This is in response to your request for an opinion regarding whether minors may own
                  property in the five states and one district in our region and, if so, regarding any
                  specific requirements on how the property must be titled. This issue has previously
                  been addressed by our region in a November 1992 memorandum. See Memorandum from Elinor Stoddard, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of the General
                  Counsel, Region III, to Larry Massanari, Regional Commissioner, Social Security Administration,
                  State Laws Regarding the Titling of Property in the Name of a Minor or Incompetent.
                  In response to your request, we rely mainly on our prior memorandum. This prior memorandum
                  did not address the issue of any titling requirements within our jurisdictions, but
                  we have found no authority specifically regarding either "restrictions as to the age
                  of the minor or the types of property that can be held" or "how the property should/must
                  be titled to show the minor as the titleholder" in any of our jurisdictions.
               
               This memorandum should serve as an addendum to our November 1992 memorandum, as it
                  provides further support for our position that a minor may hold title to property
                  in Pennsylvania, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Virginia, and West Virginia and
                  may hold title to property in Maryland, unless he has a guardian. Since we have determined
                  that a minor may hold title to property in all of our jurisdictions, there is no need
                  to address the fourth question concerning the preferred method of titling property
                  if a minor cannot hold title to property.
               
               Uniform Transfers to Minors Act
               Each of the states and the district in our region has a Uniform Transfers to Minors
                  Act (UTMA), which provides a mechanism for transferring property to a minor by will,
                  trust, gift, or payment of debt. 20 Pa. Cons. Star. Ann. §§ 5301(b), 5304-5306 (West
                  1998); Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, §§ 4504-4506 (1997); D.C. Code Ann. §§ 20-305 to -307
                  (1998); Va. Code Ann. §§ 31-40 to -42 (Michie 1998); W. Va. Code §§ 36-7-4 to -6 (1998);
                  Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts §§ 13-304 to -306 (1998). Although the UTMA does not
                  directly address the issue of whether a minor may acquire property with retroactive
                  benefit checks, it provides further support for the common law proposition that miners
                  may hold title to property. When property is transferred in accordance with the UTMA,
                  the custodial property is indefeasibly vested in the minor, but the custodian retains
                  the authority to take control of, register and record title to, collect, hold, manage,
                  invest, and reinvest the property. Pa. Cons. Star. Ann. §§ 5311(b), 5312(a) (West
                  1998); Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, §§ 4511(b), 4512(a) (1998); D.C. Code Ann. §§ 21-311(b),
                  -312 (1998); Va. Code Ann. §§ 31-47 to -48 (Michie 1998); W. Va. Code §§ 36-7-11(b),
                  -13 (1998); Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts §§ 13-311(b), -312 (1998). Under the UTMA
                  in each of our jurisdictions, a minor may hold title to property that is received
                  by gift, will, trust, or payment of debt, and none of our jurisdictions have authority
                  indicating that miners have lesser rights with respect to property acquired through
                  purchase or other conveyance. The UTMA in the District of Columbia and Virginia defines
                  "minor" as an individual under the age of eighteen, while the UTMA in the remaining
                  jurisdictions, Pennsylvania, Delaware, West Virginia, and Maryland, defines "minor"
                  as an individual under the age of twenty-one. D.C. Code Ann. § 20-301 (1998); Va.
                  Code Ann. § 31-37 (Michie 1998); Pa. Cons. Star. Ann. § 5301(b) (West 1998); Del.
                  Code Ann. tit. 12, § 4501(11) (1998); W. Va. Code § 36-7-1 (1998); Md. Code Ann.,
                  Est. & Trusts § 13-301(k) (1998).
               
               Delaware
               An additional provision of the Delaware Code addressing certificates of title for
                  automobiles presumes that minors may hold title to property. In order to apply for
                  a certificate of title to an automobile, an individual under the age of eighteen must
                  obtain written consent from at least one parent or guardian. Del. Code Ann. tit. 21,
                  § 2302(c) (1997). The Department of Motor Vehicles will only issue a certificate of
                  title to an individual under the age of eighteen with the signature of a parent or
                  guardian consenting to the grant of title. Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 2306(d) (1997).
                  Although a minor must obtain consent from a parent or guardian to obtain title, the
                  title is ultimately granted to the minor, not the parent or guardian. Therefore, a
                  minor may hold title to property, including an automobile, in Delaware.
               
               CONCLUSION
               For the above reasons, in addition to the reasons outlined in our November 1992 memorandum,
                  we believe that a minor may own and acquire property in Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
                  Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia.
               
               Attachment
               SOCIAL SECURITY
               DATE: November 25, 1992 TITLE: State Laws Regarding the Titling of Property in the
                  Name of a Minor or Incompetent AUTHOR: Hardnett, Charlotte; Newman, James C.; Stoddard,
                  Elinor AUTHOR—POSITION: Acting Chief Counsel; Division Chief, Program Review; Assistant
                  AUTHOR—POSITION: Regional Counsel RGNDIV: R3 ADDRESSEE AND POSITION: Massanari, Larry
                  G.; Regional Commissioner ADDRESSEE—LOCATION (Region/Div): SSA
               
               TEXT
               This is in response to your memorandum in which you ask whether property in Region
                  III states can be titled in the name of a minor or an incompetent. You asked this
                  question in the context of evidencing a Supplemental Security Income (SSI) beneficiary's
                  ownership in property that representative payees purchase as a conservation or investment
                  of SSI benefits.
               
