QUESTION PRESENTED
You have asked whether the conviction in New York of S~, (Claimant) for the second-degree
manslaughter of her husband E~, the number holder (NH), disqualifies her from receiving
widow’s benefits on the account of her deceased husband, and if so, whether SSA is
permitted to reopen her initial determination of eligibility.
OPINION
Under New York State law, a conviction for second-degree manslaughter constitutes
a felony and an intentional homicide within the meaning of SSA’s regulations. Accordingly,
Claimant’s conviction for the second-degree manslaughter of the NH makes her ineligible
to receive benefits on the NH’s account. SSA is permitted to reopen Claimant’s 2014
initial determination of eligibility at any time.
BACKGROUND [1] Claimant married the NH in June 1970 in Syracuse, New York. The NH died in December
1975 in Syracuse, New York. Claimant was convicted of second-degree manslaughter in
New York State for the death of the NH in September 1977, and incarcerated from that
date until June 1980. Claimant was on placed on parole until June 1983
Claimant filed an application for Social Security widow’s benefits on the record of
the NH on April 24, 2014. Claimant’s application was approved on June 11, 2014. Subsequently,
the Victorville, California Field Office discovered Claimant’s prior conviction and suspended her widow’s
benefits.
Claimant’s daughter informed an SSA Claims Representative that Claimant and the NH
had been involved in an altercation at the time of the homicide. She stated that her
mother did not kill the NH intentionally, but rather as an act of self-defense.
Claimant has not been cooperative with providing further evidence regarding her prior
conviction.
ANALYSIS
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1.
Claimant is Ineligible for Benefits on the NH’s Account Because She Was Convicted
of the Felonious and Intentional Homicide of the NH
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a.
SSA Regulations and Policy
The widow of an individual who died a fully insured wage earner is entitled to widow’s
insurance benefits if she is not married, has attained the age of 60, and has filed
an application for widow’s insurance benefits. Social Security Act (Act) § 202(e)(1),
42 US.C. § 402(e)(1); 20 C.F.R § 404.335; Program Operations Manual System (POMS)
RS 00207.001(A)(1)(b); see Act § 216(c), 42 U.S.C. § 416(c) (defining the term “widow”). Claimant satisfies these
requirements for entitlement to widow’s insurance benefits on the NH’s earnings record.
SSA regulations and policy provide that a claimant may not become entitled to or continue
to receive any survivor’s benefits or payments on the earnings record of any person
if he or she was convicted of a felony or an act in the nature of a felony of intentionally
causing that person’s death. 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b). “An adult convicted of the felonious
and intentional homicide of another person cannot be entitled to monthly benefits
. . . on the earnings record of that person.” PMS GN 00304.060(A)(1). Thus, for purposes of satisfying 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b), Claimant must have
been convicted of a felony and an intentional homicide in order to be deemed ineligible
to receive widow’s benefits on the NH’s account.
The classification of a conviction for manslaughter as an “intentional homicide” under
20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b) depends on the laws of the state in which the claimant was
convicted. POMS GN 00304.065. When determining whether the manslaughter conviction constitutes an “intentional
homicide,” under the regulations, the Agency must first consider whether the conviction
was for involuntary or voluntary manslaughter. Id. In the event that state law does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary
manslaughter, the Agency must not presume intent, but rather must develop the facts
relative to the slaying to determine if intent was present. Id.
SSA defines “intent” to mean:
A wish or expectancy that an act will have a certain result (regardless of the actual
likelihood of such result).
The presence of will in the commission of a criminal act where the individual is fully
aware of the nature and probable consequences of the act that he or she plans to commit.
This applies whether the individual desires that such consequences occur or is indifferent
as to their occurrence.
Seldom intent is established by direct proof, but must be inferred from facts.
POMS GN 00304.060(B)(1). SSA excludes homicides where the killing is the result of self-defense from
its definition of intentional homicide. POMS GN 00304.065.
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b.
New York State Law
New York State law classifies manslaughter in the second degree as a class C felony.
N.Y. Penal Law § 125.15 (McKinney 1965). Thus, second degree manslaughter in New York
constitutes a “felony” for purposes of satisfying 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b) and POMS
GN
00304.060(A)(1).
As noted above, whether manslaughter in the second degree is classified as an “intentional
homicide” under the regulations depends on the laws of the state in which the claimant
was convicted. POMS GN 00304.065. Under New York State law, “[a] person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree
when he recklessly causes the death of another person. . . .” N.Y. Penal Law § 125.15.
[2] A person acts recklessly under New York law when “he is aware of and consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that
such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard
thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable
person would observe in the situation.” N.Y. Penal Law § 15.05(3) (McKinney 1965).
