QUESTION
To determine resources and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility for a number
holder in Mississippi, you asked whether the number holder has an ownership interest
in the home in which she resides.
BACKGROUND
To determine resources and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility for a number
holder in Mississippi, you asked whether the number holder has an ownership interest
in the home in which she resides.
OPINION
The number holder has a life estate in the property conveyed to her by her sister’s
children, because there is substantial evidence the children intended to convey a
life estate to the number holder and the parties signed and delivered a writing that
evidences the conveyance of the life estate.
DISCUSSION
SSI is a general public assistance program for aged, blind, or disabled individuals
who meet certain income and resource restrictions and other eligibility requirements.
See Social Security Act (Act) §§ 1602, 1611(a); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.110, 416.202 (2011).
“Resources” include cash or other liquid assets or any real or personal property that
an individual owns and could convert to cash and use for her support and maintenance.
See Act § 1613; 20 C.F.R. § 416.1201(a) (2011). “Resources” generally exclude an individual’s
home. See Act § 1613(a)(1); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1210(a), 416.1212(b) (2011); Program Operations
Manual System (POMS) SI 01110.210(B); POMS SI 01130.100(B). For the home exclusion to apply, however, the individual must have an ownership
interest in the property. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1212(a); POMS SI 01130.100(A)(1).
An individual may have an ownership interest in a property if he or she has a life
estate or equitable ownership in the property. See POMS SI 01110.500(B)(3). A life estate conveys ownership of limited duration. See POMS SI 01110.500(B)(3)(a); POMS SI 01110.515(A)(2)(a), (B)(1); POMS SI 01140.110(A)(6). A life estate is a form of legal ownership usually created through a legal
document. See POMS SI 01110.515(A)(2)(a); POMS SI ATL01110.516(A). An individual with a life estate can sell only his or her interest, and a life
estate in home property generally is an excluded resource. See POMS SI 01110.515(B)(1); POMS SI 01140.110(A)(6).
Equitable ownership may occur when an individual does not have legal title to the
property. See POMS SI 01110.500(B)(3)(b); POMS 01110.515(A)(2)(b). An individual may acquire an equitable ownership
interest in his or her home through personal considerations or by performing certain
activities such as making improvements to a shelter. See POMS 01110.515(C)(3). Generally, a court determines whether an individual has an
equitable ownership interest, but under certain circumstances, an SSA adjudicator
may determine the existence of an equitable ownership interest. See POMS SI 01110.515(C). If an individual alleges equitable ownership in a property (i.e., an unwritten
ownership interest or right of use for life), an SSA adjudicator should follow applicable
regional instructions, if available. See POMS SI 01130.100(C)(4).
NH alleged in her statement that her sister’s heirs had given her an “unwritten ownership
interest and right of use of [the home] for the remainder of [her] life.” NH’s nephew
also stated he and his siblings agreed to allow NH to live in the home “as if it were
her own home for the remainder of her life.” These statements by NH and NH's nephew
suggest they believe NH has an equitable ownership interest in the home. See POMS SI 01130.100(C)(4). The Atlanta Region has regional instructions for determining if an individual
has an “equitable life estate” in home property. See POMS SI ATL01110.516. The instructions provide two situations under which a district or branch office
may decide an equitable life estate exists, but NH’s situation does not fit the criteria
in the POMS because NH did not own or purchase the home. See POMS SI ATL01110.516(B).
We look, then, to state law to determine whether NH had an equitable or other ownership
interest in the home. See POMS SI 01110.500(C). Because NH is a resident of Mississippi and the home is located in Mississippi,
we look to Mississippi law to determine NH’s ownership interest in the home.
Mississippi law provides guidance on the types of ownership interests an individual
may have in real property as well as the requirements for transferring real property.
Mississippi recognizes life tenancy as a form of real property ownership. See Twin States Land & Timber Co. v. Chapman, 750 So. 2d 567, 570 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). The life tenant “holds the exclusive
right to the use, possession, and enjoyment of the property during the term of the
tenancy.” Id. (citing Wright v. Sullivan, 42 So. 2d 185, 187 (Miss. 1949)); see also Miss. Code Ann. § 89-1-9 (West 2011) (describing creation of life estate). Limitations
on the life estate do not preclude the creation of a life estate. See, e.g., Chapman v. Thornhill, 802 So. 2d 149, 156 (Miss. App. 2001) (life tenant’s right of enjoyment of property
did not include the right to harvest timber); Wolfe v. Estate of W~, 756 So. 2d 788, 792-93 (Miss. App. 1999) (noting that will left life estate to wife
and allowed her to lease the property and sell it in public or private sale, but she
was not allowed to gift the property).
