QUESTION
               When determining entitlement for Lydia Perez A~ (Claimant) to benefits as the spouse
                  of Florida resident Daniel A~ (NH), should the Social Security Administration (SSA)
                  apply any provisions of New York or California law to determine whether NH's Dominican
                  Republic divorce from Gloria Frazier A~ (first wife) would be recognized in Florida
                  as a valid divorce?
               
               ANSWER
               For the reasons stated below, it is our opinion that the divorce obtained in the Dominican
                  Republic would not be valid for SSA purposes, Claimant's marriage to NH is void, and
                  Claimant has not presented sufficient evidence to qualify for benefits as a deemed
                  spouse.
               
               BACKGROUND
               According to the file, NH married his first wife on October 20, 1969. NH and his first
                  wife separated some time in 1985. On September 29, 2004, while NH resided in New York
                  and his first wife resided in California, NH obtained a divorce in the Dominican Republic
                  without personally appearing in the Dominican Republic or being domiciled there. NH's
                  first wife states she never divorced NH. On December 15, 2004, NH married Claimant
                  in New York. NH and Claimant currently reside in Florida. On June 8, 2005, Claimant
                  filed an application seeking spouse's benefits on NH's account.
               
               DISCUSSION
               The Social Security Act (Act) provides that “an applicant is the wife, husband, widow,
                  or widower” of an insured individual if “the courts of the State in which such insured
                  individual is domiciled at the time such applicant files an application . . . would
                  find that such applicant and such insured individual were validly married at the time
                  such applicant files such application . . . .” § 216(h)(1)(A)(i) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.
                  § 416(h)(1)(A)(i). The Act also allows a finding that the applicant is the wife, husband,
                  widow, or widower if the courts of that state would determine the applicant could
                  inherit a wife's, husband's, widow's, or widower's share of the insured's personal
                  property if he or she were to die without leaving a will. See § 216(h)(1)(A)(ii) of the Act. Finally, the Act permits the Commissioner to deem that
                  a marriage is valid if she is satisfied that an applicant in good faith went through
                  a marriage ceremony with the insured individual resulting in a purported marriage
                  between them which, but for a legal impediment not known to the applicant at the time
                  of such ceremony, would have been a valid marriage. See § 216(h)(1)(B)(i) of the Act. Claimant cannot establish entitlement under any of
                  these three methods.
               
               
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                        a.  
                           Claimant and NH Were Not Validly Married. At the time of Claimant's application, NH was domiciled in Florida. So, we first look
                              to Florida law to determine whether she and NH have a valid marriage. It is well established
                              in Florida that a presumption of validity attaches to one's last marriage, and this
                              presumption is referred to as “one of the strongest known to the law.” King v. Keller, 117 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1960). To overcome the presumption of the validity of the last
                              marriage, there must be some evidence showing that the previous marriage was not dissolved
                              by death or divorce. In this case, NH's first wife states she and NH never divorced.
                            However, once a marriage is shown to have been ceremonially entered into, it is presumed
                              to be legal and valid. All presumptions necessary to make a marriage valid, including
                              capacity to contract, attach on proof of a ceremonial marriage and cohabitation by
                              the parties under the belief that they were lawfully married. Grace
                                 v. Grace, 162 So. 2d 314 (Fla. App. 1964). The presumption in favor of the validity of the
                              subsequent marriage formally entered into is so great that in the absence of competent
                              proof to the contrary, it is to be assumed that the previous marriage has been dissolved
                              either death or legal action. Id., at 317. Here, there is a question regarding the validity of Claimant and NH's marriage.
                              Under Florida law, the validity of a marriage is determined by the law of the jurisdiction
                              where the marriage occurred. See
                                 Smith v. Anderson, 821 So.2d 323, 325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). Because NH and Claimant were married
                              in New York, we must look to that state's law.
                            Under New York law, once a ceremonial marriage has been performed, there is a strong
                              presumption in favor of holding the latest ceremonial marriage valid.  See Grabois v. Jones, 89 F.3d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1996). Furthermore, the presumption of validity of the
                              latter marriage becomes “stronger and stronger where a substantial injustice would
                              be created by invalidating that marriage.” See
                                 Grabois, 89 F.3d at 100; see also Dolan v. Celebrezze, 381 F.2d 231, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1967) (finding that a review of New York case law
                              indicates that the presumption favoring the validity of the second marriage varies
                              in force with the attendant facts and circumstances). The court in Dolan noted that the presumption for validating subsequent ceremonial marriages in New York
                              operates to effectuate “a particular public policy such as upholding legitimacy, favoring
                              the participation in the decedent's estate of one who lived with him as his spouse,
                              and preserving the validity of a marriage where no strong public policy would be served
                              by doing otherwise.” Dolan, 381 F.2d at 237; see also Boyd v. Heckler, 588 F.Supp. 31, 34-35 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that “[c]hief among the equities
                              to be considered is whether there are children of the second marriage” in holding
                              that testimonial evidence, absence of divorce records, and no children in the second
                              marriage were sufficient to rebut the presumption of validity of the second marriage
                              for purposes of awarding widow's social security benefits).
                            Here, a question remains regarding the validity of NH's divorce from his first wife,
                              which affects the validity of his subsequent marriage to Claimant. According to New
                              York law, “a marriage is absolutely void if contracted by a person whose husband or
                              wife by a former marriage is living and the prior marriage has not been dissolved
                              legally.” Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 34 Misc.2d 193, 194 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962). In this case, NH sought a divorce from
                              his first wife in the Dominican Republic while residing in New York. New York law
                              states that a foreign divorce will not be recognized if none of the parties were residents
                              of the foreign country. See Walsh v. Andorn, 41 A.D.2d 720, 721 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973); Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 130 NE.2d 902, 903-04 (N.Y. 1955). Information contained in the file states neither
                              NH nor his first wife resided in the Dominican Republic at the time of the divorce.
                              Moreover, neither party personally appeared in the Dominican Republic for the divorce
                              proceedings. Consequently, NH's divorce from his first wife was invalid and his subsequent
                              marriage to Claimant is void. Neither Florida nor New York would look to California
                              law to determine the validity of Claimant's marriage.
                            