[3] New York courts have held that a person is “chargeable with recklessness when he
is aware of a designated risk and consciously disregards it.” People v. Licitra, 393 N.E.2d 456, 458-59 (N.Y. 1979) (holding that a defendant’s conviction for manslaughter
in the second degree was proper because a jury could have properly concluded that
defendant acted recklessly in creating and disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable
risk) (citing People v. Montanez, 359 N.E.2d 371 (N.Y. 1976) (“if he was aware of the grave risk of death and acted
in disregard of it, he acted recklessly … and is guilty of manslaughter in the second
degree…”) (additional citations omitted). “[T]o establish manslaughter in the second
degree, the prosecution must prove three elements: the creation of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk; an awareness and disregard of the risk on the part of defendant;
and a resulting death.” Licitra, 393 N.E.2d at 459.
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c.
Analysis
A homicidal act is intentional if the actor “is fully aware of the nature and probable
consequences of the act that he or she plans to commit.” POMS GN 00304.060(B)(1). Thus, if a person commits an act which he or she wishes or expects will result
in the death of another person, he or she would be considered to have committed an
“intentional homicide”, regardless of whether or not the resulting death was actually
desired. Id.; See SSR 89-6c (noting that the POMS “expand[s] on the traditional meaning of an intentional
state of mind . . . [to] include … ‘an act which [the actor] knows could result in
death of the [wage earner] even though the [insured’s] death is not actually desired.’”)
(adopting the holding of Davis v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 867 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1989).
The definition of second-degree manslaughter in New York State comports with the definition
of intent found in the POMS. Furthermore, in Davis, the Sixth Circuit held that a claimant’s conviction of second-degree manslaughter
in Kentucky satisfied the Agency’s definition of an “intentional homicide” for the
purposes of applying the regulation. 867 F.2d at 340. In 1982, the Kentucky penal
code defined second-degree manslaughter as “wanton killing.” Kentucky defined “wantonly”
as follows: “[a] person acts wantonly . . . when he is aware of and consciously disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance
exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes
a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe
in the situation.” Davis, 867 F.2d at 337. With the exception of the use of the word “wanton” instead of “reckless,”
Kentucky’s definition of second-degree manslaughter is virtually identical to New
York State’s definition of second-degree manslaughter. See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 15.05; 125.15.
For these reasons, second-degree manslaughter in New York qualifies as an intentional
homicide within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b). See POMS GN 00304.060(B)(1).; SSR 89-6c (citing Davis.).
SSA excludes homicides where the killing is the result of self-defense from its definition
of intentional homicide. POMS GN 00304.065A. Nevertheless, despite the statement of Claimant’s daughter that Claimant’s killing
of the NH was an act of self-defense, the evidence does not establish this. Under
New York State law, a person who “use[s] physical force upon another person when,
and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend [himself]
from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical
force by such other person,” is justified in his or her actions. N.Y. Penal Law §
35.15(1) McKinney 1968). [4] “In any prosecution for an offense, justification, as defined [by the Statute] is
a defense.” N.Y. Penal Law § 35.00 (McKinney 1965). [5] “The defense does not operate to excuse a criminal act, nor does it negate a particular
element of a crime. Rather, by recognizing the use of force to be privileged under
certain circumstances, it renders such conduct entirely lawful.” People v. McManus, 496 N.E.2d 202, 205 (N.Y. 1986) (citations omitted). Thus, if a jury determines
that the use of force is justified, then the act cannot be considered criminal and
the actor cannot be convicted of the crime. Here, Claimant was convicted of second-degree
manslaughter, and thus, there is no evidence that her act was determined to be legally
justifiable. [6] Because Claimant’s conviction for second-degree manslaughter constitutes a felonious
and intentional homicide under 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b), she is ineligible to receive
widow’s benefits on the NH’s account.
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2.
SSA Regulations Permit Reopening Claimant’s Eligibility Determination
SSA regulations provide that a determination may be reopened within twelve months
of the determination for any reason. 20 C.F.R § 404.988(a). Furthermore, a determination
may be reopened at any time if that determination “is incorrect because . . . [y]ou
were convicted of a crime that affected your right to receive benefits or your entitlement
to a period of disability. . . ." 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(c)(11).
The initial determination regarding this matter was made on June 11, 2014, and thus,
may be reopened at this time for any reason. Furthermore, the initial determination
that Claimant was eligible for widow’s benefits was incorrect, because she was convicted
of a crime that rendered her ineligible to collect benefits on her deceased husband’s
account. We therefore conclude that the determination may be reopened at any time
pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(c)(11).
CONCLUSION
Under New York law, Claimant’s conviction for the second-degree manslaughter of the
NH is a felonious and intentional homicide, and Claimant is therefore ineligible for
widow’s benefits on the NH’s account. SSA is permitted to reopen Claimant’s 2014 eligibility
determination at any time.