QUESTION PRESENTED
For purposes of the claimant J1~’s (J1~’s or second wife’s) application for surviving
spouse benefits on the record of J2~, the number holder (NH), you asked us to determine
whether the NH was validly married to J1~, his purported second wife, at the time
of his death in 2004. If J1~ is the NH’s legal widow, you also asked whether L~ (L~
or third wife), the NH’s purported third wife who is currently entitled to widow’s
benefits on the NH’s record, is a party to a putative marriage or a deemed spouse
for purposes of entitlement to surviving spouse benefits on the NH’s record.
ANSWER
Based on the evidence submitted, although Louisiana law presumes the validity of the
last marriage, we believe that J1~ has successfully rebutted this presumption in challenging
the NH’s last marriage to L~ and proving her marriage to the NH. As such, J1~ was
validly married to the NH at the time of his death in 2004 and is entitled to benefits
on the NH’s account as his surviving spouse, or widow.[1] We find that L~ is the NH’s putative spouse under Louisiana law and, as such, is
also entitled to benefits (to continue to receive widow’s benefits) on the NH’s account
as his widow.
BACKGROUND
The NH passed away on August XX, 2004, while domiciled in Louisiana. There is evidence
indicating that the NH potentially had three marriages to three different women, and
it is our understanding that the Social Security Administration (SSA or agency) has
been paying widow’s benefits to the NH’s third wife, L~, on his record since 2004.
Your legal opinion request focuses only upon whether J1~ or L~ is the NH’s legal widow.
Further, because evidence shows a divorce from the NH’s first wife, M~ (M~ or first
wife), M~ would not qualify as his legal widow.[2] Thus, this legal opinion focuses only upon J1~’s and L~’s claims for widow’s benefits.
The NH’s Second Purported Marriage to J1~
On March XX, 2015, J1~ filed a claim for benefits on the NH’s record as a surviving
spouse, and it is this claim that is the subject of this present legal opinion request.
The evidence includes a certified copy of a Pennsylvania marriage certificate showing
that J1~ and the NH married in a solemnized marriage ceremony in Paoli, Chester County,
Pennsylvania on August XX, 1986.[3] According to your request, J1~ alleged that she never filed for divorce and was not
aware of the NH filing for divorce.
J1~ listed her marriage to the NH in her 1994 disability application. The NH did not
list his marriage to J1~ in his 2003 retirement and disability applications. In an
August 2015 statement to the agency, J1~ stated that the NH was previously married
to and legally divorced from M~. She said the NH had two daughters with M~. J1~ further
stated that she and the NH lived together on and off from 1981 to 1990 and did not
conceive any children during their marriage. J1~ stated that the NH left Pennsylvania
in 1990 to work in Louisiana, and it was her understanding that he met L~ there. The
NH called J1~ once in 1991, but she had very little contact with him after that. J1~
also said she no longer had contact information for any of the NH’s family. Additionally,
she did not know the exact dates and places the NH lived after leaving Pennsylvania
in 1990, but she thought that he lived in or around New Orleans, Louisiana and possibly
Thibodaux, Louisiana; Labadieville, Louisiana; or Baton Rouge, Louisiana. J1~ stated
that she was never served with a notice of divorce proceedings and never received
notice that the NH was trying to obtain a divorce. In June 2015, the field office
contacted Assumption Parish, Louisiana; Lafourche Parish, Louisiana; New Orleans,
Louisiana; and East Baton Rouge, Louisiana and did not locate a divorce decree between
the NH and J1~. The field office also contacted Chester County, Pennsylvania and did
not find a divorce decree.
