QUESTION PRESENTED
D~ (Claimant) filed an application for widow’s insurance benefits on the record of
the deceased number holder (NH) C~. The Claimant alleges a common-law marriage to
the NH beginning in April 2009 and ending with the NH’s death on December XX, 2021,
in the District of Columbia. The couple separated in February 2019. You asked whether
a valid common-law marriage existed between the NH and the Claimant under District
of Columbia law such that the Claimant is the NH’s widow under Title II of the Social
Security Act (Act).
ANSWER
We believe District of Columbia courts would find that the Claimant has proven by
a preponderance of the evidence that she was in a valid common-law marriage with the
NH under District of Columbia law from April 2009 until the NH’s death on December
XX, 2021. Once a valid common-law marriage exists, it may be terminated only by death
or divorce. Thus, the couple’s separation in 2019 did not terminate their valid common-law
marriage. Accordingly, we believe there is support for the agency to find that the
Claimant is the NH’s widow for purposes of determining her entitlement to widow’s
insurance benefits on the NH’s record.
BACKGROUND
The NH died on December XX, 2021, domiciled in the District of Columbia.[1] On October XX, 2022, the Claimant filed an application for widow’s insurance benefits
as the NH’s widow. You stated that she alleged a common-law marriage with the NH from
April 2009 until the NH’s death on December XX, 2021. They lived together in the District
of Columbia until they separated in February 2019, at which time the Claimant moved
to Pennsylvania and the NH stayed in the District of Columbia.
In support of her common-law marriage claim, the Claimant completed the Form SSA-754
Statement of Marital Relationship in November 2022 and provided a few documents. She
was living in Pennsylvania. She reported that she and the NH began living together
as spouses in April 2009 in the District of Columbia. She stated that they lived together
continuously in the District of Columbia as spouses for almost ten years from April
2009 until February 2019 when they separated. When they began living together, they
told each other that they loved one another, they understood they would be together
forever, and the NH always introduced her as his wife. She reported that they did
a lot of things that married people did such as filing joint tax returns for the years
2014 through 2018. The Claimant provided IRS documents confirming that for the 2016
and 2017 tax periods, the NH and the Claimant filed tax returns jointly as a married
couple. Documents from their landlord in 2009 indicate that the Claimant and the NH
had been living together at a property in the District of Columbia for fifteen years.
The Claimant had a prior spouse who died in August 2004.
The Claimant identified three of her relatives and one of the NH’s relatives who knew
of their relationship but stated that his sister may not want to answer questions
because they were not speaking to her. She also reported that their separation in
2019 was due to his family. Two of the Claimant’s relatives provided marital statements
to the agency supporting the Claimant’s common-law marriage with the NH. None of the
NH’s relatives provided statements.[2]
G~, the Claimant’s sister, completed the Form SSA-753 Statement Regarding Marriage.
She described herself as the NH’s sister-in-law and stated she had known him for 28-29
years. She would visit the couple often. The NH attended all family events. To her
knowledge, the NH and the Claimant were generally known as a married couple and she
considered them to be a married couple. She reported that the Claimant cooked, cleaned,
washed clothes, and shopped for the entire household and took care of the NH, who
had cerebral palsy. She reported that she heard the NH and the Claimant refer to each
other as spouses and that this was always how they described their relationship. She
believed that they maintained a home and lived together continuously as a married
couple in the District of Columbia from 2009 to 2020 when they separated. She stated
that even after they separated, the Claimant continued to do things for the NH.
E~, another one of the Claimant’s sisters, completed the Form SSA-753 Statement Regarding
Marriage. She described herself as the NH’s sister-in-law and reported knowing the
NH for 24 years. To her knowledge, the NH and the Claimant were generally known as
a married couple and she considered them to be a married couple because of how long
they were together, the fact that the NH called her his sister-in-law, and the fact
that they lived together at her house and her mother’s house. She heard the NH and
the Claimant refer to one another as spouses whenever they were together and stated
that he always called her his sister-in-law. She believed that the Claimant and the
NH maintained a home and lived together continuously as a married couple in the District
of Columbia from 2009 until 2019.
