QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether a New York State court order vacating the divorce of F~ and D~ is valid and
binding on the Agency, and whether the Claimant is entitled to widower’s benefits
as the surviving spouse of D~.
OPINION
The New York State Supreme Court’s order to vacate the divorce judgment satisfies
the criteria listed in Social Security Ruling (SSR) 83-37c, and is therefore binding
on the Agency. As a result, the Claimant was legally married to the NH for the nine
months prior to her death, and is therefore entitled to widower’s benefits on her
account, assuming that the Claimant has satisfied the other statutory and regulatory
requirements for such benefits.
BACKGROUND[1]
D~ (NH) and F~ (Claimant) were legally married in New York State on December XX, 1986.
On September XX, 1991, the NH brought an action for a judgment of absolute divorce
against the claimant, alleging that he had abandoned her. On March XX, 1992, the Supreme
Court granted the divorce, and issued a judgment of absolute divorce pursuant to Domestic
Relations Law Section 170(2). See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §170(2) (McKinney 2016). The divorce judgment states that F~ was
served in person with the divorce action within the State of New York.
The NH filed a retirement claim on May XX, 2008, at which time she listed a terminated
marriage to F~. She reported that the marriage had ended in divorce in Brooklyn on
January XX, 1988. The NH subsequently died on October XX, 2008 in Brooklyn, New York.
F~ filed a retirement claim on his own account on May XX, 2012, and indicated that
he had been divorced from the NH on March XX, 1992. He provided a copy of the 1992
divorce judgment to the Agency on May XX, 2012.
On September XX, 2015, F~ filed an order to show cause with an application to vacate
the 1992 divorce judgment. In his Complaint, F~ alleged that he never had been served
with the divorce action, and that his signature had been forged on the waiver and
affidavit of service. He further alleged that he had not been living in New York in
1991.
On June XX, 2016, Judge W~ of the New York State Supreme Court held an inquest, at
which F~, his attorney, and an attorney representing the Estate of D~ appeared. At
the hearing, the Judge found that F~ had not been served with divorce papers by D~,
and had only first learned of the divorce in 2009. Judge W~ further found that the
waiver and affidavit of service could not have been signed by F~ in 1991 because he
was not in New York at that time. The court therefore granted F~’s application to
vacate the divorce judgment.
On July XX, 2016, the New York State Supreme Court issued an order to vacate the divorce
judgment, and further ordered that the marriage be restored as of March XX, 1992,
as if the parties had never been divorced.
On July XX, 2016, the Claimant filed for widower benefits on the NH’s record.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ANALYSIS
A. Social Security Act and Regulations
To receive benefits as the widower of an insured wage earner, a claimant must, among
other requirements, have been in a valid marital relationship for at least 9 months
immediately prior to the insured’s death.[2] 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(f) and 416(g) (defining “widower”), 416(h)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.335(a)(1);
404.344-45. SSA looks to the laws of the state where the insured had a permanent home
at the time of her death to determine whether the claimant and insured were validly
married. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i); 20 C.F.R. § 404.345. The NH was living in New
York at the time of her death in 2008, and the claimant’s relationship to the NH will
therefore be determined under New York law.
B. Social Security Ruling 83-37c and the Gray Analysis
On July XX, 2016, the New York State Supreme Court issued an order to vacate the divorce
judgment and restore the parties’ marriage as of March XX, 1992. Thus, the relevant
question is whether the court order vacating the divorce judgment is valid and binding
on the Agency.
In SSR 83–37c, which adopts the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Gray v. Richardson, 474 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1973), the Agency explains when it is bound by State court
decisions on family law issues. The SSR provides that the Agency must not ignore a
State court’s decision where: (1) an issue in a claim for Social Security benefits
has been determined by a State court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the issue was
genuinely contested before a State court with opposing interests; (3) the issue falls
within the general category of domestic relations law; and (4) the resolution by the
State trial court is consistent with the law enunciated by the highest court in the
State. SSR 83-37c.
1. The Issue of the Claimant’s Marital Status Has Been Decided by a Court of Competent
Jurisdiction
“The supreme court shall have general original jurisdiction in law and equity,” and
has exclusive jurisdiction over divorce actions.[3] N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 7(a). Furthermore, “[t]he court which rendered a judgment
or order may relieve a party from it upon such terms as may be just.” C.P.L.R. 5015(a).