There is no legal document here that actually conveys any ownership interest to NH,
but there is a document that evidences the conveyance and the circumstances surrounding
the conveyance provides substantial evidence to support the actual conveyance of a
life estate to NH. See Davis v. Smith, 922 So. 2d 814, 819 (Miss. App. 2005) (substantial evidence supported reforming
deed to include life estate to seller). The circumstances providing substantial evidence
of a conveyance of a life estate to NH, include the statements from the nephew, on
behalf of his co-heirs, and NH asserting the existence of a life estate for NH. The
information shows that only NH is living at the address. NH’s investments in improvements
to the home also support her claim of an ownership interest. Even if the nephew’s
written statement submitted to SSA had contained limitations, such as prohibiting
NH from selling her interest, such limitations would not alone detract from the evidence
supporting the creation of a life estate. Therefore, substantial evidence supports
the conveyance of a life estate by the nephew, on behalf of his co-heirs, to NH in
the 406 Northwest home.
Under Mississippi law, any conveyance of land for a term of more than one year must
be declared by writing signed and delivered. See Miss. Code Ann. § 89-1-3 (West 2011). The statute of frauds in Mississippi also requires
that in order to enforce a contract for the sale of land, the contract must be in
writing. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-3-1 (West 2011); see Harvey v. Daniels, 96 So. 746 (Miss. 1926) (a contract for the sale of land, though within statute
of frauds and unenforceable, is not void). Thus, in Mississippi for NH’s ownership
interest in the life estate to be valid, there must be a writing evidencing the conveyance
of the life estate. From the information provided, the only writings are the statements
given by NH and the nephew to SSA. The question then is whether these writings satisfy
the statute of frauds.
Nothing in the statute of frauds requires a written contract itself for the sale of
an interest in land. Rather, it only requires that some writing exist to show the
existence of the contract. The statute of frauds states that an “action shall not
be brought whereby to charge a defendant or other party [on a contract for the sale
of land] unless . . . the promise or agreement upon which such action may be brought,
or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to
be charged therewith . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-3-1. “The statute is satisfied so
long as there is ‘some memorandum or note thereof.’ For the prevention of fraud, the
statute merely prescribes the form a part of the evidence must take.” Putt v. City of Corinth, 579 So. 2d 534, 538 (Miss. 1991) (minutes of the city utility commission meeting
authorizing contract for purchase of property were “memorandum or note” satisfying
statute of frauds).
The writing must also be signed and include a description of the property. A description
of the property by name and physical address constitutes a description with reasonable
certainty. See Theobald v. Nosser, 752 So. 2d 1036, 1040 (Miss. 1999); Frostad v. Kitchens, 377 F.2d 475, 478 (5th Cir. 1967) (a contract for sale of land must describe the
land with reasonable certainty). To satisfy the signature requirement of the statute
of frauds, the courts look to the intent of the parties. The signature can take many
forms and be anywhere in the document. See T~, 752 So. 2d at 1040.
Mississippi also requires the writing signed for the sale of land be delivered either
to the grantee or a third party (but recording is not required). See Miss. Code Ann. § 89-1-3; see also In re Estate of H~, 910 So.2d 1052, 1054-55 (Miss. 2005) (citing treatise that defines delivery as transfer
of the writing from the grantor to the grantee or a third person, in such a manner
as to deprive the grantor of the right to recall it as his option, and with intent
to convey title); Stennis v. Stennis, 218 So.2d 716, 718 (Miss. 1969). Manual delivery of the deed to the grantee is not
required, however. Delivery may be constructive as well as actual and delivery is
sufficient if it is apparent from either the words or actions of the grantor that
the grantor intended to treat the deed as having been delivered. See Frederic v. Merchants & Marine Bank, 28 So. 2d 843 (Miss. 1947).
The writings in this case appear to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds
under Mississippi law. Although the statements provided to SSA are not an official
contract, the statements would qualify as a “memorandum or note thereof.” The statements
evidence an agreement to transfer an ownership interest in the property to NH. NH
and her nephew describe the property by the street address, 406 Northwest St., Carthage,
Mississippi, and indicate that it is the home on that property. This name and physical
address of the property are sufficient under Mississippi law to describe the property
interest with reasonable certainty. Both NH and her nephew also signed their statements.
Further, NH's nephew delivered his statement to SSA. Thus, the requirements under
Mississippi law for the transfer of an ownership interest in the home have been satisfied.
The improvements NH made to the home are not relevant in the analysis of whether the
transfer of an ownership interest in the home falls under the statute of frauds. Under
Mississippi law, neither part performance of an oral contract with respect to the
sale of land nor the expenditure of money in reliance upon the oral contract are sufficient
to take the contract out of the statute of frauds. See Brown v. Gravlee Lumbar Co., 341 So. 2d 907, 912 (Miss. 1977). Thus, NH’s improvements on the property would
be insufficient alone to validate the contract and remove the transfer of an ownership
interest from the statute of frauds.
Here, there is substantial evidence that the heirs, through the nephew, intended to
transfer a life estate to NH and the transfer of the life estate would not be void
merely because the contract itself for the transfer of the ownership interest in the
home was not in writing. A writing evidencing the transfer of the life estate exists
and is sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute of frauds. Thus, the statements
from NH and her nephew are sufficient evidence to establish that NH has a life estate
in the home.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that NH has a life estate in the property
at 406 Northwest Street.
Mary Ann S~
Regional Chief Counsel
Kristin M. T~
Assistant Regional Counsel