I. QUESTION PRESENTED
You have asked whether the intestacy law of Minnesota confers child status from the
date of a court order of paternity or from the date of birth of the child found to
have been fathered.
II. ANSWER
If the court that entered the paternity judgment had proper jurisdiction, and complied
with state law, the judgment confers child status on Steven P~ from the date of his
birth. Further development is necessary to determine if the trial court had proper
jurisdiction and complied with state law.
III. DISCUSSION
A. MINNESOTA INTESTACY LAW
Minnesota intestacy law, as amended in 1971 confers inheritance rights on a person
who has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to be the natural child
of a deceased man. Minn. Stat. Ann. §525.172 (1975). The paternity suit to make such
a determination may be brought even after the death of the alleged father. Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. 1978). The plaintiff in a Minnesota paternity suit brought
after the death of the putative father must prove the case "by clear and convincing
evidence." Id.
The court order in the claims file was entered in a paternity suit which was brought
after the death of wage earner Howard P~, Jr.E-239 A/N. While the order indicates
no appearance by Howard P~ personal representative, if the court had proper jurisdiction,
the judgment may nevertheless be valid to declare Steven P~ a child and heir of Howard
P~ for the purpose of intestate succession. Minn. Stat. Ann. §525.172. Such finding
under state law would confer "child" status under the Social Security Act.
As we interpret the Minnesota statute, id., any such determination is retroactive to the birth of the child The reason is,
the statute states that
"An illegitimate child shall inherit from his mother the same as if born in lawful
wedlock, and also . . . from the person who has been determined to be the father of
such child in a paternity proceeding before a court of competent jurisdiction;
Minn. Stat. Ann. §525.172 (emphasis added). This statute has been held sufficient
to impart the status of "child" of a wage earner under §216{h)(2}(A} of the Social
Security Act. "Ronald K. N~,CL-8-12 A/N ~," RA V {Helps} to Hearing Examiner, BHA,
SSA Minneapolis, Minnesota (Fischer),
Although the grammar of the foregoing quote is not completely unambiguous, we interpret
the final clause as meaning that a court order of paternity, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, confers legitimate child status as if born legitimate, i.e., the same
status as conferred on the illegitimate child vis-a-vis its mother. Cf. also, POMS
GN 00306.140(A) {showing Minnesota as one state in which an act of legitimation of a child dates
back to the child's birth).
Therefore, the court order in this matter, if valid, confers the status of parent
and child from date of birth of Steven P~.
B. Federal Law
The general rule regarding state lower court determinations is that the Secretary,
in making determinations of family status under State law for purposes of the Social
Security Act, need not afford controlling weight to a state trial court decision where
the Secretary was not a party. As noted in Cain v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 377 F.2d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1967):
The Secretary was under no constitutional compulsion to give full faith and credit
to the state court decree; he was only under a statutory compulsion to determine what
"the courts" of South Carolina would find in regard to Mr. C~ marital status at the
time he died Where, as here, the [State] Supreme Court has not had occasion to declare
the law, the Secretary may follow the decision of a nisi prius court; but if he believes
its decision to be in conflict with what the [State] Supreme Court "would find" were
the point presented to it, he may disregard that lower court's decision .... 377 F.2d
at 58.
The Sixth Circuit has set forth principles upon which to decide when the Secretary
must accept a state trial court decision on family status. In Gray v. Richardson, 474 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1973), the court used language to the effect that the Secretary
was "not free to ignore an adjudication of a state trial court where it is fair and
consistent with the law as enunciated by the highest court of the State." Id. at 1373. However, despite the non-mandatory language "not free to ignore," the court
in Gray mandated that the Secretary accept the particular state lower court determination
there because the state lower court decision met four tests tending to ensure reliability.
The Gray court stated:
We therefore hold that the Secretary should have accepted the determination made by
the State court. Such a holding is proper in the present case where the following
prerequisites are found: 1) An issue in a claim for social security benefits previously
has been determined by a State court of competent jurisdiction; 2) this issue was
genuinely contested before the State court by parties with opposing interests; 3)
the issue falls within the general category of domestic relations law; and 4) the
resolution by the State trial court is consistent with the law enunciated by the highest
court in the State. 474 F.2d at 1373 (emphasis added).
The Social Security Administration has adopted the language of Gray setting forth the four criteria for acceptance of a lower court judgment by the Secretary.
Our central office has approved a draft ruling incorporating the language of Gray, scheduled to be published in July (copy attached hereto). However, neither that
draft ruling nor the language in Gray requires that all four criteria be met to bind the Secretary to a state trial court
decision, [1] but where the criteria are met, the Secretary will be bound, at least in Ohio.
