QUESTION PRESENTED
You asked whether a Judgment of Disavowal of a Child by the number holder J~ (NH)
obtained after the expiration of the time limit set by Louisiana statutory law affects
the status of (C1~’s) entitlement to child’s insurance benefits on the NH’s account.
If the Social Security Administration (SSA or agency) can accept the Judgment of Disavowal
of a Child at face value, you further ask whether SSA can re-open the agency’s initial
determination awarding child’s insurance benefits to C1~ and spouse’s benefits to
D~.
ANSWER
Under Louisiana law, the NH is presumed to be C1~’s father and the Louisiana Judgment
of Disavowal is not binding on the agency. As such, there is no basis for reopening
C1~’s or D~’s applications.
BACKGROUND
According to the information that you provided, the NH married D~ on May XX, 2012,
and she gave birth to C1~ on July XX, 2012. The NH became entitled to disability benefits
effective October 2012. On September 23, 2013, D~ filed an application on C1~’s behalf
for child’s insurance benefits on the NH’s account, but reported that the NH was not
C1~’s biological father. Based upon a presumption that the NH was C1~’s father because
C1~ was born during the NH’s and D~’s marriage, SSA awarded child’s insurance benefits
to C1~ effective October 2012. It is our understanding that SSA also awarded spouse’s
benefits to D~ as the NH’s wife with a child under age 16 in her care.
On September XX, 2013, the NH filed a petition for divorce, which incorporated a disavowal
action, alleging that he was not C1~’s father. The 21st Judicial District Court, Parish
of Tangipahoa, State of Louisiana, issued a Judgment of Divorce and a Judgment of
Disavowal on March XX, 2014. It is our understanding that SSA terminated D~’s spouse’s
benefits due to the divorce from the NH. The Judgment of Disavowal declared that the
NH was not C1~’s biological father, that the NH be allowed to disavow paternity of
C1~, and that his name be stricken from C1~’s birth certificate. However, as addressed
below, the evidence presented shows that the NH did not timely file an action to disavow
paternity under Louisiana statutory law.
DISCUSSION
Requirements for Child’s Insurance Benefits Under the Social Security Act
Section 202(d) of the Social Security Act (Act) provides that a child of an individual
entitled to old-age or disability benefits is entitled to child’s insurance benefits
beginning with the first month in which the child meets certain criteria. 42 U.S.C.
§ 402(d)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.352(a)(2). To be entitled to child’s benefits on an insured
number holder’s account, a child must be (1) the number holder’s child, (2)apply for
benefits, (3) under age 18, or a full-time elementary or secondary school student
under age 19, or under a disability that began before age 22, (4) be dependent on
the insured, and (5) be unmarried. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1), 20 C.F.R. § 404.350(a)(1)-(5).
In this case, at the time of the filing of the application for child’s insurance benefits
on C1~’s behalf on September 23, 2013, C1~ was under the age of eighteen and unmarried.
Further, SSA found that the presumption of paternity applied because C1~ was born
during the marriage between the NH and C1’s mother, D~, [1] and thus SSA found that C1~ was the NH’s natural child, and, as a result, that she
was dependent on the NH. [2] See 20 C.F.R. § 404.361(a). Therefore, the question of C1~’s entitlement or continuing
entitlement to benefits turns on whether the Louisiana court’s judgment binds SSA.
A. Child Status Under Louisiana Law and the Presumption of Paternity
In determining whether an applicant is a number holder’s child when the number holder
is living, SSA applies the state inheritance laws of the state where the number holder
has his permanent home when the child applies for benefits to determine if the child
could inherit the number holder’s property. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A), 20 C.F.R. §
404.355(a)(1), (b). Because the NH had his permanent home in Louisiana at the time
of C1~’s application, we apply Louisiana inheritance laws to determine C1~’s status
as the NH’s child. Louisiana intestacy law provides that when a person dies without
a valid will, “the undisposed property of the deceased devolves by operation of law
in favor of his descendants, ascendants, and collaterals, by blood or by adoption,
and in favor of his spouse not judicially separated from him.” La. Civ. Code Ann.
art. 880. Descendants include children. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 882. Louisiana defines
a child as “those persons born of the marriage,” and “a child born of marriage is
a child conceived or born during the marriage of his parents.” La. Civ. Code Ann.
