QUESTIONS PRESENTED
               You asked us to determine whether a parent-child relationship was established under
                  Virginia law between the Number Holder (NH), M~, and M2~, the claimant, the biological
                  child of the NH’s same-sex spouse, V~ (V~) for purposes of determining the claimant’s
                  entitlement to child’s insurance benefits (CIB) under Title II of the Social Security
                  Act (Act).
               
               SHORT ANSWER
               We believe that the Virginia courts will likely find that a parent-child relationship
                  was established under Virginia law to allow the claimant to inherit as the NH’s child
                  under Virginia’s intestacy statutes. Thus, we believe a parent-child relationship
                  likely exists for purposes of Title II of the Act.
               
               BACKGROUND
               The NH began receiving disability benefits in July 1996. The NH and her spouse, V~,
                  were married on February XX, 2005, in Massachusetts, which has recognized same-sex
                  marriages since 2004.[1] Nearly six years after the couple married, on January XX, 2011, V~ gave birth to
                  the claimant in Virginia.[2] The claimant is not the biological, adopted, or step-child of the NH. The claimant’s
                  birth certificate issued on June XX, 2015, lists V~ as the claimant’s “mother” and
                  the NH as the claimant’s “father.”
               
               DISCUSSION
               The Act and Regulations
               A claimant may be entitled to CIB under section 202(d)(1) of the Act, if he or she
                  (1) is the “child” of an insured individual NH, as defined in section 216(e) of the
                  Act, and (2) was dependent on the insured individual at the time the application was
                  filed. See Act §202(d)(1)(C)(i). In determining whether a claimant qualifies as the child of
                  the NH, the Commissioner applies the law governing “the devolution of intestate personal
                  property by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domiciled
                  at the time such applicant files application.”[3] See Act §216(h)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a)(1). An applicant who satisfies the requirements
                  of section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Act is also deemed dependent upon the insured individual.
                  20 C.F.R. § 404.361(a) (“If you are the insured’s natural child, as defined in § 404.355,
                  you are considered dependent upon him or her”); Social Security Ruling 77-2c (“where
                  state intestacy law provides that a child may take personal property from a father’s
                  estate, it may reasonably be thought that the child will more likely be dependent
                  during the parent’s life ...”). Since the NH is domiciled in Virginia, we apply Virginia
                  intestacy law to determine whether the claimant is NH’s child for the purposes of
                  the Act.
               
               State and Federal Law 
               The Virginia Code provides that a child can inherit from a parent through intestate
                  succession. Va. Code Ann. § 64.2–200 (West 2017). In terms of the parent-child relationship,
                  the Virginia Code provides that “[t]he parentage of a child resulting from assisted
                  conception is determined as provided in Chapter 9 (§ 20-156 et seq) of Title 20.” Va. Code Ann. § 64.2-102 (West 2017). Pursuant to Chapter 9 (§ 20-156
                  et seq) of Title 20, in cases of assisted conception, parentage is established as follows:
                  1) the gestational mother of a child is the child’s mother; 2) the husband of the
                  gestational mother is the child’s father; and 3) a donor is not the parent of the
                  child, unless that donor is the husband of the gestational mother. Va. Code Ann. §
                  20-158 (West 2017).
               
               No Court has interpreted Chapter 9 (§ 20-156 et seq) of Title 20 in the context of a same-sex marriage. That said, case law and state
                  agency determinations shed light on how Virginia courts would likely interpret such
                  provisions.
               
               On February 13, 2014, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
                  Virginia,
               
               Norfolk Division ruled that Virginia’s laws defining marriage as between one man and
                  one woman and prohibiting recognition of a union between two people of the same sex
                  were unconstitutional. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014), amended and superseded by 2014 WL 10022686, aff’d sub nom Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 190 L. Ed. 2d 140 (2014). Specifically,
                  the Court held that “[t]hese laws deny [same-sex couples] their rights to due process
                  and equal protection guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
                  Constitution.” Id. at 484.
               
