony.
20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b) (2008). When SSA made this change, the Agency explained that
SSA's policy was to prevent the lack of a conviction from barring implementation of
the general policy:
These regulations reflect a change in SSA policy that a child who is found to have
intentionally caused the death of a parent or spouse may not collect Social Security
benefits based on that person's earnings. Prior policy denied survivor's payments
only to persons finally convicted of a felony for intentionally causing a worker's
death. In most jurisdictions, no conviction of a felony is possible for individuals
who are under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court system. On that basis, the Social
Security Administration has paid benefits to children in this category who otherwise
qualified for benefit payments.
47 Fed. Reg. at 42,097-98. Furthermore, although the regulation retains "conviction"
in the adult provision, SSA announced its intention to equalize, not distinguish,
the standards for adults and juveniles: "It [the new policy] provides for uniform
treatment of juveniles and adults in these homicide cases . . . ." Id. at 42,097.
Interpreting the regulation to require a conviction in a criminal proceeding would
thus be contrary to SSA's stated policy in two ways. First, as noted above, requiring
a conviction would, in cases such as the present one, allow payment to an individual
who is found to have intentionally caused the death of the worker on whose earnings
record the benefit payments are based. Second, such an interpretation would contradict
"uniform treatment of juveniles and adults in these homicide cases," by providing
that an adult would need a "conviction," but a juvenile would not. Therefore, we believe
that a finding in a civil proceeding that a claimant intentionally caused the death
of the number holder should have the force of a conviction for purposes of SSA's regulation.
Conspiracy to cause a person's death falls within the regulatory prohibition on receipt
of benefits. First, the regulation itself includes "an act in the nature of a felony
of intentionally causing that person's death." 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b). Second, South
Carolina law treats conspiracy to commit homicide as equivalent to homicide for purposes
of determining entitlements resulting from a spouse's death. See Pinion ex. rel. Montague v. Pinion, 611 S.E.2d 271, 272 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-803 (1987);
Wilson v. Wilson, 319 S.C. 370, 372-73, 461 S.E.2d 816, 817 (S.C. 1995)).
The regulation does not direct that conviction should be defined according to state
law. However, our P~ is consistent with South Carolina law. In P~, the Court explicitly found that Claimant's actions were a criminal violation, and
not just a civil wrong: "Section 62-2-803, although not itself a criminal statute,
applies only to situations where the deceased was intentionally and feloniously killed,
which is a crime. Thus, it follows any conspiracy triggering this statute would also
be criminal, rather than civil." The issue was relevant to Claimant's case, because
civil conspiracy requires an overt act, whereas criminal conspiracy does not, with
the agreement itself constituting the crime. See P~, at 272 (citing Future Group, II v. Nationsbank, 478 S.E.2d 45, 50-51 (1996)). The court then analyzed Claimant's actions under the
criminal standard, even though the proceeding itself was a civil suit. Thus, the court
gave Claimant's actions the force of a criminal, rather than civil, violation of law.
Given such rules and policies, we believe that because the court found Claimant intentionally
caused, or conspired to cause, NH's death, the court's findings should be given the
force of a "conviction" for purposes of applying 20 C.F.R. 404.305(b).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we believe Claimant is not entitled to benefits on NH's wage record.
Mary A. S~
Regional Chief
Counsel
By: ______________________
Rollin M~
Assistant Regional Counsel