The NH’s Third Purported Marriage to L~
You advised that the agency received proof of a ceremonial marriage by clergy or public
official between the NH and L~ that took place on September XX, 1992, in Thibodaux,
Louisiana. The NH also listed his September 1992 marriage to L~ in his 2003 disability
and retirement applications.[4] Following the NH’s death in August 2004, on September XX, 2004, L~ filed an application
for a lump sum death payment on the NH’s account, in which she stated that she and
the NH were living together at the time of his death in August 2004.[5] We understand that L~ also submitted a signed statement to the agency that she did
not have any knowledge of a marriage between the NH and J1~ and was only aware of
his marriage to M~.[6] L~ indicated that the NH lived in Assumption Parish, Louisiana, and that he possibly
lived in New Orleans, Louisiana; Lafourche, Louisiana; and Baton, Rouge, Louisiana.
L~ is currently receiving widow’s benefits on the NH’s record.
ANALYSIS
Entitlement to Widow’s Benefits Under the Social Security Act
The Social Security Act (Act) provides that a claimant may be eligible for benefits
as an insured NH’s widow if she was validly married to the NH at the time of his death,
or if not validly married, she would be able to inherit a spouse’s share under state
intestate succession laws. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e)(1), 416(c)(1), (h)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.335(a), 404.345. There
are additional requirements for entitlement to widow’s benefits that we do not address,
as they are not relevant to this legal opinion. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1)(A)-(D); 20 C.F.R. § 404.335(b)-(e). Because the Act directs
the agency to apply the law of the state where the NH had a permanent home at the
time of his death to determine the validity of a marriage and inheritance as a spouse
under intestate succession laws, Louisiana law controls. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.345; 20 C.F.R. § 404.303 (permanent home
means the true and fixed home or legal domicile of the insured individual).
Under Louisiana Law, J1~ has Proven that She had a Valid Marriage to the NH at the
Time of the NH’s Death in 2004, under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i)
As noted above, Louisiana law is controlling in the present matter as we consider
whether J1~ or L~ is the NH’s legal widow. Under Louisiana law, a marriage is presumed
valid. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3520. A marriage contracted in violation of an impediment,
however, is an absolutely null union and “devoid of legal effect from the moment of
its inception.” See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 94, comment (b). An existing marriage qualifies as such an
impediment. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 88. In a situation involving successive or conflicting marriages
where the validity of the subsequent marriage is attacked on the basis that a previous
marriage still existed at the time the subsequent marriage occurred, the presumption
of validity attaches to the last marriage. See Lands v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 120 So.2d 74, 76-77 (La. 1960). However, the presumption that the last marriage
is valid may be rebutted. See Ellis v. Hayes, 168 So.2d 885, 886 (La. Ct. App. 1964). The burden of rebutting the presumption
rests with the party asserting the invalidity of the last marriage. See Zanders v. Zanders, 434 So.2d 1213, 1215 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Lands, 120 So.2d at 76-77.
It is our understanding that the agency determined that L~ presented sufficient evidence
establishing that she was validly married to the NH in a ceremonial marriage in Louisiana
in 1992, granted her 2004 application for benefits as the NH’s widow, and that she
is currently entitled to widow’s benefits on the NH’s record.[7] Louisiana law presumes that L~ is the NH’s legal widow because her 1992 ceremonial
marriage to the NH in Louisiana was his last marriage. See Lands, 120 So.2d at 76-77; see also U.S. v. Marlow, 235 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1956) (a ceremonial marriage shown by a proper marriage
certificate is presumed to have been legal and valid, and anyone asserting the invalidity
of such marriage has the burden of proof). Therefore, J1~, who is claiming that she
is the NH’s legal widow, has the burden of proving that she was married to the NH
at the time he married L~ and that her marriage to the NH had not ended before he
married L~. See Patterson v. Gaines, 47 U.S. 550, 597 (1848) (“The burden of proof in such cases is not upon the party
asserting the validity of the second marriage, but on the other, who asserts its invalidity
on account of the validity of the first.”); Succession of Primus, 131 So.2d 319, 322 (La. Ct. App. 1961) (burden of proof rests on party attacking
the second marriage to prove that first marriage still in existence).