               The Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment on July 28, 2014. Schaefer, 760 F.3d at 384. On October 6, 2014, the United States Supreme Court denied the
                  three outstanding petitions for writ of certiorari as to the Fourth Circuit’s affirmance.
                  Rainey v. Bostic, 190 L. Ed. 2d 140 (2014); Schaefer v. Bostic, 190 L. Ed. 2d 140 (2014); McQuigg v. Bostic, 190 L. Ed. 2d 140 (2014).
               
               Subsequent to the decision in Bostic, the Fairfax County Clerk of Court asked the Virginia Attorney General to provide
                  an advisory opinion as to whether Bostic altered the term “husband and wife” as used for purposes of the recordation of a
                  tax exemption as set forth by the Virginia Code. 2014 WL 7407210, at *1 (Va. A.G.
                  Dec. 18, 2014). On December 18, 2014, the Virginia Attorney General found that it
                  did and further stated:
               
               I note that, while your request addresses only one specific occurrence of “husband
                  and wife”, the term, along with “man and wife,” “wife,” and “husband” appears in the
                  Code of Virginia no fewer than 61 times, applying to subjects ranging from insurance contracts, to
                  joint ownership of property, and to adoption. See, respectively, Va. Code Ann.
               
               §§ 38.2-302 (2014), 55-20.2 (2012), 63.2-1215 (2012). The guarantees of equal protection
                  and due process apply equally to these provisions, and they must be applied equally
                  to all legal marriages. As Bostic v. Rainey makes clear, the Constitution of the United States requires no less.
               
               2014 WL 7407210, at *3, n 14 (Va. A.G. Dec. 18, 2014). Neither the Virginia Attorney
                  General’s opinion, nor its content has been interpreted by a Court, but the opinion
                  can be fairly read to state that Chapter 9 (§ 20-156 et seq) post-Bostic likely means that in the case of a same-sex marriage involving assisted conception
                  that the same-sex spouse of the child’s gestational mother is the child’s parent.
               
               The following month, on January 22, 2015, the Commonwealth of Virginia Department
                  of Health, Division of Vital Records, through the Director and State Registrar, wrote
                  a letter to hospital administrators stating that based on Bostic where a child is conceived by assisted conception and there are two female spouses
                  in a legal marriage, both spouses can be listed on their child’s birth certificate.[4] This letter is notable because the Virginia Code states that “[f]or the purpose of
                  birth registration in the case of a child resulting from assisted conception, pursuant
                  to Chapter 9 (§ 20-156 et seq.) of Title 20, the birth certificate of such child shall contain full information
                  concerning the mother’s husband as the father of the child and the gestational mother
                  as the mother of the child.” Va. Code Ann. § 32.1-257 (West 2017). In other words,
                  the Virginia Department of Health interpreted the Virginia Code post-Bostic to stand for the proposition that in the case of assisted conception, a same-sex
                  spouse of the child’s gestational mother is the child’s parent, regardless of the
                  use of the terms “husband” and “father” in Chapter 9 (§ 20-156 et seq.) of Title 20 of the Virginia code
               
               In sum, while no Court has interpreted Chapter 9 (§ 20-156 et seq) of Title 20 in the context of a same-sex marriage, the federal courts’ determination
                  in Bostic, the Virginia Attorney General’s Opinion in December 2014, and the Virginia Department
                  of Health’s letter to hospital administrators in January 2015, appear to indicate
                  that the Virginia courts will likely find— in the case of assisted conception—the
                  existence of a parent-child relationship between the child and the same-sex spouse
                  of the child’s gestational mother.
               
               CONCLUSION
               In conclusion, we believe that the Virginia courts will likely find that a parent-child
                  relationship was established under Virginia law to allow the claimant to inherit as
                  the NH’s child under the Virginia intestacy statutes. Thus, we believe a parent-child
                  relationship exists between the claimant and the NH for purposes of Title II of the
                  Act.
               
               Sincerely,
               Nora Koch
               Acting Regional Chief Counsel
               By: Stuart Weiss
               Assistant Regional Counsel