In the instant case, the claimant obtained a decree of paternity after the death of
the wage earner. Such a finding is permitted in Minnesota, if supported by "clear
and convincing evidence." Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. 1978). However, the Minnesota trial court obviously entered
a default judgment against deceased wage earner P~, i.e., there was not only no contest,
but unlike Larry G~,E-157 A/N ~, RA V {H~) to ARC-Programs (W~) 7/8/82, there was
no appearance by the estate or representative of the deceased wage earner.
The default judgment here thus defeats at least one of the Gray criteria — contested case. The default judgment casts some doubt on two of the remaining
three Gray criteria - court of competent jurisdiction and consistency with state law.
In Donald E. C~ , NCIF A/N~, RA V (D~) to ARC-Programs (W~} 7/2/82, a Minnesota default
judgment was found insufficient to bind or persuade the Secretary because it violated
two of the Gray court's tests [2] and because the default judgment was based on the same evidence which had previously
been rejected by the Secretary.
We believe that our inquiry should be more specific: whether the Minnesota Supreme
Court "would find" that the default judgment in this case was a valid and binding
judgment under Minnesota law. Cain v. Secretary, supra; Legory v. Finch, 424 F.2d 406, 409 (3rd Cir. 1970); Collins v. Celebrezze, 250 F.Supp. 37, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), In Collins, id., the court stated that a state court judgment determining marital status
. . . shall be the measure of federal rights under the Social Security Act, . . except
upon proof of extra- ordinary facts and circumstances which would impel the state
courts to sustain an attack upon the previous finding.
Such a rule makes sense under the Social Security Act. If the courts of a state "have
found" a person to be an heir of a wage earner that person is an heir under state
law unless the judgment is defective. Where a person is an heir under state intestacy
law, the Social Security Act deems that person a "child." Section 216{h){2){A). If
the state courts of Minnesota were deciding on the devolution of the estate of this
wage earner, the proper question is would the state Supreme Court treat claimant as
a "child" of the deceased wage earner because of the default trial court judgment
finding paternity on the part of the deceased wage earner. [3] Certainly, the Gray court itself thought that that was the proper determination because in Gray the court stated:
In the present case the right of the child to Social Security benefits is controlled
by the Ohio law of intestate succession of personal property. We have no doubt that
an Ohio probate court, in determining an issue of intestate succession would follow
an adjudication of legitimacy made by an Ohio Court of Common Pleas in a contested
divorce case.
We are convinced that the Supreme Court of Ohio would hold, under the facts of the
present case, that the right of Tamara L. Gray under the Ohio law of intestate succession would be controlled by the decision of
the Common Pleas Court in the contested divorce proceedings. 474 F.2d at 1372-73 (emphasis
added).
From the above quote and the foregoing discussion, we conclude the Gray court meant its language pertaining to criteria as an explanation why the state trial
court's determination in that case would be binding on the wage earner's estate under
Ohio law. The criteria set forth by the Gray court, if met, would bind the Secretary to a state lower court determination of paternity
because such a judgment would be valid and binding against the wage earner and his
estate thereby granting "child" status under Section 216 (h)(2)(A).
In our opinion, where one or more of the Gray criteria are not met, we should still look to the law of the state to determine whether
the paternity judgment would nevertheless be valid and binding against the wage earner
or his estate. In this particular case, we should look to Minnesota law pertaining
to judgments in general and default judgments in particular to ascertain whether this
default judgment is valid arid binding with respect to the deceased wage earner's
estate.
C. Minnesota Law of Judgments
The Minnesota law on default judgements in paternity actions has recently been announced
by the Minnesota Supreme Court.
As background the Minnesota Supreme Court has been urging the Minnesota trial courts
and the Minnesota legislature to consider the use of blood tests in paternity actions.
See State of Minnesota on behalf of Ortloff v. Hanson, 277 N.W.2d 205, 207 (Minn. 1979); Howells v. McKibben, 281 N.W.2d 154, 158 & n.3 (Minn. 1979); State of Minnesota on behalf of Hastings v. Deny, 296 N.W.2d 378, 379-80 (Minn. 1980). The reason is the belief of that Court "that
blood-test procedures provide the most reliable means for making the determination
of paternity more accurate and efficient." Ortloff v. Hanson, supra, 277 N.W.2d at 206.
In Wessels v. Swanson, 289 N.W.2d 469 (Minn. 1979), the Minnesota Supreme Court specifically addressed
the matter of default judgments in paternity cases. In that case, the Court upheld
the default judgment of paternity entered against the defendant because he "advanced
no reason for his failure and neglect to file an answer and to appear at trial and
he failed to act with due diligence after receiving notice of entry of the judgment."
