TN 10 (03-20)

PR 05840.035 New York

A. 19-045 Valid Vermont Civil Union Qualifies As A Marital Relationship Under the New York's Intestacy Laws

Date: January 31, 2019

1. Syllabus

The Claimant and the number holder (NH) entered into a valid civil union in Vermont in July 2003 and were living together in New York at the time of the NH’s death. We must determine whether the couple’s Vermont civil union qualifies as a marital relationship under New York law or whether the couple’s civil union would allow Claimant to inherit a spouse’s share of NH’s personal property should NH have died without a will. We believe that Claimant could inherit the spouse’s share of NH’s property under New York intestacy law, and Claimant was living with NH at the time of NH’s death. Thus, Claimant is deemed the NH’s widow under the Social Security Act (Act). Accordingly, there would be legal support for an adjudicator to find that Claimant is entitled to the lump sum death payment (LSDP) on the record of NH and to the underpayment owed to NH.

2. Opinion

Question

Is M~ (Claimant), the surviving civil union partner of the decedent number holder D~ (NH), entitled to a lump-sum death payment (LSDP) on the record of NH and to an underpayment owed to NH, where the civil union was performed in Vermont and NH resided in New York with Claimant when NH died?

Short Answer:

We believe that Claimant could inherit the spouse’s share of NH’s property under New York intestacy law, and Claimant was living with NH at the time of NH’s death. Thus, Claimant is deemed the NH’s widow under the Social Security Act (Act). Accordingly, there would be legal support for an adjudicator to find that Claimant is entitled to the LSDP on the record of NH and to the underpayment owed to NH.

Background:

Claimant and NH entered into a civil union in Bennington, Vermont on July xx,2003. NH died on January xx, 2015 in Colonie, New York. Claimant and NH were living together in Albany, New York at the time of NH’s death.

ANALYSIS

A. Social Security Act and Regulations

A claimant may be entitled to an LSDP under Title II of the Act if she establishes, among other things, that she is the insured’s widow(er) and was living in the same household[1] as the insured at the time of the insured’s death. 42 U.S.C. § 402(i); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.390 - 404.391. The agency considers a claimant to be the insured’s widow(er) if the courts of the State in which the insured resided at the time of death would find that the claimant and the insured were validly married at the time the insured died, or if, under application of that State’s intestate succession laws, the claimant would be able to inherit a spouse’s share of the insured’s personal property. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.344 - 404.345. A surviving spouse, i.e. a widow or widower, may also be entitled to priority for distribution of any underpayment owed to the deceased insured. 42 U.S.C. § 404(d)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.503(b) (referring to a surviving spouse “as defined in section 216(c), (g), or (h) of the Act”); see 42 U.S.C. § 416(a)(2) (noting that the term “surviving spouse” means a widow as defined in subsection (c) or a widower as defined in subsection (g)). Accordingly, a claimant who was in a civil union with the insured can be considered the insured’s surviving spouse if the relationship was valid in the place where it was established, and would allow the claimant to inherit a spouse’s share of the insured’s personal property if the insured died without leaving a will. POMS GN 00210.004.

When NH died on January XX, 2015, she was domiciled in New York State. Claimant lived with NH at the time of NH’s death, so that the living-in-the-same-household requirement was met. Thus, in order for Claimant to be entitled to an LSDP or underpayment on NH’s account: (1) the civil union between Claimant and NH must be valid in Vermont and (2) under New York law, Claimant must have been able to inherit a spouse’s share of NH’s personal property had NH died without leaving a will. See POMS GN 00210.004C.

A. Vermont Law [2]

Vermont’s civil union statute, which became effective on July 1, 2000, provides that parties to a civil union will be entitled to “the benefits and protections and be subject to the responsibilities of spouses.” Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1201(2). Of relevance here, for a civil union to be established in Vermont, the parties must (1) not be a party to another civil union or a marriage and (2) be of the same sex, and (3) not enter a civil union with certain relatives. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1202, 1203. Vermont recognizes civil unions as affording “all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under the law … as are granted to spouses in a civil marriage.” Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1204(a). A party to a civil union is included in the definition of the term spouse, family, immediate family, dependent, next of kin and “other terms that denote the spousal relationship, as those terms are used throughout the law.” Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1204(b). Laws of descent and distribution, intestate succession, survivorship, “or other incidents of the acquisition, ownership, or transfer, inter vivos or at death” are included as listed examples that apply to parties to a civil union in a like manner to spouses. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1204(e)(1).

