QUESTION
You have asked whether the claimant and the number holder had a valid common-law marriage
for determining the claimant's eligibility for widow's insurance benefits (WIB) on
the number holder's earnings record, and if the marriage was not valid or of sufficient
duration, whether the Social Security Administration (SSA) can reopen its August 2016
award of WIB to Claimant.
OPINION
The claimant and the number holder did not have a valid common-law marriage for determining
the claimant's eligibility for WIB on the number holder's earnings record. SSA may
reopen its August 2016 award of WIB to Claimant at any time within 12 months of the
initial determination awarding Claimant WIB.
BACKGROUND
SSA records show that A~, the number holder (NH), died on March XX, 2006, while domiciled
in Alabama. A2~ (Claimant) initially applied for WIB on NH's earnings record on July
XX 2015, alleging she had a common-law marriage with NH. SSA denied Claimant's July
2015 application initially August XX, 2015, and on reconsideration on October XX,
2015. Claimant did not appeal SSA's reconsideration denial.
Claimant filed a second application for WIB on NH's earnings record on June XX, 2016,
again alleging she had a common-law marriage with NH. In support of her claim, Claimant
submitted a Statement of Marital Relationship; Statements Regarding Marriage from
her sister, NH's brother, and NH's friend; and an order from the Probate Court of
Baldwin County, Alabama, dated February XX, 2008. Claimant's attorney also requested
that SSA reopen its denial of Claimant's prior application for WIB on NH's earning
record.
In her undated Statement of Marital Relationship, Claimant alleged that she and NH
began living together as husband and wife in Alabama in June of 2000 or 2001, and
continued to live together as husband and wife until NH's death in 2006. Claimant
indicated that she and NH had an understanding about their relationship and stated
that they lived together as husband and wife and presented themselves that way to
others. Claimant also indicated that their understanding did not change and she and
NH intended to stay together forever. Claimant stated that she and NH supported each
other, shared the bills and shopping, gathered with family and friends, and slept
in the same bed every night. Claimant indicated that she and NH did not have an understanding
as to how their relationship could be ended or an agreement or promise that a ceremonial
marriage would also be performed in the future. Claimant stated that she "never really
thought about" changing her last name after she and NH began living together. Claimant
reported that no tax returns, deeds, contracts, insurance policies, bank accounts,
or other documents indicated they were husband and wife, nor did they have any joint
business dealings or joint charge accounts as husband and wife. Claimant stated that
she and NH introduced each other to relatives, friends, neighbors, and others as husband
and wife.
In a January 2016 Statement Regarding Marriage, NH's friend stated that he saw NH
and Claimant almost every weekend and would "double date" with them. NH's friend also
stated that he lived next door and saw NH and Claimant almost every day together.
NH's friend indicated that, to his knowledge, NH and Claimant were generally known
as husband and wife, and he considered them husband and wife. NH's friend stated that
NH and Claimant lived next door and "acted just as any other husband and wife would."
NH's friend indicated that he heard NH and Claimant refer to each other as husband
and wife "just about daily," and in his opinion, NH and Claimant maintained a home
and lived together as husband and wife. NH's friend also indicated that to his knowledge,
NH and Claimant lived together continuously.
In a February 2016 Statement Regarding Marriage, Claimant's sister stated that she
saw Claimant and NH several times a year and stayed with them for vacation or holidays.
Claimant's sister indicated that, to her knowledge, NH and Claimant were generally
known as husband and wife, and she considered them husband and wife. Claimant's sister
stated that Claimant and NH "lived together and did everything together, just as husband
and wife," and [w]hen [NH] worked out of town, he would send for [Claimant] so they
could spend more time together." Claimant's sister also indicated that she heard NH
and Claimant refer to each other as husband and wife and stated NH "would always introduce
[Claimant] as his wife to everyone they met." Claimant's sister also opined that NH
and Claimant maintained a home and lived together as husband and wife.
In an undated Statement Regarding Marriage, NH's brother stated that he saw NH and
Claimant on holidays and vacations a few times a year. NH's brother indicated that
to his knowledge, NH and Claimant were generally known as husband and wife, and he
considered them husband and wife. NH's brother stated that NH and Claimant "lived
together and took care of each other as any husband and wife would." NH's friend indicated
that he heard NH and Claimant refer to each other as husband and wife whenever he
would visit them or they would visit him. NH's brother opined that NH and Claimant
maintained a home and lived together as husband and wife, and to his knowledge, they
lived together continuously.
In the order from the Probate Court of B~ County, Alabama, dated February XX, 2008,
the court granted Claimant's application for judicial determination of NH's heirs
at law. The court ordered that NH was common-law married to Claimant when he died
and Claimant is an heir at law and surviving spouse of NH. The court indicated that
it granted Claimant's application based on "testimony given and evidence presented,"
but the court did not describe any testimony or evidence in its order.