298 N.W.2d at 470
However, in an unusual move,. the Minnesota Supreme Court then went on to hold that
if defendant submitted to blood tests within 90 days and could show the trial court
a likely meritorious defense, the default judgment would be vacated, and otherwise
the default judgment would be affirmed. 289 N.W.2d at 470. The Court set forth its
rationale in the following language:
We are cognizant, however, not only of the financial burden placed upon defendant
as a result of the adjudication of parentage, but also of the even more significant
consequences of the adjudication both for him and the other persons affected by it.
Such consequences require that an adjudication of paternity be based on the most reliable
kind of evidence available. In two decisions released in the last few months, we have
recognized that recently developed and highly sophisticated blood- grouping tests
may furnish such evidence and have urged the legislature to consider the matter of
blood testing in the context of paternity actions. In this case we have concluded
that if such tests furnish reliable evidence substantiating defendant's denial of
paternity, such evidence would furnish a reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment pursuant to R. 60.02(6).
289 N.W.2d at 470 (citations omitted).
As noted above, the Minnesota Supreme Court has also held, in Weber v. Anderson, supra, that a paternity action for inheritance purposes may be brought after the death
of the putative father, but clear and convincing proof of the deceased's paternity
must be adduced. 269 N.W. 2d at 895.
To our knowledge, the Minnesota Supreme Court has not addressed the matter of a default
judgment of paternity against a dead putative father or his estate. We are convinced
that, if presented with such a case, the Minnesota Supreme Court "would find" that
the default judgment should be reopened, upon motion of the defendant's estate, in
order to accomplish, at a minimum, any blood testing which could be done at that time,
unless the proceedings leading to the default judgment disclosed such blood tests
and their results, or proof that such blood tests are unavailable, [4] along with other evidence constituting "clear and convincing" evidence.
We base our interpretation of what the Minnesota Supreme Court "would find" on two
facts: First, the unusual action of the Minnesota Supreme Court in permitting the
defendant in Wessels v. Swanson, supra, to open a default judgment just held to be valid if the defendant would submit to
blood tests and those tests indicated that defendant was probably not the father.
Such a flexible interpretation of Minnesota's Rules of Civil Procedure indicates a
very strong feeling by the Court that blood tests are the best evidence of paternity
and should be required in every conceivable paternity case.
Second, the concern expressed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Weber v. Anderson, supra, over the possibility of fraudulent paternity actions against deceased putative.
fathers leads us to believe that the Minnesota Supreme Court would remand the first
default judgment against a deceased putative father, on motion of the estate, [5] for a determination of what blood-test proof would be available, if any. Then, if
any such proof were available, the Minnesota Supreme Court would require whatever
was available to uphold the default judgment against a collateral attack.
D. Conclusion
Because, in our opinion, the Minnesota Supreme Court would sustain a collateral attack
against a default judgment of paternity against a deceased wage earner, the Secretary
may disregard the default judgment in the claims file, standing alone. See Cain v. Secretary, supra; Collins v. Celebrezze, supra; cf. also, Gray v. Richardson, supra.
Moreover, in the absence of other evidence rising to the "clear and convincing" standard,
Weber v. Anderson, supra, the Minnesota Supreme Court "would find" the evidence insufficient to establish
paternity as against a dead man and the Minnesota Supreme Court "would remand" the
case for a determination of the feasibility of blood-tests and for the examination
of comparative blood samples or medical records, if feasible.
In the situation we find this case before SSA, the default court order — is not adequate
to prove paternity by the deceased wage earner, by itself or in connection with other
evidence in the claims file. Therefore, SSA must further develop the facts surrounding
the entry of the default judgment. [6] And, in the event that the court entering the default judgment has no evidence of
comparative blood tests or of the unavailability of such tests, SSA should determine
if such tests would be feasible where the putative father is deceased and require
them if feasible, or require claimant to provide other evidence that would prove paternity
on the part of deceased wage earner, Howard P~, Jr. by "clear and convincing" evidence.
"Of the four prerequisites listed in Gray for a state trial court decision to be binding on the federal Government when interpreting
a federal statute, three were definitely present in this case .... " 585 F.2d at 155.
We do not believe that Dennis meant to extend Gray to hold that each of the four criteria is necessary before the Secretary will be bound,
and we have found that the Secretary should accept a decision in an uncontested case
where the other criteria were met and the estate of the deceased wage earner did not
contest the entry of an order of paternity. Larry G~, supra.