QUESTION
You have asked whether the annulment of the claimant’s marriage to an individual after
the death of the number holder permits the Social Security Administration (SSA) retroactively
to reinstate widow’s insurance benefits the claimant previously received as the surviving
spouse of the deceased number holder.
OPINION
The claimant’s later marriage was voidable, not void under applicable law. Therefore,
the claimant could not become eligible for reinstatement of widow’s insurance benefits
on the earnings record of the number holder before the month of the annulment.
BACKGROUND
Lois C~ (Claimant) became entitled to widow’s insurance benefits on the earnings record
of D. R. C~, the number holder (NH), effective December 2004. Clamant then married
Joseph B. C~ on October 29, 2008, in Florida. Due to Claimant’s remarriage, SSA terminated
Claimant’s widow’s insurance benefits effective October 2008.
On March 5, 2010, Mr. C~ filed a complaint for annulment, stating that he was induced
fraudulently into the marriage. Mr. C~ alleged Claimant committed fraud by failing
to inform him that she was the adoptive parent of a natural grandchild and he would
be responsible for the child’s custody and care. He also alleged the marriage was
unconsummated as of the date of the complaint, the couple had not acquired any property
jointly, and no children were born of the marriage. On March 5, 2010, Claimant and
Mr. C~ entered a settlement agreement to determine the parties’ rights and responsibilities,
if any, regarding property, debt, child support, and alimony. On March 11, 2010,
the Circuit Court of Baldwin County, Alabama entered an Order granting the petition
for annulment and finding the marriage between the parties was void. Clamant now requests
reinstatement of her widow’s insurance benefits on NH’s account due to the annulment
of her marriage to Mr. C~.
DISCUSSION
A widow can only qualify for widow’s insurance benefits under the Social Security
Act (Act), if (with certain exceptions not present here) she is unmarried. See Act § 202(e)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.335(e) (2009); Program Operations Manual System
(POMS) RS 00207.001(B)(1). If a claimant remarries and the subsequent marriage is void under state law,
the claimant can collect benefits as if the subsequent marriage never happened. See POMS GN 00305.120, GN 00305.125. Thus, if Claimant’s marriage to Mr. C~ was void under Alabama law, she could collect
retroactive benefits for the entire duration of her voided marriage. However, if Claimant’s
marriage to Mr. C~ was merely voidable, she could reapply for widow’s insurance benefits
as NH’s surviving spouse, but SSA could find Claimant eligible for benefits no earlier
than the month of the annulment. See POMS GN
00305.130B(1)(a).
According to the marriage certificate, Mr. C~ was a Florida resident and Claimant
was an Alabama resident when they married in 2008. The couple got their marriage license
and married in Florida. According to the complaint for annulment, Mr. C~ had been
an Alabama resident for six months prior to filing his complaint. The child support
information sheet, which appears to have been completed at the time of the annulment
action, shows Claimant had the same Alabama residence as Mr. C~. Therefore, Claimant
appears to have been an Alabama resident at the time of the annulment. An Alabama
court has no jurisdiction over a marital claim unless the litigants satisfy certain
residency requirements and any judgment entered by a court without jurisdiction is
void. See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 12 So. 3d (Ct. Civ. App. 2009). Because Claimant and Mr. C~ were residents of Alabama
but were married in Florida, we first determined whether the Alabama court had jurisdiction
to annul this Florida marriage. The Alabama court had jurisdiction because Claimant,
the defendant in this annulment action, was a resident of Alabama at the time of the
marriage and when the annulment action was filed; and Mr. C~ had been an Alabama resident
for six months when the annulment action was filed. See Hamlet v. Hamlet, 4 So.2d 901, 902 (Ala. 1941); cf. Ala. Code § 30-2-5 (“When the defendant is a nonresident,
the other party to the marriage must have been a bona fide resident of this state
for six months next before the filing of the complaint, which must be alleged in the
complaint and proved.”). The Hamlet court specifically held that the Alabama court’s
jurisdiction extends over its citizens and their marital status, without regard to
where the marriage ceremony occurred. See id. The Alabama court had jurisdiction over the couple’s marital status because Claimant
was an Alabama resident at the time of the marriage and both parties were residents
of Alabama at the time of the annulment proceedings; so, we look to Alabama law to
determine whether Claimant’s marriage to Mr. C~ was void or voidable.
Under Alabama law, “few, if any, kinds of fraud or trickery will warrant an annulment
after the marital status has been entered upon by cohabitation and marital intercourse
has intervened.” Hyslop v. Hyslop, 2 So. 2d 442, 444 (Ala. 1941). However, a court may annul a marriage because of
fraudulent inducement at the time of the marriage that goes to “the essence of the
marriage relation.” Janda v. Janda, 984 So. 2d 434, 436 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (citing Williams v. Williams, 105 So. 2d 676, 678 (Ala. 1958)). Read together, these cases indicate that the fraudulent
inducement to marry must be so extreme that it goes to the essence of the marriage. See Janda, 984 So. 2d at 438 (“It may readily be conceded that a court should not annul a marriage
on the ground of fraud except in extreme cases, where the particular fraud goes to
the very essence of the marriage relation.”)(quoting Millar v. Millar, 167 P. 394 (Cal. 1917)).
