Under Title II of the Act, a claimant may be entitled to widow(er)’s insurance benefits on a deceased insured individual’s account if, among other things, the claimant is the widow(er) of the insured individual and their marriage lasted nine months before the insured individual died.[^[2] ]

The agency will find that a claimant is an insured individual’s widow(er) if the courts of the State in which the insured individual resided at the time of death “would find that such applicant and such insured individual were validly married” at the time such insured individual died, or if, under application of that State’s intestate succession laws, the applicant would be able to inherit a spouse’s share of the insured’s personal property. See Act § 216(h)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.344, 404.345. Here, the evidence shows that NH resided in Louisiana at the time of his death. We therefore look to Louisiana law to determine whether Claimant is NH’s widow.

B. State Law: Valid Marriage under Louisiana Law at the Time of NH’s Death^[3]

1. Presumption of the Validity of I~ 2003 Marriage to NH

As noted above, Louisiana law is controlling in the present matter as we consider whether Claimant or I~ is NH’s legal widow. Under Louisiana law, a marriage is presumed valid. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3520; see also La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 87 (the requirements for a valid marriage contract are: the absence of a legal impediment, a marriage ceremony, and the free consent of both parties to be married as expressed at the ceremony). A marriage contracted in violation of an impediment, however, is an absolutely null union and “devoid of legal effect from the moment of its inception.” See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 94, comment (b). An existing marriage qualifies as such an impediment. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 88. In a situation involving successive or conflicting marriages where the validity of the subsequent marriage is attacked on the basis that a previous marriage still existed at the time the subsequent marriage occurred, the presumption of validity attaches to the last marriage. See Lands v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 120 So. 2d 74, 76-77 (La. 1960). However, the presumption that the last marriage is valid may be rebutted. See Ellis v. Hayes, 168 So. 2d 885, 886 (La. Ct. App. 1964). The burden of rebutting the presumption rests with the party asserting the invalidity of the last marriage. See In re Succession of Jones, 6 So. 3d 331, 336 (La. Ct. App. 2009); Zanders v. Zanders, 434 So. 2d 1213, 1215 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Lands, 120 So. 2d at 76-77.

It is our understanding that the agency determined that I~ presented sufficient evidence establishing that she was validly married to NH in a ceremonial marriage in Louisiana on July xx, 2003. The agency granted her application for spouse’s benefits as NH’s spouse effective June 2013, converted her benefits to widow’s benefits effective December 2018 with NH’s death, and determined that she is currently entitled to widow’s benefits on NH’s record. Louisiana law presumes that I~ is NH’s legal widow because her 2003 ceremonial marriage to NH in Louisiana was his last marriage. See Lands, 120 So. 2d at 76-77; see also U.S. v. Marlow, 235 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1956) (a ceremonial marriage shown by a proper marriage certificate is presumed to have been legal and valid, and anyone asserting the invalidity of such marriage has the burden of proof).

Therefore, Claimant, who is asserting that she is NH’s legal widow based on her 1990 marriage and the purported August 2019 annulment of their 1996 divorce, has the burden of proving that she was married to NH at the time he married I~ in July 2003 and that her marriage to NH had not ended before he married I~. See Patterson v. Gaines, 47 U.S. 550, 597 (1848) (“The burden of proof in such cases is not upon the party asserting the validity of the second marriage, but on the other, who asserts its invalidity on account of the validity of the first.”); Succession of Primus, 131 So. 2d 319, 322 (La. Ct. App. 1961) (burden of proof rests on party attacking the second marriage to prove that first marriage still in existence). To try to rebut the validity of I~’s 2003 valid marriage to NH and I~’s status as NH’s legal widow, Claimant has presented the 2019 Judgment of Annulment that she obtained 23 years after her divorce from NH. In analyzing this evidence, we next consider Louisiana law on nullifying divorce judgments.