Although the NH did not list his marriage to J1~ in his 2003 applications for benefits,
J1~ presented evidence establishing that she was validly married to the NH in the
form of a certification of a marriage record from Chester County, Pennsylvania showing
that she and the NH married in a solemnized marriage ceremony in Paoli, Chester County,
Pennsylvania on August XX, 1986. Louisiana will recognize a valid out-of-state marriage.[8] See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3520(A) (“A marriage that is valid in the state where contracted,
or in the state where the parties were first domiciled as husband and wife, shall
be treated as a valid marriage unless to do so would violate a strong public policy
of the state”); see also Ghassemi v. Ghassemi, 998 So.2d 731, 738 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (“it is the public policy of Louisiana that
every effort be made to uphold the validity of marriages.”). Given this certification
of a marriage record, the more critical issue under these facts is whether J1~ has
successfully rebutted the presumption of validity of L~’s marriage to the NH by showing
that her 1986 marriage was still in existence when the NH married L~ in 1992 in Louisiana.
J1~ has presented her own statements as to their marriage.
In analyzing the evidence, we look to Louisiana cases involving the presumption of
the validity of the last marriage and the types of evidence that courts found sufficient
or insufficient to rebut the presumption. J1~ listed her marriage to the NH on her
1994 disability application and asserted that the marriage had not ended. J1~ also
stated that she never obtained a divorce from the NH, she was never served with notice
of a divorce proceeding, and she never received notice that the NH was trying to obtain
a divorce. Louisiana courts have held that while not conclusive, such factors are
probative in rebutting the presumption that the last marriage is valid. See In re Succession of Jones, 6 So.3d 331, 336 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (presumption rebutted where first wife never
received notice of divorce and still considered herself married); King v. Cancienne, 303 So.2d 891, 894 (La. Ct. App. 1974), judgment rev’d on other grounds, 316 So.2d 366 (La. 1975) (marriage certificate and deposition of the woman’s first
husband that they had never been divorced sufficient to rebut validity of the woman’s
second marriage); Henderson v. Finch, 300 F.Supp. 753, 756 (W.D. La. 1969)[9] (while not conclusive, plaintiff’s assertions that she never obtained a divorce,
that no divorce papers or summons were ever served upon her, and that the wage-earner
never indicated to her that he desired a divorce, were highly probative); Ellis, 168 So.2d at 886 (presumption rebutted where wife testified that she had never filed
for divorce or separation action and had never been served with any papers for such
an action).[10]
Additionally, the agency has been unable to locate any divorce records as to J1~’s
marriage to the NH. Louisiana courts have found the inability to locate divorce records
particularly relevant in rebutting the presumption that the last marriage is presumed
valid against all earlier marriages. See Greer v. Hatter, 364 So.2d 1050, 1052-1053 (La. Ct. App. 1978) writ denied, 367 So.2d 392 (La. 1979); Henderson, 300 F.Supp. at 756; Ellis, 168 So.2d at 886. Here, J1~ and the NH were married in Chester County, Pennsylvania.
J1~ stated that the NH left Pennsylvania in 1990 to work in Louisiana. She was unsure
of the exact dates and places the NH lived after 1990, but she thought that he lived
in or around New Orleans, Louisiana and possibly in Thibodaux, Louisiana (Lafourche
Parish); Labadieville, Louisiana (Assumption Parish); or Baton Rouge, Louisiana. L~
confirmed that the NH lived in Assumption Parish, Louisiana, and possibly in New Orleans,
Louisiana; Lafourche, Louisiana; and Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The agency found no record
of divorce in Chester County, Pennsylvania. The agency also contacted, but did not
find a divorce decree between the NH and J1~, in Assumption Parish, Louisiana; Lafourche
Parish, Louisiana; New Orleans Parish, Louisiana; and East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana.
Thus, based on the information available, there is no evidence of divorce in any of
the jurisdictions where the NH might reasonably have pursued a divorce.