Based on this evidence, SSA granted Claimant's June xx, 2016 application in an initial
determination dated August 15, 2016, finding her entitled to WIB on NH's earnings
record beginning August 2016.
DISCUSSION
A claimant may be eligible for WIB if the claimant is the widow of an individual who
died fully insured. See Social Security Act (Act) § 202(e)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.335(a) (2016).[1] A claimant may qualify as the widower of an insured individual if the courts of the
state in which the insured individual was domiciled at the time of death would find
the claimant and insured individual were validly married when the insured individual
died. See Act § 216(h)(1)(A)(i); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.335(a)(1), 404.345; Program Operations Manual
System (POMS) GN 00305.001A.2.a; POMS RS 00207.001A.1.a.1. A claimant may qualify as a widow for purposes of WIB if the claimant was married
to the insured individual for a period of not less than nine months immediately prior
to the day on which the insured individual died.[2] See Act § 216(g)(1)(E); 20 C.F.R. § 404.335(a)(1); POMS GN 00305.100A.1; POMS RS 00207.001A.1.a.2. SSA records show that NH was a resident of Alabama when he died. Therefore, we
look to Alabama law to determine if Claimant and NH were validly married.
Alabama recently abolished common-law marriage as of January xx, 2017. See Ala. Code § 30-1-20(a) (2016)[3] ; POMS GN 00305.075B. However, "[a]n otherwise valid common-law marriage entered into before January xx,
2017, shall continue to be valid in" Alabama. Ala. Code § 30-1-20(b); see POMS GN 00305.075B. The elements of a valid Alabama common-law marriage are: (1) the capacity to marry;
(2) a present agreement or mutual consent to enter into the marriage relationship;
(3) public recognition of the existence of the marriage; and (4) cohabitation or mutual
assumption openly of marital duties and obligations. See Adams v. Boan, 559 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Ala. 1990); POMS GN 00305.075B. These elements may be "either explicitly expressed or implicitly inferred from the
circumstances." Boswell v.
Boswell, 497 So. 2d 479, 480 (Ala. 1986). Alabama courts "closely scrutinize claims of common
law marriage and require clear and convincing proof thereof." Lofton v. Estate of Weaver, 611 So. 2d 335, 336 (Ala. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Clear and convincing
evidence" is defined as:
Evidence that, when weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind
of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and
a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion. Proof by clear and convincing
evidence requires a level of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence or
the substantial weight of the evidence, but less than beyond a reasonable doubt.
Ala. Code § 6-11-20(b)(4), quoted in Dyess v. Dyess, 94 So. 3d 384, 386-87 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012). "The determination of whether a relationship
between a man and a woman was intended as a common-law marriage is made on the facts
of a particular case, with regard to the situation and circumstances of the individuals
involved." Boswell, 497 So. 2d at 480.
The evidence provided by Claimant is insufficient to establish that she and NH had
a common-law marriage under Alabama law.[4] Claimant’s Statement of Marital Relationship and the Statements Regarding Marriage
from her sister, NH's brother, and NH's friend allege that Claimant and NH considered
themselves married, but the statements do not provide clear and convincing proof that
the relationship between Claimant and NH satisfied the elements of a valid Alabama
common-law marriage. See Lofton, 611 So. 2d at 336; Adams, 559 So. 2d at 1086; POMS GN 00305.075B. Nothing in the information provided suggests that either Claimant or NH lacked the
capacity to marry. See Adams, 559 So. 2d at 1086-87. However, the statements, standing alone, do not clearly establish
that Claimant, and particularly NH, had agreed or consented to permanently enter into
a marriage relationship. See Lofton, 611 So. 2d at 336; Adams, 559 So. 2d at 1086. The statements also do not provide clear and convincing evidence
of public recognition of the existence of a marriage between Claimant and NH or that
they openly assumed marital duties and obligations. See Lofton, 611 So. 2d at 336; Adams, 559 So. 2d at 1086; see also, e.g.,
Melton v. Jenkins, 92 So. 3d 105, 110 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (holding purported husband of decedent
failed to meet heavy burden of proving that he and decedent had gained public recognition
of their purported common-law marriage); Reese v. Holston, 67 So. 3d 109, 113 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (holding statements by purported wife and
her family members and funeral programs were insufficient to establish public recognition
of the parties' alleged common-law marriage). Moreover, Claimant did not provide any
corroborating evidence to support her allegations or the allegations of her sister,
NH's brother, or NH's friend. Claimant admitted that no documents, such as tax returns
or bank accounts, indicated that she and NH were husband and wife. See, e.g., Melton, 92 So. 3d at 110 (holding "the lack of jointly owned property and integrated finances
also militate against a determination of the existence of a common-law marriage");
Reese, 67 So. 3d at 113 (holding "the evidence shows that the parties did not handle their
finances in a way that would be consistent with the existence of a marital relationship").
