Ms. Charlene L~ (SSN ~) applied for mother's benefits based on the record of her deceased
                  husband, Reid Derek L~ (SSN ~). You have asked for advice as to whether the State
                  of Missouri would recognize a marriage between Charlene L~ and Reid Derek L~ which
                  occurred on June 28, 1986, when the divorce of Ms. L~ from her previous husband (Henry
                  W~) was not finalized until July 8, 1986.
               
               FACTUAL BACKGROUND
               The information you provided indicates that Ms. L~ previously applied for benefits
                  on her deceased husband's record, Reid Derek L~, on December 23, 2002. Her application
                  was denied for failure to provide proof of divorce from her previous husband, Henry
                  W~.
               
               Ms. L~ applied again on May 30, 2003. A marriage certificate indicates that Charlene
                  W~ and Reid Derek L~ were married on June 28, 1986. A birth certificate indicates
                  that they had a child together. Court records indicate that the dissolution of marriage
                  between Charlene W~ (L~) and Henry W~ was entered on July 8, 1986, or 10 days after
                  Ms. L~'s subsequent marriage to Reid Derek L~.
               
               ANALYSIS
               Missouri statutes provide in relevant part:
               1. A judgment or dissolution of marriage is final when entered, subject to the right
                  of appeal. An appeal from a dissolution that does not challenge the finding that the
                  marriage is irretrievably broken does not delay the finality of that provision of
                  the judgment which dissolves the marriage beyond the time for appealing from that
                  provision, so that either of the parties may remarry pending appeal.
               
               See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.360.1. Thus, if neither party appeals the finding that the marriage
                  was "irretrievably broken," the divorce is final when entered and both parties are
                  free to marry.
               
               In James v. James, 45 S.W. 3d 458, 460 (Mo. App. S.D. 2001) (citing Dunafon v. Dunafon, 800 S.W. 2d 483, 484 (Mo. App. W.D. 1990)), the court held that a judgment granting
                  a dissolution of marriage was final when entered. In Stamatiou v. El Greco Studios, Inc., 898 S.W. 2d 571, 575 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995), the court stated: "In enacting
                  § 452.360.1 the legislature intended that the part of the decree dissolving the marriage
                  would become final by operation of law if it were not appealed, thereby allowing the
                  parties to remarry even if other matters in the dissolution were appealed." See also Stratman v. Stratman, 948 S.W. 2d 230, 234 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997). From the case law, it is clear that Missouri
                  courts have interpreted the statute to allow an individual to remarry when neither
                  party has contested the finding that the marriage is irretrievably broken because
                  the judgment is then final.
               
               In Ms. L~'s (W~'s) case, although apparently neither party contested the finding that
                  the marriage was irretrievably broken, Ms. L~'s second marriage occurred prior to
                  the filing of the decree dissolving her first marriage to Henry W~. Thus, the judgment
                  was not final. In fact, it had not even been filed prior to Ms. L~'s second marriage.
                  Missouri case law has consistently held that a second marriage is presumed to be valid.
                  See Chervitz v. Bi-State Development Agency, 11 S. W. 3d 714 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000); Estate of Lucas v. Lucas, 909 S.W. 2d 365, 369 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995); Sumners v. Sumners, 645 S.W. 2d 205 (Mo. App. S.D. 1983); Carr v. Carr, 232 S. W. 2d 488, 489 (Mo. 1950). A second or subsequent marriage will not be declared
                  invalid except upon clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. See Chervitz, 11 S. W. 3d at 717; Lucas, 909 S. W. 2d at 369; Enlow v. Fire Protection Systems, Inc., 803 S. W. 2d 148, 150 (Mo. App. E.D. 1991); Carr, 232 S. W. 2d at 489 (presumption
                  of the validity of the last marriage may be repelled only by the most cogent and satisfactory
                  evidence). Thus, the question in this case, is whether there is clear, cogent, convincing,
                  and satisfactory evidence to overcome the Missouri presumption that Ms. L~'s second
                  marriage is valid. We believe it is reasonable to conclude that a Missouri court would
                  find that there is clear, cogent, convincing, and satisfactory to overcome the presumption
                  of validity.
               
               There is no case law directly on point, however, the Missouri Supreme Court stated
                  in State v. Byrd, 676 S. W. 2d 494, 501 (Mo. 1984), that "defendant's admission that his second marriage
                  was invalid was sufficient to overcome the presumption of its validity. That statement
                  goes beyond the assertion that he did not obtain a divorce from his first wife and
                  yields the conclusion that neither party to that marriage obtained a divorce prior
                  to the second marriage." Id. at 501.
               
               CONCLUSION
               In this case, it is clear that the judgment and decree of dissolution of marriage
                  was entered on July 8, 1986, which was ten days after the Marriage license for Charlene
                  W~ (L~) and Reid Derek L~. Although there are strong presumptions in favor of the
                  validity of a second marriage, on the facts presented, it is reasonable to conclude
                  that the marriage between Ms. L~ and Mr. L~ would be found invalid under Missouri
                  law.
               
               Frank V. S~ 
Region Chief Counsel, Region VII
               
               By: ________________
 Jeffrey J. L~
 Assistant Regional Counsel