On September 1, 2009, Vermont changed its legal definition of civil marriage from the “legally recognized union of one man and one woman” to the “legally recognized union of two people.” Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 8, amended by An Act Relating to Civil Marriage, 2009 Vermont Laws No. 3 (S. 115). The enactment of S. 115 did not affect existing civil unions entered into before September 1, 2009.[3] Couples who entered into a civil union remained joined in civil union until the death of one of the partners unless (1) they legally dissolved their relationship by court order, or (2) the couple subsequently married and chose to dissolve their civil union upon their marriage. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1206, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 5131(4), 12-3 Vt. Code. R. 206(9).

Claimant and NH entered into a valid civil union in 2003. They were of the same sex and there is no evidence that they were relatives or that either woman was party to another civil union or marriage. There is also no evidence that Claimant and NH dissolved their civil union or that they entered into a marriage after same-sex marriage became legal in Vermont. As such, under Vermont law, Claimant and NH continued in a valid civil union until NH died. The question, thus, becomes whether the couple’s Vermont civil union qualifies as a marital relationship under New York law or whether the couple’s civil union would allow Claimant to inherit a spouse’s share of NH’s personal property should NH have died without a will. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(ii); 20 C.F.R. § 404.345.

.

C. New York Law

New York’s longstanding Estates, Powers, and Trusts Law (EPTL) provides that an intestate decedent’s property may pass to his or her “spouse.” N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 4-1.1(a). Though the intestacy section of the EPTL does not define “spouse,” the law elsewhere advises that, for purposes of various sections, including the intestacy section (4-1.1), “a husband or wife is a surviving spouse … ” barring certain exceptions. N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 5-1.2(a). The EPTL does not further define spouse, husband, or wife.

In 2008, although New York did not permit same sex marriages to be contracted within the State, the State’s governor indicated that recognizing same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions was consistent with public policy. See Letter from David Nocenti, Advisor to Governor of New York David Paterson, to All Agency Counsel (May 14, 2008), available at https://www.nycbar.org/pdf/memo.pdf. [4] The governor directed staff to “ensure that terms such as ‘spouse,’ ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ [were] construed in a manner that encompasses legal same-sex marriages, unless some other provision of law would bar your ability to do so.” Id.; see also Golden v. Paterson, 877 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (upholding the governor’s directive).

New York’s 2011 Marriage Equality Act (MEA), which conferred on same-sex couples the right to marry, uses the terms “spouses” and “parties in a marriage” interchangeably and provides that such individuals shall have all the rights and responsibilities attendant to marriage. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-a, amended by Marriage Equality Act, 2011 Sess. Law News of N.Y. Ch. 95 (A. 8354). The MEA provides that, “[w]hen necessary to implement the rights and responsibilities of spouses under the law, all gender-specific language or terms shall be construed in a gender-neutral manner in all such sources of law.” N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-a (b). The MEA did not, however, convert existing civil unions into “marriages,” define parties to a civil union as husbands, wives, or spouses, or otherwise equate the two institutions.

Recently, in a case involving property rights, New York’s Appellate Division, Fourth Department[5] addressed the status of Vermont civil unions. The Court held that “a civil union is not equivalent to a marriage for the purposes of equitable distribution of property” under the State’s Domestic Relations Law. O’Reilly-Morshead v. O’Reilly-Morshead, 83 N.Y.S.3d 379, 381 (App. Div. 2018); see N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236. The Court went on, however, to hold that “comity does require the recognition of property rights arising from a civil union in Vermont,” pointing out that marriage-equivalent property division is one of the rights granted by Vermont’s civil union law. Id. at 382 (citing Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1204(d)). The Court emphasized that New York’s and Vermont’s laws shared a common public policy, which was to “predicate[] [property rights] on objective evidence of a formal legal relationship …” Id. The Court also relied on a decision from the Court of Appeals, New York’s highest court, which applied the principle of comity to recognize parental status arising from Vermont law, but “left open the question whether New York should extend comity to the civil union for purposes other than parentage.” Id. (citing Debra H. v. Janice R., 14 N.Y.3d 576 (2010), abrogated on other grounds by Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 28 N.Y.3d 1 (2016))).[6]

