QUESTION
You asked whether J~ (Claimant) is the sole life estate owner in the subject property
by virtue of a May XX, 2014 warranty deed executed by her mother, L~. You also asked
whether a subsequent May XX, 2019, Corrective Warranty Deed Reserving Life Estate
executed by Claimant’s mother was effective to create a second life estate in the
subject property for Claimant’s mother. If so, you ask how Claimant’s life estate
would be valued given the second life estate and the effective date of the second
life estate.
OPINION
Based on the May XX, 2014, warranty deed, Claimant is the sole life estate owner in
the subject property and her two children have a remainder interest in the subject
property. All interest Claimant’s mother had in the subject property passed with the
2014 deed, and therefore, the May XX, 2019, corrective deed was ineffective in creating
a second life estate for Claimant’s mother. Thus, Claimant’s mother does not have
a life estate or any other ownership interest in the subject property.[1]
BACKGROUND
Claimant is an adult Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipient residing in Troy,
Alabama. Claimant’s mother signed a Last Will and Testament (Will) on May XX, 2014.
According to the terms of the Will, upon the death of Claimant’s mother, all of her
property is to go to Claimant. Also on May XX, 2014, Claimant’s mother signed a warranty
deed in which she conveyed a life estate in her real property, located at XXX Street
in Troy, Alabama (the subject property), to Claimant. According to a Real Estate Sales
Validation Form, signed in December 2014, the assessed market value of the subject
property was $64,340.00. The warranty deed, signed by Claimant’s mother created a
life estate in the subject property for Claimant, with remainder interest in Claimant’s
two children.
Claimant provided a letter indicating that she was not aware of the conveyance and
that she had not resided on this property since 1997. In a signed statement dated
May XX, 2019, Claimant’s mother stated her intent was to transfer ownership of the
subject property only upon her death, as stated in her Will.
On May XX, 2019, Claimant’s mother signed a “Corrective Warranty Deed Reserving Life
Estate” (corrective warranty deed). This document indicated the intent to correct
“certain omissions and clerical errors” made in the May XX, 2014 warranty deed. The
corrective warranty deed stated that it was the intent of the original grantor, Claimant’s
mother, to reserve a life estate for herself. The corrective warranty deed named Claimant
as a life estate owner with the same remainder beneficiaries listed in the original
warranty deed. The corrective warranty deed purportedly conveyed two life estates
in the subject property, to Claimant and her mother.
DISCUSSION
A. Federal Law
SSI is a general public assistance program for aged, blind, or disabled individuals
who meet certain income and resource restrictions and other eligibility requirements.
See Act §§ 1602, 1611(a); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.110, 416.202 (2019).[2] “Resources” include cash or other liquid assets or any real or personal property
that an individual owns and could convert to cash to be used for his or her support
and maintenance. See Act § 1613; 20 C.F.R. § 416.1201(a); Program Operations Manual System (POMS) SI 01110.100(B)(1); POMS SI 01120.010(B). “Resources” generally exclude an individual’s home. See Act § 1613(a)(1); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1210(a), 416.1212(b); POMS SI 01110.210(B); POMS SI 01130.100(B). For the home exclusion to apply, however, the individual must have an ownership
interest in the property and it must serve as his or her principle place of residence.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1212(a); POMS SI 01130.100(A)(1), (B)(1)-(3).
An individual may have an ownership interest in a property if he or she has a life
estate in the property. See POMS SI 01110.500(B)(3)(a). A life estate conveys ownership of limited duration. See POMS SI 01110.500(B)(3)(a); POMS SI 01110.515(A)(2)(a), (B)(1); POMS SI 01140.110(A)(6). A life estate is a form of legal ownership usually created through a legal
document. See POMS SI 01110.515(A)(2)(a); POMS SI ATL01110.516(A). An individual with a life estate can sell only his or her interest, and a life
estate in home property generally is an excluded resource. See POMS SI 01110.515(B)(1); POMS SI 01140.110(A)(6).
B. State Law
Under Alabama law, courts look to the clear, unambiguous language of the deed to determine
the intent of the grantor. SeeBarter v.
Burton Garland Revocable Trust, 124 So. 3d 152, 159 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013). In construing the terms of a deed, a
court will ascertain the intention of the parties based on the entire instrument.