2. Annulment of Divorce Judgments under Louisiana Law

“The only remedy available to a party seeking to set aside a final judgment is an action in nullity.” M.P.W. v. L.P.W., 136 So. 3d 37, 44 (La. Ct. App. 2013); see La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 2001. Under Louisiana law, a final judgment may be nullified for “vices of either form or substances.” La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 2001. However, as the Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized, there is “a presumption as to the regularity of judicial proceedings.” Wilson v. Calvin, 59 So. 2d 451, 453 (La. 1952). Furthermore, as to divorce judgments specifically, the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated: “There is a strong public policy against disturbing or declaring invalid a judgment of divorce, especially after a long period of time where the marital status of innocent parties who relied on the validity of that judgment would be disturbed, and more particularly where a decree would render innocent parties guilty of bigamy and cast a cloud on the legitimacy of their children.” Wilson, 59 So. 2d at 453. Further, the Court has recognize that “where the status of another would be seriously impaired if the judgment of divorce was to be set aside . . . in dealing with the equities, we are bound to give consideration to the second marriage which was contracted in good faith of the judgment under attack and also scrutinize the motives which prompted plaintiff to seek the annulment of the judgment after her former husband’s death.” Id. (quoting Walsh v. Walsh, 42 So. 2d 860, 865 (La. 1949)). “[E]very presumption will be indulged in favor of a judgment that is collaterally attacked.” Id. at 455. Thus, “[i]n order to prevail, plaintiff must therefore establish with certainty the invalidity of the judgment which he attacks.” Id. at 453. We next consider what constitutes a vice of form and vice of substance that would be sufficient to overcome such strong presumptions and strong policies in favor of the validity of the final divorce judgment and I last marriage to NH.

a. Vice of Form

A final judgment can be nullified for “vice of form” if the final judgment was: (1) rendered against an incompetent person not represented as required by law; (2) against a defendant who has not been served with process as required by law and who has not waived objection to jurisdiction or against who, a valid final default judgment has not been taken; or (3) by a court which does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 2002. Here, as to elements one and three, there is no claim that we are aware of that Claimant is such an “incompetent person” under Louisiana law. In addition, we are unaware of any issues with regard to subject matter jurisdiction of the 14th Judicial District Court over the 1996 divorce action. A Louisiana district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a divorce action, if, at the time of filing, one or both of the spouses are domiciled in this state. See La. Const. Ann. art. 5, § 16; La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 10(A)(7). It is our understanding that at least NH was domiciled in Louisiana in 1996. Thus, it would appear that the only possible grounds available to Claimant for nullifying the Judgment of Divorce as a vice of form would be evidence related to element two that she was not served with process in the divorce action. However, as the Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized with regard to a collateral attack on a court’s final judgment, “it will be presumed, unless contrary to what is shown by the record, that legal and proper process was issued in the action and that it was duly and regularly served upon the defendant.” Logwood v. Logwood, 168 So. 310, 311 (La. 1936). Based on the broad language in the Judgment of Annulment alone, we are unable to determine if the Judgment of Annulment was properly entered based upon evidence of a vice of form or, if it was, which vice of form Claimant proved.

We recognize that although there is no evidence that Claimant ever challenged the validity of the Judgment of Divorce prior to NH’s death, an action to annul a judgment based on “vice of form” can be brought at any time. La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 2002(B). Thus, even though Claimant waited 23 years after their divorce to seek the annulment and until after NH’s death, there is no time limitation for such an action. However, of concern here, voluntary acquiescence in the judgment precludes an action to annul a judgment based on vice of form. La. Code. Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 2003. Although Louisiana law provides that “[a]mere failure to act immediately after receiving notice of an invalid judgment does not amount to acquiescence,” the information available to the agency indicates that Claimant did more than just fail to act. See Peschier v. Peschier, 419 So. 2d 923, 928 (La. 1982). In 2015, Claimant alleged to the agency that she was NH’s divorced spouse for purposes of trying to obtain federal benefits, and she provided her Judgment of Divorce to the agency in support of her application for benefits as a divorced spouse of NH. Accordingly, in light of her assertions to the agency in 2015 that she was NH’s divorced spouse and her reliance on the Judgment of Divorce to support her application for auxiliary spouse benefits as NH’s divorced spouse, we believe that there is a strong likelihood that a Louisiana court might find that Claimant voluntarily acquiesced to the Judgment of Divorce, which would preclude an annulment action based on a vice of form.

In summary, given of the broad language of the 2019 Judgment of Annulment, which does not specify if the annulment was based on a vice of form or which of the three vices of form were present, we are unable to determine whether such Judgment is consistent with Louisiana law, and information available to the agency regarding Claimant’s actions in 2015 raises a strong possibility that it is not.