Based upon the above law, we believe that Claimant could inherit from NH. Even if the couple’s Vermont civil union was not a marriage and they were not “spouses” as contemplated by the EPTL, the Appellate Division’s decision in O’Reilly-Morshead suggests that New York courts would nonetheless apply the principle of comity to recognize inheritance rights arising from the Vermont civil union. Although the Appellate Division did not speak directly to intestate rights of inheritance, we see no basis on which to distinguish this form of property right from other property rights arising from the civil union. And while O’Reilly-Morshead did not come from New York’s highest court, its recognition of rights arising from same-sex relationships is broadly consistent with that court’s holding in Debra H. and the legislative and executive branches’ general movement in that direction.

Conclusion

As discussed above, we believe that courts in New York, where NH was domiciled at the time of her death, would allow Claimant to inherit the spouse’s share of NH’s intestate estate. In addition, Claimant was living with NH at the time of NH’s death. Therefore, we believe there is legal support for the agency to conclude that Claimant is entitled to the LSDP and underpayment on the record of NH.


Footnotes:

[1]

To be entitled to the LSDP, the claimant need only show that she was living in the same household as the insured when the insured died. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.390 - 404.392; see also Program Operations Manual System (POMS) RS 00210.001C. Only if a claimant cannot meet the living-in-the-same-household requirement must she meet the nine-month duration requirement or another alternative to be entitled to the LSDP. See id.

[2]

All conclusions in this opinion related to Vermont law were based on guidance from the Office of the Regional Chief Counsel for Region I.

[3]

However, individuals can no longer enter into a civil union in Vermont. S. 115 § 12(b)(1) (repealing tit. 18, § 5160-65 regarding civil unions).

[4]

This letter was issued in response to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department’s decision in Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App. Div. 2008), which held that an Ontario-solemnized same-sex marriage was entitled to recognition under principles of comity because it did not violate natural law or an affirmative statute.

[5]

Although not New York’s top appellate court, the “Appellate Division is a single statewide court divided into departments for administrative convenience.” Mountain View Coach Lines, Inc. v. Storms, 476 N.Y.S.2d 918, 919-20 (2d Dept. 1984). Accordingly, precedents set by one department apply statewide until the Court of Appeals or the Appellate Division of another department pronounces a contrary rule. Id. It appears that the decision in O’Reilly-Morshead will not be appealed to the State’s highest court. Per New York court rules, the parties had 30 days to appeal. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5513(b). Since the Appellate Division issued the decision on July 25, 2018, an appealing party would have had to appeal by August 24, 2018. According to the Clerk’s offices for the Appellate Division and Court of Appeals, neither party did so.

[6]

At least one earlier case, out of the Appellate Division’s Second Department, did conclude that a Vermont civil union partner was not a “distributee” as required to maintain a wrongful death action under N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 5-4.1. Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477-80 (App. Div. 2005). However, the Court considered intestacy law only in connection with a challenge to the wrongful death statute’s constitutionality, and the Court’s equal protection analysis has been invalidated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). See id. at 478 (“it has already been established that confining marriage and all laws pertaining either directly or indirectly to the marital relationship to different sex couples is not offensive to the equal protection clause of either the Federal or State constitutions”). The Court also assumed that comity had “no application” in part because “the Vermont Legislature refused to alter traditional concepts of marriage (i.e., limiting the ability to marry to couples of two distinct sexes).” Id. at 479. Subsequent changes in state policy, including Vermont’s 2009 changed definition of civil marriage and New York’s 2011 MEA discussed above, similarly render that conclusion suspect. In any event, the Appellate Division’s more recent decision in O’Reilly-Morshead suggests that a civil union partner need not be considered a “spouse” under New York statutory definitions to be entitled to spouse-equivalent property rights under New York law. See O’Reilly-Morshead, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 379.


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PR 05840.035 - New York - 03/18/2020
Batch run: 03/18/2020
Rev:03/18/2020