ANALYSIS
A. Federal Law: Entitlement to Widow(er)’s Insurance Benefits as a Widow(er)[3]
Under Title II of the Act, a claimant may be entitled to widow(er)’s insurance benefits
on a deceased insured individual’s record if, among other requirements, the claimant
is the widow(er) of the insured individual and their marriage relationship lasted
at least nine months before the insured individual died.[4] See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e), (f), 416(a)(2), (c), (g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.335.
The agency will find a claimant to be an insured individual’s widow(er) if the courts
of the State in which the insured individual was domiciled at the time of death would
find that the claimant and the insured individual were validly married at the time
the insured individual died, or if, under application of that State’s intestate succession
laws, the claimant would be able to inherit a spouse’s share of the insured individual’s
personal property. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.344, 404.345. It
is our understanding that the NH was domiciled in the District of Columbia when the
NH died on December XX, 2021. Therefore, we look to the District of Columbia law to
determine if the Claimant is the NH’s widow.
B. State Law: Validly Married under District of Columbia Law at the Time of the NH’s
Death
1. District of Columbia Law and the Claimant’s Common-Law Marriage to the
NH
a. Elements of a Common-Law Marriage
“The District of Columbia has long recognized common-law marriages.” Coates v. Watts,
622 A.2d 25, 27 (D.C. 1993). Under District of Columbia law, the elements of a common-law
marriage are:
1. an express mutual agreement, which must be in words of the present tense, to be
permanent partners with the same degree of commitment as the spouses in a ceremonial
marriage,
2. followed by cohabitation. In re Estate of Jenkins, 290 A.3d 524, 528 (D.C. 2023);
Gill v. Nostrand, 206 A.3d 869, 875 (D.C. 2019).
The agreement to be married “must be consummated by cohabitation if it is to result
in a marriage.” U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Britton, 269 F.2d 249, 251 (D.C. Cir.
1959). However, “living together, by itself, is not a common-law marriage.” Cerovic
v. Stojkov, 134 A.3d 766, 776 (D.C. 2016). While there is no set formula required
for the agreement, the exchange of words must unambiguously indicate that an agreement
was being entered into to become spouses as of the time of the mutual consent. Coates
v. Watts, 622 A.2d 25, 27 (D.C. 1993). The agreement must be in the present-tense;
an agreement to be married in the future is insufficient.[5] Gill, 206 A.3d at 875; Coates, 622 A.2d at 27. Further, the agreement must be mutual,
which means that if only one party to the purported common-law marriage believes they
are married, but the other party does not, a common-law marriage cannot be established.
Gill, 206 A.3d at 881.
b. Burden of Proof: Preponderance of the Evidence
The burden is on the proponent to prove the essential elements of a common-law marriage
by a preponderance of the evidence.[6] Cerovic, 134 A.3d at 774-775; Coates, 622 A.2d at 27. The preponderance of the evidence
standard means that the court must determine who has the most competent evidence.
In re E.D.R., 772 A.2d 1156, 1160 (D.C. 2001). It means “evidence which is of greater
weight and more convincing than the evidence presented in opposition to it; that is
evidence which is as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable
than not.” Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary). “Whether a common-law marriage exists
is largely a factual determination.” Mesa v. U.S., 875 A.2d 79, 83 (D.C. 2005). In
terms of the type of evidence offered to meet this burden, the parties may provide
direct evidence of their common-law marriage in the form of the parties’ testimony
and documents, such as property deeds and tax records. Mesa, 875 A.2d at 83. Testimony
by the parties is the best evidence of the present-tense express mutual agreement
to be married.[7] Gill, 206 A.3d at 875. However, the mutual agreement “may be inferred from the character
and duration of cohabitation, or from other circumstantial evidence such as testimony
by relatives and acquaintances as to the general reputation regarding the parties’
relationship.” Gill, 206 A.3d at 875; Mesa, 875 A.2d at 83. Such an inference may
then be rebutted by direct evidence that there was in fact no present agreement to
be married. Mesa, 875 A.2d at 83.