               In brief, our survey reveals that only Pennsylvania clearly allows minors and incompetents
                  to hold title to real and personal property. We believe that District of Columbia
                  law places title in minors and, unless they have conservators, incompetents as well.
                  Delaware law strongly indicates that both minors and incompetents can have title to
                  property. Among the remaining states, minors may have title in Virginia and West Virginia,
                  and lose title in Maryland if they are under guardianship. In those same states, incompetents
                  retain title in Virginia, may retain title in West Virginia, and lose title in Maryland
                  if they are under guardianship.
               
               BACKGROUND
               According to Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.), minors generally can have title to real
                  and personal property, and "insane" persons retain title to their real and personal
                  property. In researching the states in Region III, however, other than in Pennsylvania,
                  we can find no specific authority answering the question of whether title can rest
                  with a m/nor or incompetent. In these states one must rely on statutes and cases governing
                  the relation between guardian and minor or incompetent, or on statutes in other areas
                  of the law. Where the law is unclear, C.J.S. assertions may indicate that these states
                  would allow minors and/or incompetents to hold title to real and personal property.
                  C.J.S., however, merely describes its general findings among the states. It in no
                  way controls the law of any state.
               
               DISCUSSION
               II. Delaware: Statutes and Case Law Read in Light of C.J.S. Indicate That Both Minors
                  and Incompetents can Hold Title to Real and Personal Property.
               
               Delaware's relevant statute on Titles and Conveyances explains that persons at least
                  eighteen years of age and not otherwise incompetent can take title to a deed. The
                  statute thus implies that title cannot vest in minors and incompetents: Acquisition
                  and conveyance of title to real estate by persons of the age of 18 years or older.
                  Any person of the age of 18 years or older who is not otherwise incompetent may contract
                  to purchase, acquire, take, hold, sell, transfer, assign . . . or otherwise convey
                  any estate, right, title or interest in real estate, may take title to and accept
                  delivery of a deed . . . or other instrument of conveyance . . . and may execute,
                  acknowledge and deliver a deed . . . or other instrument . . . without the interference
                  of a guardian, trustee, or the like, and such . . . instrument . . . shall be valid
                  and legally effective . . . and shall bind him . . . .
               
               Del. Code Ann., tit. 25, Sec. 312 (1974) (emphasis added).
               However, one of Delaware's "Guardian and Ward" statutes speaks of a minor's having
                  title in real estate. Section 3954 states that, upon sale of the minor's real estate,
                  the court "shall direct the guardian or trustee to make a deed to the purchaser, who
                  shall take, under such deed, all the title to the real estate which the minor had
                  therein." Del. Code Ann., tit. 12, Sec. 3954 (1987) (emphasis added). This provision
                  and a virtually identical provision (Del. Code Ann., tit. 12, Sec. 3706(a)) for mentally
                  ill persons (incompetents) refer to the minor's and incompetent's having title in
                  real estate.
               
               The statutes regarding guardians and the mentally ill, therefore, appear to contradict
                  section 312, the general title statute. One way to resolve the conflict is to read
                  section 312 not as barring minors and incompetents from holding title, but merely
                  as specifying that if the party is at least eighteen years of age and competent [FN1],
                  the party can hold title, and enter into binding contracts with respect to their property,
                  regardless of any action by a guardian. This reading would acknowledge that minors
                  and incompetents can disaffirm or "avoid" the contracts into which they enter. That
                  is, minors and incompetents can purchase and hold title to property, but if they avoid
                  their contracts to purchase the property, they are not bound by the terms of those
                  contracts and thereby lose title to that property. Section 312 may merely acknowledge
                  that parties over eighteen years of age and competent are bound to their contracts,
                  while minors and incompetents are not.
               
               This reading of section 312 comports with C.J.S.'s provision on acquisition of property
                  by infants, 43 C.J.S. Infants Sec. 126 - 46 (1978), and its provision on the rights
                  of guardians and committees over "insane" persons, 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons Secs.
                  1-155 (1945). Moreover, the holding of Equitable Trust Co. v. Union Nat. Bank, 18 A. 2d 22'8 (1941), (described below) that incompetents retain title to their
                  property requires us to read section 312 as allowing at least incompetents to hold
                  title.
               
               First, C.J.S. states that an infant generally "has the capacity to acquire and own
                  property" and to "receive title to property." 43 C.J.S. Infants Sec. 126 46. Section
                  137 also states.that "until a contract of purchase is avoided by the infant's disaffirmance
                  thereof, an infant purchaser has the capacity to pass good title to the property."
                  43 C.J.S. Infants Sec. 137. C.J.S. thus states that infants do hold title to property
                  for which they contract, and continue to hold that title unless they disaffirm the
                  contract.
               
