NH’s text messages are insufficient to establish paternity under North Carolina’s
intestacy law because there is no evidence they were “acknowledged before a certifying
officer” and “filed during [NH’s] own lifetime . . . in the office of the clerk of
superior court of the county where either he or the child resides.” See id.
Further, the text messages are insufficient to establish NH as the father of Claimant
under section 216(h)(3)(C)(i)(I)) of the Act because they do not clearly acknowledge
that Claimant is the son of NH.
Although the writing containing the recognition of paternity need not be in any particular
form, see POMS GN 00306.105(B), SSR 79-22, it should contain a clear and unequivocal acknowledgment that the
writer is the father of the child. See Johnson v. Sullivan, 735 F. Supp. 416, 420 (M.D. Fla. 1990). “Incomplete or ambiguous acknowledgements
of paternity are not construed presumptively in illegitimate claimants’ favor.” Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. Sullivan, 874 F.2d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir.1989) . “A writing satisfies the statute when it ‘unequivocally
acknowledges paternity,’ that is, when it ‘is susceptible of only one reasonable construction.’”
Johnson, 735 F. Supp. at 421 (citations omitted). Examples of “unequivocal language” concerning
paternity include references to a child as “my [son]” or “our baby.” Id. Thus, text messages may qualify as a writing under § 216(h)(3)(C)(i)(I) if the person
sending the messages clearly and unequivocally acknowledges his paternity of the child.
Here, the texts messages from NH do not clearly and unequivocally acknowledge his
paternity of Claimant. NH made statements that demonstrate his affection for Claimant
and desire to spend time with Claimant. However, such statements are insufficient.
See, e.g., Cox v. Schweiker, 684 F.2d 310, 317 (5th Cir. 1982) (references in diary by putative father to claimant
as a “pretty” kid and designation of claimant as beneficiary of a life insurance policy
was insufficient); Johnson, 735 F. Supp. at 421 (letter to claimant’s mother stating “I miss you and [claimant]
so damn much” and “Give [claimant] a big kiss for me every morning” was insufficient).
Here, the strongest evidence of an acknowledgment of paternity is NH’s reference to
Claimant as “my stinkin L~.” However, the statement is not unequivocal language of
paternity because it fails to clearly identify Claimant as NH’s child. See Parker v.
Barnhart, 2006 WL 2135754, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 1, 2006) (holding number holder’s reference
to claimant as “my little girl” was “far too ambiguous” and explaining that it “conveys
affectionate feelings, [but] does not unequivocally imply a father-daughter relationship.”);
cf. Vance v. Heckler, 757 F.2d 1324, 1327–28 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (putative father’s letter referring to mother
of claimant and indicating that “I told her that I would take care of my son” was
sufficient); PR 01210.036 North Carolina, A. PR. 13-100 Child Status Based on DNA Testing of Claimant, Claimant’s
Mother, and Number Holder’s Sister – North Carolina (July 9, 2013) (advising that
for purposes of deeming the claimant to be the NH’s child under section 216(h)(3)(C)(i)(I),
NH’s messages on Facebook were sufficient where he, inter alia, referred to claimant as his “daughter”). Therefore, Claimant has not established
that NH is his father under § 216(h)(3)(C)(i)(I).