The Supreme Court entered the original judgment of divorce in 1992, and had jurisdiction
to vacate the judgment in 2016. Accordingly, the claimant’s marital status was determined
by a State court of competent jurisdiction.[4] Thus, the first requirement of the Gray analysis is satisfied.
2. The Issue Was Genuinely Contested By Parties With Opposing Interests
To be genuinely contested, an issue must be disputed by parties with opposing interests.
See Gray, 474. F.2d at 1373 (6th Cir. 1973). F~'s marital status appears to have been “genuinely
contested” within the meaning of SSR 83–37c.
Prior to filing his motion to vacate the divorce judgment, F~ moved for the Kings
County Public Administrator to be appointed as a representative of the Estate of D~.
F~ then served the motion to vacate the divorce judgment on the designated counsel
for the Kings County Public Administrator for the Estate of D~. The attorney for the
Estate appeared at the inquest held before Judge W~ on June XX, 2016, and asked the
court to consider the amount of time that had passed since the divorce action, the
unavailability of evidence to contradict F~’s testimony, and the remote possibility
that some other assets could be found that F~ would be able to inherit. We therefore
believe that under the circumstances, the attorney fulfilled his ethical obligation
to properly represent the Estate of D~. As such, we believe that the second requirement
of the Gray analysis was also satisfied. [5]
3. The State Court Determined an Issue of Domestic Relations Law
The determination of the Claimant’s marital status falls within the general category
of domestic relations law, thereby satisfying the third step of the Gray analysis.
4. The Court’s Order is not Inconsistent with Any Law Enunciated by the New York Court
of Appeals
Finally, the Court’s Order does not appear to be inconsistent with any law enunciated
by the New York Court of Appeals, the highest court in New York State.
Under New York State law, a court that rendered a judgment may relieve a party from
the judgment with a sufficient showing of fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct
of an adverse party. See CPLR 5015(a)(3). A defendant seeking to vacate a judgment of divorce under CPLR 5015(a)(3)
has the burden of establishing, by admissible evidence, the existence of fraud, misrepresentation,
or other misconduct on the plaintiff's part sufficient to entitle him or her to vacatur.[6] See Thakur v. Thakur, 49 A.D.3d 861, 861 (2d Dep’t 2008). A decision to vacate due to fraud is a matter of the court’s discretion, and is subject
to reversal only where there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. See Matter of Mclaughlin, 111 A.D.3d 1185, 1186 (3d Dep’t 2013); Augustin v. Augustin, 79 A.D.3d 651 (1st Dep’t 2010); see also Nash v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 22 N.Y.3d 220, 225-26 (2013) (“[CPLR] 5015(a) makes clear that the motion court's determination to vacate
a judgment is a discretionary one.”).
The Federal courts have made it clear that whether or not the lower court’s decision
would be reversed on appeal for abuse of discretion is not controlling. Rather, the
proper inquiry is whether the court’s order was consistent with the law enunciated
by the highest court in the State. See, e.g., Outwater for Mcclinchey v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 1114, 1120 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (“Gray requires that the proceeding be consistent with the law enunciated by the highest
court of the State, whether or not an order would be reversed for abuse of discretion
is not controlling.”). We are unaware of any reported cases where the New York Court
of Appeals has ruled on the propriety of a motion with facts similar to those at hand.
Accordingly, deference should be given to the Supreme Court’s decision to vacate the
divorce order. See Warren v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 868 F.2d 1444, 1447 (5th Cir. 1989) (a lower court decision should be followed if
it is fair and logical and no authoritative decision to the contrary exists).
CONCLUSION
The New York State Supreme Court’s order to vacate the divorce judgment satisfies
the criteria listed in SSR 83-37c and is therefore binding on the Agency. The order
vacated the divorce judgment and restored the parties’ marriage, as if they had never
been divorced. As a result, the Claimant was legally married to the NH for the nine
months prior to her death in 2008, and is entitled to widower’s benefits as her surviving
spouse, assuming that the Claimant has satisfied the other statutory and regulatory
requirements for such benefits.