 

A final judgment can be nullified based on “vice of substance” if the final judgment was obtained by fraud or ill practice. La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 2004. The Louisiana Civil Code defines “fraud” as “a misrepresentation or a suppression of the truth made with the intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or to cause a loss or inconvenience to the other” and further states, “[f]raud may also result from silence or inaction.” La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1953. “The criteria for determining whether there has been an ill practice are when the circumstances under which the judgment was rendered show the deprivation of legal rights of the litigant who seeks relief, and when the enforcement of the judgment would be unconscionable and inequitable.” Pyle v. Pyle, 769 So. 2d 626, 628 (La. Ct. App. 2000); seeLeidig v. Leidig, 187 So. 2d 201, 202-04 (La. Ct. App. 1966) (party successfully annulled divorce decree on “ill practice” when former wife proved that she was denied service of process because former spouse provided false information about the wife’s location); see also Elmore v. Johnson,46 So. 310, 311-312 (La. 1908) (affirming the trial court’s annulment of divorce based on when the former wife was denied service of process and did not appear at the divorce proceeding because former husband reported to the Court that he did not know his former’s wife whereabouts although the evidence showed he sent his former wife letters at her address). Based on the broad language in the Judgment of Annulment alone, we are unable to determine if the Judgment of Annulment was properly entered based upon evidence of a vice of substance by proving fraud or ill practice.

Furthermore, unlike an annulment for vice of form, a nullity action based on vice of substance must be brought within one year of the discovery of the fraud or ill practice. La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 2004; see Smith v. Smith, 104 So. 3d 512, 516 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (the one-year preemption for the nullity action applied as the ex-wife’s actions revealed her knowledge of the divorce proceeding in 2006 and yet, she did not institute an action for nullity until two years later). Moreover, a party cannot later maintain an action to annul a judgment based on fraud or ill practice that the party should have raised in the original suit. See Lyons v. Fontenot, 344 So. 2d 1068, 1071-72 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (noting that Plaintiff did raise a cause of action for nullifying divorce based on fraud when the plaintiff claimed that she and her spouse did not reside separately for the prescribed amount of time prior to filing the petition for divorce because the plaintiff was aware of their cohabitating status at the time of the original suit but did not raise it); Burnett v. Burnett, 349 So. 2d 490, 491 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (dismissing suit to annul divorce based on fraud when plaintiff argued that the reasons for divorce originally plead in the divorce suit were false because the plaintiff never raised the defense during the original suit). As we noted above, Claimant provided the agency with the Judgment of Divorce with her application for divorced spouse’s benefits on NH’s record in 2015 and thus, had knowledge at least since that time of the divorce. Thus, in light of her knowledge of the divorce in 2015, and her failure to raise concerns about the validity of the divorce at that time, there is a strong likelihood that a Louisiana court might find that an action for annulment based on vice of substance is barred as untimely. See Patton v. Patton’s Heirs, 86 So. 2d 57, 58 (La. 1956) (plaintiff’s action brought in 1948 to annul the divorce judgment based on a vice of substance due to fraud was barred by the one-year prescriptive period since she knew of the divorce at least as of 1931 and knew that the ex-husband had remarried).

However, in summary, in light of the broad language of the Judgment of Annulment, which does not specify if the annulment was based on a vice of form or substance, we have concerns about the validity of the Judgment of Annulment and are unable to determine whether the Judgment is consistent with Louisiana law.

 

As explained above, because of the “presumption as to the regularity of the judicial proceedings” and the “strong public policy against disturbing or declaring invalid a judgment of divorce, especially, like here, after a long period of time where the marital status of innocent parties who relied on the validity of that judgment would be disturbed, and more particularly, where a decree would render innocent parties guilty of bigamy,” for a party to annul a divorce judgment, the party must prove the grounds for the annulment by “clear and convincing evidence.” Peschier v. Peschier, 419 So. 2d 923, 926 (La. 1982).

Here, Claimant obtained the Judgment of Annulment after NH’s death. Louisiana courts recognize that it is possible to nullify a final judgment, including a divorce decree, after the death of a party to the original suit. In the case where an individual is attacking the validity of a divorce judgment post-death, the party must prove the circumstances voiding the judgment by “exceptionally strong and convincing proof”—through either vice of form or vice of substance. See Patton v. Patton’s Heirs, 86 So. 2d at 58 (rejecting former wife’s petition to nullify divorce decree brought 20 years after the divorce judgment and 12 years after the husband’s death because she did not prove the circumstances justifying the annulment for vice of form - lack of valid citation and service of process - by “exceptionally strong and convincing proof” or bring the action within the one-year prescriptive period required for annulment based on vice of substance); see also Peschier, 419 So. 2d at 926-927 (affirming former wife’s nullification of her 1960 divorce judgment from her former husband six months after his death in December 1976 for vice of form based on “overwhelming proof” showing that former husband had deliberately misled the Court about the former wife’s location such that former wife was deprived of service of process in the original divorce suit).

As noted above, the Judgment of Annulment neither specifies whether the annulment was based on a vice of form or vice of substance nor identifies any evidence presented or considered by the court in reaching the Judgment. Thus, we are unable to determine whether Claimant provided such “exceptionally strong and convincing proof” to support her nullity action as required under Louisiana law given the fact that 23 years had passed since the divorce, NH married Inette in 2003, and Claimant asserted to the agency in 2015 that she was in fact NH’s divorced spouse.

