The following summary of a U.S. District Court ruling is not part of the California
State plan but is herein included as an interpretation of the State plan criteria.
[17,108]Haxel Doffer, et al, Plaintiff, and Grace Smith, Intervening Plaintiff v.
Robert Martin, Director of the Department of Social Welfare of the State of California,
et al. U.S. District Court, Northern District of California. No C-70919 LHB. Memorandum
and Order filed March 7, 1973. Before Hamlin, Cir. J., East and Burke, D. JJ.
Disabled Persons—Eligibility—Performance of “Homemaker” Tasks Around Own Home.—The California welfare regulations that provided that, in
connection with the state's program of assistance to needy permanently and totally
disabled persons, if a person who had carried the responsibilities for both homemaking
and employment was unable to continue employment, such person should be evaluated
against homemaking where contrary to the stated purpose of the federal statute. California
Manual of Policies and Procedures, Secs. 42-203.22, 42-203.31, 42-203.32. The purpose
of the statute (42 U.S.C. 1351) was to provide assistance to needy persons who could
not, because of their disabilities, earn a living. Moreover, the implementing federal
regulations intended to insure that applicants for aid be evaluated for their future
earning potential against their own personal backgrounds. 45 CFR 233.80. California's
regulations could deny aid to such persons. The regulations held an applicant up to
two separate tests of total disability. First, such an applicant was held to a test
of employability. Even where the state welfare agency might find that an applicant
was unable to continue employment, it moved on to determine whether the same person
could keep house. This dual and cumulative evaluation established California's adopted
view that there were certain persons who, even though they were unable to work, were
prevented from receiving assistance because they could perform some combination of
activities that kept homes in livable order. Nothing could be further from the purpose
of the federal statute. Therefore, the regulation was repugnant to the funding legislation
and, therefore, was violative of the Supremacy Clause. It appeared that the state
welfare agency had adopted a shortcut in evaluating the applications of persons who
had a history of homemaking, which shortcut was used in this proceeding. Instead of
beginning with an inquiry as to the applicant's employability, an immediate finding
was made with respect to that person's ability to perform homemaking activities. Since
the complainants in the proceeding were found fully capable of performing homemaking
duties under the short-cut method, there was no clear indication as to whether or
not they were employable under California's definition of that term. Had the referee
foreseen the issue raised here, he might well have inquired into the matter and found
that these complainants' were employable and ineligible on that ground. Accordingly,
the issue of complainants standing remained vague. Although the state regulations
were violative of the Supremacy Clause, it was not appropriate to grant any relief
to the complainants at this time. The matter, therefore, was remanded to the state
welfare agency for redetermination of complainants' physical ability to engage in
remunerative employment. Employability was to be the sole issue. Back reference: RS 01402.070. Available from National Clearinghouse for Legal Services (4071).