While it is possible that the NH obtained a divorce elsewhere, we do not think that
a Louisiana court, faced with these facts, would find it necessary for J1~ to prove
the nonexistence of divorce in every jurisdiction where proceedings could have been
possible. See Jones, 6 So.3d at 337 (because venue for a divorce action is jurisdictional in Louisiana,
first wife not required to search even those places where the wage earner traveled
overnight); Greer, 364 So.2d at 1052-1053 (rejecting argument that defendant was required to show that
first husband did not divorce wife in any of the various places he lived- sufficient
that there was no record of divorce in the parish where they first lived as man and
wife); Henderson, 300 F.Supp. at 756 (sufficient that secretary searched 11 last known localities where wage earner resided and found no evidence of a divorce); Succession of Thomas, 80 So. 186, 189 (La. 1918) (finding it impracticable, if not impossible, to produce
evidence showing that a divorce had not been granted by any of the courts in any of
the places where the husband may have been a resident). Thus, while not conclusive,
the absence of divorce records strongly suggests that the NH and J1~ were never divorced.
In sum, Louisiana law presumes that L~ is the NH’s legal widow because her 1992 ceremonial
marriage to the NH in Louisiana was his last marriage. As the party asserting the
invalidity of the last marriage, J1~ must overcome this presumption. See Zanders, 434 So.2d at 1215; Primus, 131 So.2d at 322; Lands, 120 So.2d at 76-77; Patterson, 47 U.S. at 597. We believe a Louisiana court would find that she has done so in
this case. J1~ listed her marriage to the NH on her disability application and asserted
that the marriage had not ended. J1~ also stated that she never obtained a divorce
from the NH, she was never served with notice of a divorce proceeding, and she never
received notice that the NH was trying to obtain a divorce. Finally, the agency found
no evidence of divorce in the jurisdictions where the NH might reasonably have obtained
a divorce. Thus, we conclude that the evidence indicating that the NH and J1~ did
not divorce rebuts the presumption of validity of the marriage between the NH and L~.
Accordingly, as there is evidence of a valid marriage and no evidence that such marriage
terminated, J1~ has proven that she was validly married to the NH at the time of his
death in 2004. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 101 (marriage terminates upon the death of either spouse,
divorce, a judicial declaration of its nullity when the marriage is relatively null,
or by the issuance of a court order authorizing the spouse of a person presumed dead
to remarry). As such, she has established that she is the NH’s legal widow for purposes
of her application for widow’s benefits on the NH’s record. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e)(1), 416(c)(1), (h)(1)(A)(i); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.335(a), 404.345.
Under Louisiana law, L~ has Established that She is a Party to a Putative Marriage
for Purposes of Entitlement to Surviving Spouse Benefits, under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(ii)[11]
As discussed above, because J1~ has rebutted the presumption that the NH’s marriage
to L~ was valid, L~ is not the NH’s legal widow under Louisiana law. L~’s marriage
to the NH was “absolutely null,” or void, because of the NH’s existing marriage to
J1~. See La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 88, 94 (a marriage contracted in violation of an impediment,
such as an existing marriage, is null); Burrell v. Burrell, 154 So.2d 103, 106 (La. Ct. App. 1963) (an “absolutely null” marriage is devoid
of legal effect from the moment of its inception). However, even though a marriage
may be void because of the existence of a prior marriage, Louisiana recognizes putative
marriages as giving certain rights to a spouse that enters the marriage in good faith.
See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 96 (“An absolutely null marriage nevertheless produces civil
effects in favor of a party who contracted in good faith for as long as that party
remains in good faith”); POMS GN 00305.085 (a putative marriage in Louisiana gives the status of widow or widower to a person
who applies for benefits as a surviving spouse of an insured who died after 1/1/88).