 

Lastly, in order a party to successfully maintain an action to nullify a final judgment, all indispensable parties must be joined in the action. See La. Code of Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 641. “An indispensable party is one whose interests in the subject matter are so interrelated, and would be so directly affected by the judgment, that a complete and equitable adjudication of the controversy cannot be made unless they are joined in the action.” Candler v. Candler, 556 So. 2d 261, 263 (La. Ct. App. 1990). Accordingly, in actions to nullify a divorce judgment, a former spouse’s current spouse and any other parties whose interest the annulment would affect should be joined in the action. See id. (reversing the trial court’s annulment of the divorce judgment because the former wife sued the former husband, but failed to join the former husband’s present wife as an indispensable party).

Here, this means that I~ and NH’s estate would be indispensable parties. However, the Judgment of Annulment states that NH’s estate did not make an appearance and makes no mention of I~ being joined as a party to the annulment action. Without further information that I~ and NH’s estate were properly joined in this annulment action, we are unable to determine if the Judgment is consistent with Louisiana law.

C. SSR 83-37c: The Agency is Not Bound by the Judgment of Annulment BecauseIt is Unclear whether Claimant Obtained a Valid Annulment of her Divorce from NH under Louisiana Law and it is Unclear whether the Annulment was Genuinely Contested

Claimant relies solely upon the Judgment of Annulment to support her claim that she was validly married to NH at the time of his death under Louisiana law and thus, NH’s widow under the Act for purposes of obtaining widow’s benefits on NH’s record. Social Security Ruling (SSR) 83-37c instructs the agency on how to consider a state court order. See SSR 83-37c, 1983 WL 31272, at *3 (adopting Gray v. Richardson , 474 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1973)); see also POMS GN 00305.065(B)(4). The agency is generally not bound by a state court’s determination if it involves a proceeding to which the agency was not a party. See SSR 83-37c. However, state court determinations of domestic relations matters are entitled to deference and bind the agency if the following four factors are satisfied (Gray factors) :

1. an issue in a claim for Social Security benefits was previously adjudicated by a state court of competent jurisdiction;

2. the issue was genuinely contested before the state court by parties with opposing interests;

3. the issue falls within the general category of domestic relations law; and

4. the resolution by the state trial court is consistent with the law enunciated by the highest court in the state.

SSR 83-37c. Thus, we consider whether the Judgment of Annulment binds the agency, and even if it does not, whether it would be reasonable for the agency to defer to this state court order as evidence to support Claimant’s claim for benefits on NH’s account as NH’s widow. See Hanson v. Astrue, 733 F.Supp.2d 214, 218 (D. Mass. 2010) (“It would not be inconsistent with [SSR 83-37c] for the Commissioner to follow a state adjudication even though fewer than all the conditions were met, subject to bounds of reason and good faith.”).]

1. First and Third Gray Factors

The Judgment of Annulment, which declares NH’s 1996 divorce from Claimant an absolute nullity, satisfies the first and third Gray factors because Louisiana district courts are courts of competent jurisdiction in the domestic relations matters of marital status and in particular over an action to annul a marriage if one or both of the parties are domiciled in Louisiana, which is an issue in this claim for survivor’s benefits. See La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 10(A)(6). Accordingly, the first and third Gray factors were met.

2. Second Gray Factor

However, we do not have sufficient information to know whether the Judgment of Annulment meets the second criteria of being genuinely contested. Although the Judgment of Annulment nullifies NH’s divorce from Claimant, NH died on December XX, 2018, prior to Claimant’s petition for nullity. See George v. Sullivan , 909 F.2d 857, 861 (6th Cir. 1990) (a court order did not bind the Commissioner and was not genuinely contested where no evidence was presented or any material controversy resolved). Moreover, the Judgment of Annulment states that NH’s estate did not appear, and it is unclear whether NH’s estate or I~ were properly joined in the action such that parties of opposing interest genuinely contested the issue. Thus, the agency cannot determine whether the second Gray factor was met.

3. Fourth Gray Factor

Lastly, we must determine whether the Judgment of Annulment met the fourth Gray factor. The Fifth Circuit’s test for determining when a state court order binds the agency generally places an emphasis upon the fourth Gray factor.[^[4] ] See Warren v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 868 F.2d 1444, 1446-47 (5th Cir. 1989); Garcia v. Sullivan, 883 F.2d 18, 19-20 (5th Cir. 1989). In order to determine whether the Judgment of Annulment meets the fourth Gray factor, we must determine whether the Judgment of Annulment is consistent with Louisiana law.