               C.J.S. cites no Delaware cases for the proposition that minors can hold title to property.
                  However, by interpreting section 312 according to the proposition that minors can
                  hold title, section 312 comports with section 3954, which indicates that minors can
                  hold title to real property. Thus, it appears to us that the better view is that minors
                  can hold title to property under Delaware law.
               
               For incompetents, C.J.S. states that "the guardian or committee has no title to the
                  property of his ward, whether in trust or otherwise, but the title remains in the
                  ward." 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons Sec. 85. The text then cites Equitable Trust Co. v. Union Nat.  Bank, 18 A.2d 228 (1941), a case from the Court of Chancery of Delaware. The court therein
                  stated that at common law "the trustee did not have title to the property of the incompetent
                  person . . and does not have title under our statute." Id. at 230. Although this is an old case, the statutes the court cited are virtually
                  identical to the current statutes on the trustee-incompetent relation. Delaware law
                  thus provides that the incompetent retains title to property, even if the incompetent
                  has a trustee. This case further demonstrates that section 312 cannot be read to bar
                  minors and incompetents from holding title to property.
               
               CONCLUSION
               Viewing Region III as a whole, we believe the uncertain results of our survey demonstrate
                  the difficulty with SSI's approach to handling representative payee purchases of real
                  and personal property with SSI funds. Another, perhaps more logical, approach to the
                  problem of tying the purchases in question to the minors or incompetents would be
                  to treat the purchase of the assets or improvements/additions thereto as "use" of
                  the benefits, rather than conservation of the benefits. We believe this approach is
                  consistent with the regulations and avoids what could be an awkward, if not exceedingly
                  complicated, means of ensuring that the beneficiary actually collect upon the eventual
                  sale of the "investment" asset.
               
               The SSI regulations on "Use of benefit payments" for SSI recipients states that "(w)
                  e will consider that payments we certify to a representative (sic) payee to have been
                  used for the use and benefit of the beneficiary if they are used for the beneficiary's
                  current maintenance. Current maintenance includes costs incurred in obtaining food,
                  shelter, clothing, medical care and personal comfort items." 20 C.F.R. Sec. 416.640
                  (1992).
               
               The regulations regarding "Conservation and investment of benefit payments" state:
                  If payments are not needed for the beneficiary's current maintenance or reasonably
                  foreseeable needs, they shall be conserved or invested on behalf of the beneficiary.
                  Conserved funds should be invested in accordance with the rules followed by trustees
                  . . . . . . Preferred investments for excess funds are U.S. Savings Bonds and deposits
                  in an interest or dividend paying account in a bank, trust company, credit union,
                  or savings and loan association . . . . 20 C.F.R. Sec. 416.645 (1992).
               
               The types of assets most frequently in question here are houses, additions and/or
                  improvements to existing real estate, automobiles, mobile homes, trucks, vans, and/or
                  special equipment added to motor vehicles. While the purchase of a home is to some
                  extent an investment, the additions/improvements to homes or motor vehicles that representative
                  payees make to benefit the beneficiary may not add market value to the underlying
                  asset. Furthermore, the purchase of vehicles such as automobiles, vans, and trucks,
                  or even mobile homes, whose value decreases rapidly in time, does not seem to fit
                  the type of conservation or investment of funds envisioned in the regulations at Sec.
                  416.645, which list deposits in savings account or the purchase of U.S. Savings Bonds
                  as acceptable or preferred investments. In fact, the purchase of depreciating assets
                  like automobiles hardly qualifies as an "investment" in any context.
               
               We believe that in most instances the purchases of homes, vehicles, or additions/improvements
                  thereto will qualify under the "Use of Benefits" provision of Sec. 416.640. These
                  purchases appear to directly serve the needs of beneficiaries and meet the definition
                  of "current maintenance" as shelter, personal comfort items, or reasonably foreseeable
                  needs. Therefore, deeming the purchases as use, rather than conservation, of benefits
                  is both a more accurate description of the transactions and a way to avoid the necessity
                  of developing ownership or titling of property as the means to ensure that the beneficiary's
                  benefit upon the sale of the asset. The true benefit to the beneficiary of an automobile
                  or even a house is the daily use or availability of the asset, and not its resale
                  value.
               
               Finally, we ask that if a beneficiary or his representative has information contrary
                  to what we have concluded in this memorandum concerning title, please forward it to
                  us and we will consider it. Also, if you have any questions about this memorandum,
                  please call the undersigned at 596-1246.
               
               FN1 Delaware law provides that persons eighteen years of age or older, who are not
                  incompetent, have full capacity to contract. Any person who has reached eighteen years
                  of age "shall become fully responsible for his contracts." Del. Code Ann., tit. 6,
                  Sec. 2705. Minors and incompetents can disaffirm their contracts.
               
               FN2 "'Committee' includes any reorganization or protective committee formed for the
                  purpose of formulating, proposing, or carrying out any plan of reorganization or to
                  act in any other manner for the protection of the interests of the holders of any
                  class or classes of securities, or persons performing a similar function, and any
                  corporation formed or acting for any such purpose."