These rights include the right to inherit a spouse’s share under state intestate succession
laws. See Kimball v. Folsom, 150 F.Supp. 482, 484 (W.D. La. 1957) (a putative spouse is entitled to the civil benefits
flowing from marriage, and as such is entitled to inherit intestate personal property
in Louisiana); Succession of Fields, 62 So.2d 495, 500 (La. 1952) (putative wife and surviving spouse at law both entitled
to share in husband’s estate to the extent of an undivided half each); Succession of Chavis, 29 So.2d 860, 864 (La. 1947) (finding that a putative spouse was entitled to the
same inheritance rights as to the property as though the marriage had been valid).
Louisiana law has defined the good faith requirement for putative spouses as an honest
and reasonable belief that the marriage was valid and that no legal impediment to
it existed. See Funderburk v. Funderburk, 38 So.2d 502, 504 (La. 1949); Saacks v. Saacks, 688 So.2d 673, 676 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Mara v. Mara, 452 So.2d 329, 332 (La. Ct. App. 1984). Although the good faith test incorporates
the objective elements of reasonableness, the inquiry is essentially a subjective
one. See Saacks, 688 So.2d at 676. If suspicious circumstances come to the innocent spouse’s attention,
he or she must take reasonable precautions to determine the validity of the marriage.
See Chavis, 29 So.2d at 863. However, if there is any doubt as to the good faith of the parties,
it is to be resolved in favor of good faith. See Funderburk, 38 So.2d at 504. Thus, based on Louisiana law, we must determine whether L~ was
in good faith in contracting the marriage such that she acquired putative spouse status.
As noted, L~ and the NH entered into a ceremonial marriage in Louisiana in 1992 and
it is our understanding that they lived together until his death 12 years later in
Louisiana in 2004. She has been receiving benefits as the NH’s widow for 12 years.
L~ stated that she had no knowledge of the earlier marriage that the NH and J1~ contracted
in another state and was only aware of the NH’s marriage to his first wife, M~. There
is no evidence indicating that suspicious circumstances were brought to L~’s attention
such that she was required to investigate the validity of her marriage to the NH.
J1~ acknowledged to having minimal contact with the NH after he left Pennsylvania
to work in Louisiana in 1990. Given these facts, we believe a Louisiana court would
find that L~ met the good faith requirement for status as a putative spouse. See United States v. Robinson, 40 F.2d 14, 16 (5th Cir. 1930) (second wife acquired putative status where she married
husband with no knowledge that he was still married to first wife); Kimball, 150 F.Supp. at 484 (finding putative status where the claimant and wage earner lived
together as husband and wife for 38 years and there was not a “scintilla of evidence
in the record” to show that the claimant had any knowledge that her marriage was null);
Dillon v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 183 So. 553, 555 (La. Ct. App. 1938) (“if the woman does not know that the man
has a living wife, she is not called upon to make an investigation to ascertain if
there exists any legal impediment to her marriage to him”); Succession of Navarro, 24 La. Ann. 298, 299 (La. 1872) (good faith found where second wife was entirely
ignorant of husband’s previous marriage).[12]
As discussed above, Louisiana law allows a putative spouse to inherit a spouse’s share
under state intestate succession laws. Accordingly, although L~ and the NH did not
have a valid marriage under Louisiana law, because she could inherit as a spouse under
Louisiana intestate succession law, L~ has satisfied the relationship requirement
for purposes of surviving spouse benefits on the NH’s record as a putative spouse.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e)(1), 416(c)(1), (h)(1)(A)(ii); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.335(a), 404.345.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that J1~ has successfully rebutted Louisiana’s presumption that the marriage
between L~ and the NH was valid. As such, J1~ is the NH’s legal widow under Louisiana
law and for purposes of entitlement to surviving spouse benefits on the NH’s record.
We also find that because she met the good faith requirement, L~ is the NH’s putative
spouse for purposes of entitlement to surviving spouse benefits on the NH’s record.
As such, L~ is entitled to continue to receive widow’s benefits.
Michael McGaughran Regional Chief Counsel
By: ________________
Tracey Wirmani
Assistant Regional Counsel