Under narrow circumstances as outlined above, Louisiana law allows for the annulment of final divorce judgments, even after the death of a party. However, as the Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized, there is “a presumption as to the regularity of judicial proceedings” as well as “a strong public policy against disturbing or declaring invalid a judgment of divorce, especially after a long period of time where the marital status of innocent parties who relied on the validity of that judgment would be disturbed, and more particularly where a decree would render innocent parties guilty of bigamy . . . .” Wilson, 59 So. 2d at 453.“[E]very presumption will be indulged in favor of a judgment that is collaterally attacked.” Id. at 455. Thus, “[i]n order to prevail, plaintiff must therefore establish with certainty the invalidity of the judgment which he attacks.” Id. at 453. As explained above, in order for a party to maintain an action to nullify a divorce after death, the party must prove the grounds for annulment by “exceptionally strong and convincing proof.” See Patton, 86 So. 2d at 58.

As we have addressed in detail above, here, the Judgment of Annulment does not state the basis of the nullification as a vice of form or a vice of substance. Thus, we are unable to determine if the Judgment of Annulment was properly entered based on a vice of form or vice of substance.

Further, in light of her 2015 application for benefits on NH’s record as his divorced spouse at which time she inconsistently asserted to the agency they were divorced and provided the Judgment of Divorce, we believe that we cannot rely on the Judgment of Annulment. First, given her actions in filing for divorced spouse’s benefits in 2015, there is a strong possibility that a Louisiana court would find that she voluntarily acquiesced to the Judgment of Divorce, thus precluding an annulment action based on vice of form. Additionally, we believe there is a strong possibility that a Louisiana court would find that her action was time barred under Louisiana law given her knowledge of the divorce in 2015, four years prior to her action to annul the divorce until 2019. See Patton, 86 So. 2d at 58 (plaintiff’s action brought in 1948 to annul the divorce judgment based on a vice of substance due to fraud was barred by the one-year prescriptive period since she knew of the divorce at least as of 1931 and knew that the ex-husband had remarried).

Additionally, the agency does not have any of the supportive documents Claimant may have presented to the Court in support of her 2019 petition to nullify the 1996 Judgment of Divorce. The Judgment of Annulment does not explain that the court applied the proper standard of “exceptionally strong and convincing proof” and found evidence sufficient to overcome the strong presumptions and strong policies outlined above as to final divorce judgments. This is of particular concern in a case such as this where the divorce had been obtained 23 years prior, NH remarried I in 2003, and Claimant presented the Judgment of Divorce to the agency to support her claim for divorced spouse’s benefits on NH’s record. Further suspect is that Claimant did not initiate the annulment action until after NH’s death and until after she was denied divorced spouse’s benefits because their marriage did not meet the 10-year marriage duration requirement. As the Louisiana Supreme Court explained, “where the status of another would be seriously impaired if the judgment of divorce was to be set aside . . . in dealing with the equities, we are bound to give consideration to the second marriage which was contracted in good faith of the judgment under attack and also scrutinize the motives which prompted plaintiff to seek the annulment of the judgment after her former husband’s death.” Wilson, 59 So. 2d at 453. Claimant’s motives are questionable in light of her applications for benefits on NH’s record and the timing of her action to annul their divorce.

Because the basis for the nullification is unknown, it is unclear whether Claimant met her burden of exceptionally strong and convincing proof, and it is unknown whether I~ and NH’s estate were joined as indispensable parties, it is not possible to determine whether the Judgment of Annulment is consistent with Louisiana law.

4. Summary: Judgment of Annulment Does Not Bind the Agency

In applying SSR 83-37c and the Gray factors, we believe that the Judgment of Annulment does not bind the agency, nor should the agency defer to such Judgment because we have concerns about its validity and are unable to determine whether the Judgment is consistent with Louisiana law.

Conclusion

Based on the Judgment of Annulment and the information available to the agency regarding Claimant’s application for divorced spouse’s benefits in 2015, we believe there is legal support for the agency to find that Claimant has not proven a valid annulment of her 1996 divorce from NH under Louisiana law. Consequently, Claimant has not proven that she (and not I~) had a valid marriage to NH under Louisiana law at the time of his death. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i); 20 C.F.R. 404.345. For this same reason, Claimant also has not proven a right to inherit a spouse’s share under Louisiana intestate succession law.[^[5] ] See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(ii); 20 C.F.R. § 404.345. Therefore, Claimant has not proven the requisite marital relationship with NH for widow’s benefits on his record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.335(a), 404.345.