2. Application of the Elements of the Common-Law Marriage to the Claim
a. Mutual Agreement to be Married
As stated, District of Columbia case law requires an express mutual agreement to be
permanent partners with the same degree of commitment as the spouses in a ceremonial
marriage. In re Estate of Jenkins, 290 A.3d at 528; Gill, 206 A.3d at 875. Here, there
is no information indicating that the parties had an agreement to marry in the future
or that the agreement to be married was not mutual. We believe District of Columbia
courts would find direct evidence of a present-tense mutual agreement to be married
in the form of the Claimant’s statements and the IRS documents showing that they presented
themselves as married on their tax returns. The Claimant reported on the SSA Form-754
that she and the NH began living together as spouses in April 2009 in the District
of Columbia and they lived together continuously for almost ten years from April 2009
until February 2019 when they separated. When they began living together, they told
each other that they loved one another, they understood they would be together forever,
and the NH always introduced her as his wife. The Claimant reported that they did
a lot of things that married people did such as filing joint tax returns for the years
2014 through 2018. The Claimant provided IRS documents confirming that for the 2016
and 2017 tax periods, the NH and the Claimant filed tax returns jointly as married.
Documents from their landlord in 2009 indicate that the Claimant and the NH had been
living together at a property in the District of Columbia for fifteen years even prior
to 2009.
Additionally, their ten years (plus) of cohabitation and reputation as being married,
as attested to by the Claimant’s sisters, supports a mutual agreement to be married.
Both sisters reported that the NH and the Claimant were generally known as a married
couple, they believed them to be a married couple, and they heard them refer to one
another as spouses. They also reported that the NH and the Claimant lived together
continuously as a married couple from 2009 until 2019. Sister G~ reported that the
Claimant cared for the NH, who had cerebral palsy, and that she did all of the chores
for the household.
Given these statements and documents, we believe District of Columbia courts would
find a preponderance of the evidence supports this required element of a mutual agreement
to be married for a common-law marriage.
b. Cohabitation
As noted, District of Columbia case law requires that the couple live together following
their mutual agreement to be married. In re Estate of Jenkins, 290 A.3d at 528; Gill,
206 A.3d at 875. Here, the Claimant’s statements, the sisters’ statements, and the
landlord’s records corroborate their years of cohabitation in the District of Columbia
from at least April 2009 to February 2019. We believe District of Columbia courts
would find a preponderance of the evidence supports this required element of cohabitation
for a common-law marriage.
c. Summary: Valid Common-Law Marriage Terminated by the NH’s Death
In summary, this is not a claim involving conflicting evidence or deficient evidence
as to a particular required element. We believe District of Columbia courts would
find that uncontroverted statements from the Claimant and her two sisters, the longevity
of their relationship, the IRS documents showing they presented their marital status
as married filing jointly, and the landlord documents confirming cohabitation in 2009
constitutes competent evidence establishing that it was more probable than not that
the NH and the Claimant were common-law married under the District of Columbia law.
Finally, we note that the Claimant and the NH separated in 2019 and lived apart until
the NH’s death in 2021. Once established, “a common law marriage may be legally terminated
only by divorce or death of a spouse.” Cerovic, 134 A.3d at 781 (citing Hoage v. Murch
Bros. Constr. Co., 50 F.2d 983, 984 (D.C. 1931)); see also Lee v. Lee, 201 A.2d 873,
875 (D.C. 1964) (declaring an attempted ceremonial marriage void because an earlier
common-law marriage had not been dissolved). Thus, similar to other States that recognize
common-law marriage, there is no common-law divorce under the laws of the District
of Columbia. See Phillips v. The Dow Chemical Co., 186 S.W.3d 121, 127 (Tex. App.
– Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (“Texas recognizes common-law marriage but does
not recognize common-law divorce or annulment.”); see also Estate of Claveria v. Claveria,
615 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tex. 1981) (common-law marriage, like a ceremonial marriage,
can terminate only by death or divorce). Therefore, although they separated in 2019,
in the absence of any evidence of a divorce, the Claimant’s common-law marriage with
the NH did not terminate until the NH’s death in 2021.
CONCLUSION
We believe District of Columbia courts would find that the Claimant has proven by
a preponderance of the evidence that she was in a valid common-law marriage with the
NH under the District of Columbia law from April 2009 until the NH’s death on December
XX, 2021. Once a valid common-law marriage exists, it may be terminated only by death
or divorce. Thus, the couple’s separation in 2019 did not terminate their valid common-law
marriage. Accordingly, we believe there is support for the agency to find that the
Claimant is the NH’s widow for purposes of determining her entitlement to widow’s
insurance benefits on the NH’s record.