SeeMoss v. Williams, 822 So. 2d 392, 397 (Ala. 2001). However, the granting clause in a deed determines
the interest conveyed, and unless it is repugnant, obscure, or ambiguous, it prevails
over other portions of the document that may be in conflict with it. Seeid.; see
alsoHubbard v. Cason, 258 So. 3d 1126, 1132 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018) (holding although deed was titled as
conveying ownership of real estate, the granting clause by clear and unambiguous language
conveyed only an easement).
Here, the May XX, 2014, warranty deed executed by Claimant’s mother by its express
terms conveyed her interest in the subject property to Claimant in the form of a life
estate, with a remainder interest to Claimant’s children. Claimant’s mother retained
no ownership rights in the subject property. According to the granting clause in the
May XX, 2014, warranty deed:
Grantor does hereby, grant, bargain, sell and convey unto [Claimant], a life estate
in the following described real estate for and during her natural life, and then upon
her death, unto [her children], for and during their joint lives and upon the death
of either of them, then to the survivor of them in fee simple, together with every
contingent remainder and right of reversion, the following described real estate .
. . .
Thus, the May XX, 2014, deed conveyed a life estate to Claimant and her mother retained
no ownership interest in the subject property.
Further, the fact that Claimant did not know at the time that her mother had conveyed
a life estate to her or that she did not live on the subject property does not divest
her of the life estate interest in the subject property. Generally, delivery of a
deed to the grantee is required for the deed to be valid as it signifies the grantor’s
relinquishing of the right to revoke the deed. SeeChandler v. Chandler, 409 So. 2d 780, 781 (Ala. 1982); Culver v. Carrol, 175 Ala. 469, 472 (Ala. 1912) (stating delivery of deed signifies grantor’s intent
to relinquish right to revoke deed). Here, Claimant indicated that she did not receive
a copy of the warranty deed when her mother executed it in 2014, and she did not know
of her ownership interest in the subject property. Nevertheless, Claimant’s mother
acknowledged execution of the deed creating a life estate for Claimant and evidenced
the forfeiture of her right to revoke the deed by having it recorded in the local
probate court. Under such circumstances, Alabama courts will presume delivery to a
third party on behalf of the grantee. SeeGulf Red
Cedar Co. v. Cranshaw, 169 Ala. 606, 613 (Ala. 1910) (stating “[i]t may be regarded as settled in this
state that when a paper purporting to be a deed is shown to have been signed by the
grantor, to have been then acknowledged and duly certified by a proper officer, and
recorded in the office of the judge of probate of the county in which the lands lie,
and there is no other proof to weaken the force of these facts, this is sufficient
proof of complete execution by delivery, although there is no direct proof of delivery”).
Further, Claimant’s assertion that she does not live on the property and has not resided
there since 1997 does not invalidate the May XX, 2014 deed conveying to her a life
estate. SeeThrasher v. Thrasher, 169 So. 3d 1043, 1045-47 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (holding failure of life tenant to
reside on the property did not forfeit her life estate).
Likewise, the May XX, 2019, statement by Claimant’s mother that her intent was to
transfer ownership of the subject property only upon her death, as stated in her Will,
does not change the result. In Alabama, when a court is construing the intent of an
unambiguous provision in a deed, it generally only looks to the language in the instrument,
and does not consider collateral statements about the intent of the parties. SeeBarter, 124 So. 3d at 158 (quoting Cole v. Minor, 518 So. 2d 61, 64 (Ala. 1987) (stating actual knowledge of the parties, oral statements
of the parties, and other collateral matters are inadmissible in action to construe
unambiguous document)).
Moreover, the execution of the May XX, 2019 corrective warranty deed by Claimant’s
mother was not valid and not effective in creating a life estate for herself in the
subject property. In Alabama, a grantor cannot use a corrective deed to unilaterally
terminate or revoke an interest conveyed by the original deed. SeeGallups v. Kent, 953 So. 32d 393, 395 (Ala. 2006). Additionally, where a grantor divests herself
of title, and by mistake fails to convey the title in the manner she intended, she
cannot by a subsequent conveyance correct her mistake, as she has no title remaining
to convey. Seeid. (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Ault, 280 P.2d 637, 641 (Kan. 1955)). Thus, under Alabama law, Claimant’s mother’s title
to the subject property passed with the warranty deed she executed in May 2014. She
could not thereafter execute a valid conveyance of the property with the 2019 corrective
deed. Seeid.
CONCLUSION
Claimant is the sole life estate owner in the subject property and her two children
have a remainder interest in the subject property. Claimant’s mother does not have
a life estate interest or any other ownership interest in the subject property. Because
Claimant does not reside on the subject property, the home exclusion does not apply.