We have not found any Alabama case law that specifically addresses whether the alleged
fraud involved here, concealment of an adopted child, goes to the essence of the marriage
relation. However, an Alabama court has held that concealment of the inability to
procreate was insufficient grounds to annul a marriage. See e.g., Smith v. Smith 23 So. 2d 605, 610 (Ala. 1945). Similarly, where a wife was alleged to have misrepresented
her age and her love for her husband so that she could receive his allotment check
from the United States government, those misrepresentations were also insufficient
grounds to prove fraud that went to the essence of the marriage because there was
no allegation that she entered the marriage with the intent not to perform her marital
vows and no allegation that she disavowed or refused to perform or fulfill her vows. Williams, 105 So. 2d at 677-78. By contrast, Alabama courts have found fraud that goes to
the essence of the marriage when a person enters into a marriage covenant by a ceremonial
marriage with the intent not to perform the marriage vows, followed by immediate disavowal,
and refusal to perform the vows. See Raia v. Raia, 108 So. 11, 12 (Ala. 1926); Hyslop, 2 So. 2d at 444; Janda, 984 So. 2d at 436 (holding that a sexual relationship is implicit in marriage and
that an unstated intent, held at the time of the marriage ceremony, to refuse to engage
in a sexual relationship with the other party is fraud that alters the essence of
the marriage). The Janda court cited several out-of-circuit cases that found fraud that went to the essence
of the marriage relations. See 984 So. 2d at 438 n. 4 (citing In re the Marriage of Meagher, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 663, 667 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing that annulments on the
basis of fraud are generally granted only in cases in which the fraud related in some
way to the sexual or procreative aspects of marriage); In re Marriage of Liu, 242 Cal.Rptr. 649, 656-57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (annulling marriage because wife had
fraudulently induced husband into marriage so that the wife could obtain a “green
card”); Bishop v. Bishop, 308 N.Y.S.2d 998 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.1970) (denying husband's petition for annulment based
on fraudulent inducement; court found no fraud in wife's attempt to obtain a divorce
and in her refusal to consummate the marital relationship because husband himself
testified that he and wife had agreed they would marry and then immediately divorce;
such an agreement did not contemplate marital intercourse).
Here, the Circuit Court of Baldwin County, Alabama granted Mr. C~’s petition for annulment,
which included an allegation of fraud. The order of annulment is silent as to the
grounds of the annulment but the order does indicate that the order is based on a
pleading, testimony taken by deposition, and the parties’ written agreement. Though
Mr. C~ alleged fraud because Claimant allegedly concealed her adoption of her grandson,
there is no indication that the court concluded that fraud was actually involved.
In light of the above-mentioned case law tending to show that concealing certain facts
is not grounds for an annulment, the alleged fraud involved here was not so extreme
that it would go to the essence of the marriage relations. We have no evidence that
Claimant refused to have more children or refused to perform any of her marital vows. We
therefore conclude that the trial court was without legal authority to find fraud
that went to the essence of Claimant’s marriage so as to annul Claimant’s marriage.
The court here also annulled the marriage but an annulment is the proper remedy for
the dissolution of a void marriage. Cooney v. Cooney, 840 So. 2d 903, 905 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002). An annulment renders a marriage void from
the beginning, while a divorce terminates the marriage as of the date of the judgment
of dissolution. See Thomas v. Campbell, 960 So. 2d 694, 698 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006). Therefore, we also believe the court here
could not have granted Mr. C~’s request for an annulment.
Furthermore, the Order of Annulment in this case found the marriage “void.” Under
Social Security Ruling (SSR) 83-37c, SSA is not bound by a state court decision to
which it was not a party. See SSR 83-37c. However, the Agency cannot ignore and usually must accept a state court
decision if all four of the following prerequisites are met: “(1) an issue in a claim
for Social Security benefits previously has been determined by a State court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) this issue was genuinely contested before the State court by parties
with opposing interests; (3) the issue falls within the general category of domestic
relations law; and (4) the resolution by the State trial court is consistent with
the law enunciated by the highest court in the State.” SSR 83-37c (implementing Gray v. Richardson, 474 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1973)). This order meets the first and third criteria of
SSR 83-37c.
However, we believe that an Alabama Supreme Court would find that the marriage here
was “voidable” not “void.” For instance, under Janda, the most recent Alabama court to consider fraudulent inducement to marry, even if
there was fraud perpetuated at the time of the marriage and going to the essence of
the marital relationship, that fraud would render the marriage voidable by the injured
party. Janda, 984 So. 2d at 436, 439. The effect of finding that this marriage is voidable is that
the marriage was binding until the court declared it void: “[A] major difference between
a void marriage and a voidable marriage is that the latter is treated as binding until
its nullity is ascertained and declared by a competent court, whereas the former does
not require such a judgment because the parties could not enter into a valid marital
relationship.” Broadus v. Broadus, 361 So. 2d 582, 584 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978).
We conclude that because the only alleged flaw was a concealment of adoption and because
Alabama courts would not find that concealment to go to the essence of the marriage,
Claimant’s marriage is at most voidable for purposes of SSA, regardless of whether
the court annulled Claimant’s marriage to Mr. C~. Therefore, she is entitled to widow’s
insurance benefits effective only as of the date of the order of the annulment.
CONCLUSION
Because Claimant’s marriage to Mr. C~ was voidable rather than void, Claimant became
unmarried only as of the date of the annulment. Therefore, SSA cannot find Claimant
eligible for widow’s insurance benefits as NH’s surviving spouse before the month
of the annulment.
Mary Ann S~
Regional Chief Counsel
By: ___________
Arthurice T. B~
Assistant Regional Counsel