QUESTION
You asked whether the number holder’s adoption of the claimant, an adult, is valid
under Mississippi law for determining the claimant’s entitlement to child’s insurance
benefits (CIB) as the number holder’s Disabled Adult Child (DAC).
OPINION
The number holder’s adoption of the claimant is valid under Mississippi law. Therefore,
the claimant is the number holder’s child for determining the claimant’s eligibility
for CIB as the number holder’s DAC. We express no opinion regarding whether the claimant
meets the dependency or other requirements for entitlement to CIB.
BACKGROUND
According to the information provided, J~ (Claimant) was born in October 1983. His
mother died in 2011 and his father never provided support to Claimant or participated
in Claimant’s life. On July XX, 2014, the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District
of Hinds County, Mississippi, issued a Judgment on Adoption ordering that A~, the
number holder (NH), was a fit and suitable person to adopt Claimant and that the adoption
was in Claimant’s best interest. The Chancery Court ordered that Claimant is adopted
by NH and for all legal intents and purposes is considered NH’s natural child. Claimant
was 30 years old at the time of the adoption. NH is currently receiving Old Age Insurance
Benefits.
DISCUSSION
A claimant may be entitled to CIB (whether as a DAC or category of “child”) if he
is the “child” of an individual entitled to old-age insurance benefits. See Act § 202(d)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.350(a)(1) (2015).*[1] The Act defines “child” to include a legally adopted child. See Act § 216(e)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.354. The determination of whether a claimant is the
legally adopted child of a wage earner is based on the adoption laws of the State
where the putative adoption took place. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.356; Program Operations Manual (POMS) GN 00306.135(1). NH’s purported adoption of Claimant took place in Mississippi. Therefore, we
look to Mississippi law to determine whether the adoption was valid.
Mississippi law provides that any person may be adopted. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-17-3(4)
(West 2015). The law specifically provides that the word “child” is construed to refer
to the person adopted, even if he or she is an adult. Id. Proper jurisdiction for an adoption is the chancery court of the county in which the
adopting petitioner or petitioners reside or the child to be adopted resides or was
born. Id. A petition must be accompanied by a doctor’s statement regarding the physical and
mental state of the adoptee and a schedule of property owned by the adoptee. Id. Mississippi law also provides that no action shall be brought to set aside a final
decree of adoption after six months have passed following the entry thereof. Miss.
Code Ann. § 93-17-15 (West 2015). After the six-month period, no decree of adoption
shall be set aside at all “except for jurisdictional defects and for failure to file
and prosecute the same under the provisions of this chapter.” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-17-17
(West 2015).
Mississippi courts have indicated the doctor’s certificate is a jurisdictional prerequisite,
and when the petition for adoption is not accompanied by such certificate, the petition
is not properly before the court. See S.R. v. P.L.H., 748 So. 2d 853, 856-57 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); Boone v. George Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 459 So. 2d 254, 257 (Miss. 1984). The Mississippi Supreme Court clarified, however,
that even if the court had previously referred to the requirements as “jurisdictional,”
the requirements for a doctor certificate and a statement of the adoptee’s property
were not the sort of requisite to an adoption proceeding which could be asserted two
years after the fact in an attempt to set aside or revoke an adoption. In re Adoption of R.M.P.C., 512 So. 2d 702 (Miss. 1987). The court acknowledged a strong public policy for the
finality of adoption decrees. Id. at 707 (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 93-17-17). The court deferred judgment on the question
of whether the requirements for a doctor certificate and statement of adoptee’s property
could justify revocation of an adoption within the first six months after the decree.
Id.
Here, the adoption decree was issued by the chancery court from Hinds County. The
Judgment of Adoption states that the petitioner, NH, was a resident citizen of Hinds
County, Mississippi. Thus, NH met the residency requirement. The Judgment mentions
the adoption petition and attached exhibits, but does not provide further detail about
what those documents included. The Judgment does not mention any certification from
a doctor or Claimant’s property ownership. It is possible those documents are included
among the exhibits attached to the adoption petition, but it is not clear from the
documents provided to us. Under Mississippi law, as a public official, the chancery
court judge here is presumed to have performed his duties lawfully and correctly.
See Aarco Oil & Gas Co. v. EOG Resources, Inc., 20 So. 3d 662, 668 (Miss. 2009). Regardless of whether those two documents were
included with the petition, the chancery court issued the Judgment on Adoption on
July 10, 2014. Over a year has passed. The Mississippi courts have held that at least
after six months, an adoption decree that was issued without these two requirements
does not have a jurisdictional defect. In re Adoption of R.M.P.C., 512 So. 2d at 707-08. Thus, even though it is not clear here whether NH filed the
requisite paperwork with the court, the presumption is that the judge performed his
duties according to the law and the chancery court still issued the adoption judgment
and there are no jurisdictional defects. Therefore, Mississippi would recognize NH’s
adoption of Claimant. We note that for Claimant to qualify for CIB on NH’s earning
record, Claimant also must meet the other criteria set forth in section 202(d) of
the Act and the applicable regulations. See Act § 202(d)(1)(C)(i); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.350(a), 404.360, 404.362.
CONCLUSION
Based on the evidence provided, NH validly adopted Claimant in accordance with Mississippi
law. Thus, Claimant is NH’s child for determining Claimant’s eligibility for CIB as
NH’s DAC
Mary Ann Sloan
Regional Chief Counsel
By: _________________________
Kristin M. Rogers
Assistant Regional Counsel