Art. 3506; La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 185 (a mother’s husband is presumed to be the father
of a child born during the marriage). Therefore, under Louisiana law, C1~, being born
during Domonique’s and the NH’s marriage, is the NH’s presumed child for purposes
of inheritance. See Succession of V~, 70 So.2d 89, 89-90 (La. 1953) (children conceived and born during a marriage, but
admittedly another man’s biological children, were entitled to inherit as children
from the husband’s estate where he did not file a timely action to disavow); State, Dept. of Social Services, Office of Family
Support ex rel. K.B.D. v. Drew, 70 So.3d 1011, 1012 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (mother’s husband is presumed to be the
father of a child born during the marriage, and therefore paternity was established
by operation of law). In accordance with Louisiana law, SSA awarded child’s benefits
to C1~ effective October 2012 based upon a presumption of paternity since D~ gave
birth to C1~ during D~’s and the NH’s marriage.
B. SSA is Not Bound by the Louisiana State Court’s
Judgment of Disavowal
Generally, a state court decision does not bind the agency in a proceeding to which
it was not a party. See Gray v. Richardson, 474 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1973). Pursuant to Social Security Ruling (SSR) 83-37c,
adopting the rationale of Gray, certain state court determinations on domestic relations matters are entitled to
deference. See POMS GN 00306.001(C)(3) (noting that in determining child relationship under state law, where the evidence
includes a state court decision on the issue, SSA is not necessarily bound by the
court decision. See SSR 83-37c. Per SSR 83-37c, the agency is required to accept a state court’s determination
when the following prerequisites exist: (1) a state court of competent jurisdiction
has previously determined an issue in a claim for social security benefits; (2) parties
with opposing interests genuinely contested this issue before the state court; (3)
the issue falls within the general category of domestic relations law; and (4) the
State trial court’s resolution is consistent with the law the highest court in the
State enunciated. See SSR 83-37c, 1983 WL 31272 at *3. Conversely, when one of these elements is not satisfied,
a state court determination does not bind the agency.
The Judgment of Disavowal does not bind the agency in this case. From the information
provided, D~ acknowledged that the NH is not C1~’s biological father and did not contest
this issue before the court. Thus, the Judgment of Disavowal does not meet the second
Gray criteria that parties with opposing interests genuinely contested this issue before
the court. Additionally, the State trial court’s granting of a Judgment of Disavowal
is not consistent with the law the Louisiana Supreme Court has enunciated. Therefore,
the Judgment of Disavowal does not meet the fourth Gray criteria. [3]
C. The Judgment of Disavowal is not Consistent with the Law the
Louisiana Supreme Court has Enunciated
The only means to disestablish paternity under Louisiana law when paternity is presumed,
as in this case, is through a disavowal action showing by clear and convincing evidence
that the husband is not the father. Drew, 70 So.3d at 1013; La. Civ. Code Ann. Art. 187. An action to disavowal presumed paternity
is subject to a “liberative prescription” of one year. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 189.
The prescription commences to run from the day the husband learns or should have learned
of the child’s birth. Id. In the case of Naquin v. Naquin, 370 So.2d 148, (La. Ct. App. 1979), the court held that “birth of the child” refers
to learning of the birth under circumstances that would point to the possibility of
assertion of paternity. The facts in the current case demonstrate that the NH was
aware of D~’s pregnancy with C1~ during the marriage, that he knew, or should have
known, of the “birth of the child” on July XX, 2012, and that he was listed as the
father on C1~’s birth certificate. Cf. Drew, 70 So.3d at 1013 (Drew was at the hospital when the child was born, signed the child’s
birth certificate, and is listed as the child’s father). As such, the NH was required
to institute an action for disavowal of paternity within one year of C1~’s July XX,
2012, birth, or by July XX, 2013. The NH did not institute the action to disavowal
paternity until September 30, 2013.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has noted that in accordance with the State’s civilian
tradition, “prescription is defined as a means of acquiring legal rights or of losing
certain rights as the result of the passage of time. Taranto v.
Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp., 62 So.3d 721, 726 (La. 2011). Prescription and preemption [4] are procedural devices that bar valid substantive claims in Louisiana that have not
been timely filed. Id. The creation of prescription periods is exclusively a legislative task. Id., at FN 4. Louisiana statutory law recognizes three kinds of prescription, acquisitive
prescription, liberative prescription, and prescription of no-use. La. Civ. Code Ann.
art. 3445. “Liberative prescription” which is applicable in this case, is defined
as “a mode of barring of actions as a result of inaction for a period of time.” La.
Civ. Code Ann. art. 3447. The Louisiana Supreme Court has further defined the term
“liberative prescription” as “a period of time fixed by law for the exercise of a
right,” Taranto, 62 So.3d at 726, and “repeatedly held” that “prescription bars the remedy sought
to be enforced and terminates the right of access to the courts for enforcement of
existing rights.” Pounds v.
Schori, 377 So.2d 1195, 1198 (La. 1980). If the presumed father fails to bring a timely
disavowal action, as in this case, disavowal of paternity is barred by prescription,
and the presumption of paternity is irrebuttable. Modisette v. Phillips, 736 So.2d 983, 987 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
Liberative prescription is subject to suspension or interruption. See
D~, 70 So.3d at 1014 (citing Who’s Your Momma, Who Are Your
Daddies? Louisiana’s New Law of Affiliation, 67 La. Law Rev. 307 at 314 (2007). However, liberative prescription may not be interrupted
due to the father’s erroneous belief that he is the biological father, which is subsequently
disproved by clear and convincing evidence. As the Louisiana Supreme Court stated,
“[t]he Louisiana legislature has decided … that prescription runs from the date the
presumed father learned of or should have learned of the ‘birth’ of the child,” and
the “statute is clear and unambiguous.” [5] Id . at 1015. The NH should have brought any disavowal action within one year of C1~’s
birth, and his erroneous belief that he was C1~’s biological father does not provide
a basis for suspension or interruption of liberative prescription. Accordingly, because
the Judgment of Disavowal is not consistent with Louisiana law, it does not bind the
agency for purposes of C1~’s status as the NH’s child and his continued entitlement
to child’s benefits on the NH’s account.
D. The Judgment of Disavowal Does Not Provide a Basis for
Reopening the Initial Determinations of
C1~’s
and
D~’s
Applications
You asked whether SSA could reopen C1~’s and D~’s applications to change the awards
to denials. The Agency may reopen [6] and revise [7] its determination or decision on a claim, which is otherwise final and binding, within
12 months of the date of the notice of the initial determination for any reason; within
4 years of the date of the notice of the initial determination if the agency finds
good cause to reopen the case; or at any time if the determination was obtained by
fraud or similar fault. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.987, 404.988. Here, the 12-month period has
not yet lapsed from the September 2013 applications, and, thus, the agency may reopen
and revise the determinations for any reason. However, because the NH in this case
did not timely initiate proceedings to disavow his paternity of C1~, the Judgment
of Disavowal is not binding on the agency. Thus, Louisiana law still considers the
NH to be C1~’s father and, on that basis, the agency has no grounds to reopen and
revise its earlier determinations.
CONCLUSION
Under Louisiana law, the NH is presumed to be C1~’s father and the Louisiana Judgment
of Disavowal is not binding on the agency. As such, there is no basis for reopening
C1~’s or D~’s applications.