The February 2008 order of the Probate Court of Baldwin County, Alabama, also does
not provide clear and convincing proof that Claimant and NH were in a common-law marriage
under Alabama law. SSA is not bound by the decision of a state court in a proceeding
to which SSA was not a party. See Baker o/b/o Baker v.
Sullivan, 880 F.2d 319, 322 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that "[a]s a legal matter, the Appeals
Council could determine that the state court judgment is not binding on the [Commissioner]
on the issue of paternity of the children . . . , particularly when the [Commissioner]
was not a party to the state court action, and no opposing interests were presented
in the case"). However, SSA cannot ignore an adjudication of a state court where the
following prerequisites exist: (1) an issue in a claim for Social Security benefits
previously has been determined by a state court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the
issue was genuinely contested before the state court by parties with opposing interests;
(3) the issue falls within the general category of domestic relations law; and (4)
the resolution by the state trial court is consistent with the law enunciated by the
highest court in the state. See Social Security Ruling (SSR) 83-37c (adopting as national policy Gray v. Richardson, 474 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1973)); POMS GN 00305.065B.4.
The Probate Court’s order does address an issue that falls within the general category
of domestic relations law (i.e., marriage). In addition, the Probate Court was a court
of competent jurisdiction to decide whether NH was common-law married to Claimant
to the time of his death, at least in the context of administering NH's estate. The
Alabama Code grants Alabama probate courts original and general jurisdiction over
"[a]ll controversies in relation to the right of executorship or of administration"
of estates. Ala. Code § 12-13-1(b)(3). Thus, "the probate court has 'original and
general jurisdiction in practically all matters having to do with probate and administration
of decedents' estates.'" In Re Estate of
Creel, 719 So. 2d 783, 785 (Ala. 1998) (quoting Opinion of the
Justices, 197 So. 2d 456, 460 (1967)). In interpreting section 12-13-1(b)(3) of the Alabama
Code, the Alabama Supreme Court has specifically held that "the probate courts of
Alabama are vested with the authority to determine the existence vel non [or not]
of a common law marriage as a 'controversy' that relates 'to the right of executorship
or of administration' of a decedent's estate." Id. at 786. Claimant filed her application with the Probate Court to determine NH's heirs
at law, which falls within matters having to do with the administration of NH's estate.
Therefore, the Probate Court had jurisdiction to decide whether Claimant and NH were
in a common-law marriage.
However, nothing in the Probate Court's order suggests that parties with opposing
interests genuinely contested the issue of Claimant's alleged common-law marriage
to NH. The order states that the court considered testimony and evidence, but the
order does indicate who testified or what evidence it considered. Thus, the order
does not show that any party genuinely contested Claimant's application and her allegation
that she was NH's common-law wife. The Probate Court's order also lacks information
indicating that the court complied with Alabama law in determining that Claimant was
NH's common-law wife and an heir at law and surviving spouse of NH. The Probate Court's
order does not address whether Claimant and NH had the capacity to marry, whether
they had a present agreement or mutual consent to enter into the marriage relationship,
whether there was public recognition of the existence of the marriage, or whether
Claimant and NH cohabitated or mutually and openly assumed marital duties and obligations.
See Adams, 559 So. 2d at 1086. Therefore, the Probate Court's order is not entitled to any
special significance. See
Baker, 880 F.2d at 322.
Moreover, even if a party with opposing interests genuinely contested the issue of
Claimant's alleged common-law marriage to NH and the Probate Court decision was consistent
with Alabama law, the order does not establish that the purported common-law marriage
lasted the requisite nine months prior to the day of NH's death. See Act § 216(g)(1)(E); 20 C.F.R. § 404.335(a)(1); POMS GN 00305.100A.1; POMS RS 00207.001A.1.a.2. The Probate Court issued its order on February 5, 2008, nearly two years after
NH's death, and the court stated that NH was common-law married to Claimant at the
time of his death, with no finding as to when their common-law marriage began or how
long the marriage may have lasted. In any event, even if the Probate Court's order
related back at least nine months before NH's death, the Probate Court's order and
the statements from Claimant, her sister, NH's brother, and NH's friend do not provide
clear and convincing evidence that Claimant and NH were in a common-law marriage under
Alabama law.
Finally, SSA may reopen a determination for any reason if it does so within twelve
months of the date of the notice of the initial determination. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(a); POMS GN 01010.480A. Based on the above, SSA may reopen its August 2016 initial determination awarding
Claimant WIB on NH's earnings record if SSA does so by August 15, 2017. If SSA reopens
its August 2016 initial determination and determines that Claimant is not entitled
to WIB on NH's earnings record because they did not have a common-law marriage, Claimant's
request to reopen SSA's August 2015 initial denial of her July 2015 application is
moot.
CONCLUSION
The information provided is insufficient to establish that Claimant and NH had a common-law
marriage under Alabama law for determining Claimant's eligibility for WIB on NH's
earnings record. SSA may reopen its August 2016 initial determination granting Claimant
WIB on NH's earnings record if it does so within twelve months of the initial determination.