 
 
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                        b.  
                           Claimant Could Not Inherit a Widow's Share of NH's Personal Property. Claimant could also be entitled to spousal benefits upon a finding that Florida courts
                              would determine that she could inherit a widow's share of NH's personal property if
                              he were to die without leaving a will. See § 216(h)(1)(A)(ii) of the Act.
                            If NH were to die without a will, Florida law states that a surviving spouse is entitled
                              to a share of a spouse's personal property. See FLA. STAT. § 732.102 (2005). However, Florida, as noted above, looks to the jurisdiction
                              where the marriage took place to determine its validity. New York would not recognize
                              the validity of the marriage of NH and Claimant. Because we believe New York would
                              not recognize Claimant's marriage as valid, we believe that Florida courts would also
                              decline to recognize their marriage as valid. Therefore, we further feel Florida would
                              not find Claimant was NH's surviving spouse within the meaning of the statute.
                            It is our opinion that Claimant could not inherit a spouse's share of NH's personal
                              property if he died intestate, because she was not his lawful wife. Therefore, Claimant
                              is not entitled to spousal benefits on NH's account under subparagraph (ii) of § 216(h)(1)(A)
                              of the Act.
                            
 
 
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                        c.  
                           The Commissioner Could Not Find A Valid Deemed Marriage. As stated above, the Act also permits the Commissioner to find that a marriage is
                              valid if she is satisfied that an applicant in good faith went through a marriage
                              ceremony with the insured individual resulting in a purported marriage between them
                              which, but for a legal impediment not known to the applicant at the time of the ceremony,
                              would have been a valid marriage. See § 216(h)(1)(B)(i) of the Act. Here, there was
                              a clear legal impediment to Claimant's marriage to NH. Moreover, it is clear that
                              Claimant had knowledge of NH's prior marriage and participated in his acquiring the
                              foreign divorce. However, it is unclear from the records provided whether Claimant
                              had knowledge that the foreign divorce would not be recognized as valid. Because there
                              is insufficient evidence in the record, we are unable to determine that Claimant meets
                              the definition of a deemed wife under § 16(h)(1)(B)(i) of the Act. Further development
                              may be appropriate.
                            
 
 
CONCLUSION
               Thus, Claimant is not entitled to spousal benefits, because her marriage to NH is
                  void, and she has not met her burden of proving she qualifies as a deemed wife.
               
               Mary Ann S~
Regional Chief Counsel
               
               By:
Jennifer P~
Assistant Regional Counsel