QUESTION
You asked whether the guilty plea of M~ (Claimant) in Mississippi to manslaughter
in the death of G~, the number-holder (NH), precludes him from entitlement to survivor’s
benefits as NH’s widower.
OPINION
Based on the evidence provided, Claimant’s manslaughter conviction does not preclude
him from entitlement to survivor’s benefits as NH’s widower.
BACKGROUND
According to the information provided, NH died on January XX, 1993, while domiciled
in Mississippi. NH’s death certificate listed the cause of death as a gunshot to the
right temple and characterized her manner of death as a homicide. NH’s death certificate
lists Claimant as her husband.
In November 1993, the Circuit Court of C~ County, Mississippi, ordered the amendment
of an indictment against Claimant from murder to manslaughter. That same day, Claimant
pleaded guilty to manslaughter. In December 1993, the court sentenced him to serve
eighteen years in prison. The state released Claimant on parole in January 2001 and
his parole ended in August 2001.
In March 2017, Claimant applied for survivor’s benefits as NH’s widower. In a signed
statement dated March XX, 2017, Claimant provided the following details about NH’s
death. On January XX, 1993, NH was driving a vehicle near C~, Mississippi, with Claimant
as a passenger. They began arguing and she pulled a gun on him. She stopped the car
at the side of the road. They fought over the gun and he was able to get it away from
her. The gun went off accidentally and she was shot in the head. He did not intend
to shoot her. He subsequently pleaded guilty to manslaughter.
In July 2017, the agency contacted the C~ County District Attorney’s Office, which
indicated that all its records relative to Claimant’s case had been destroyed and
there were no trial transcripts because Claimant had signed a plea agreement.
DISCUSSION
Generally, the widower of an individual who died fully insured is entitled to widow’s
insurance benefits (WIB) if he is not married, has attained age sixty, and files an
application. See Social Security Act (Act) § 202(f)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.335 (2017);[1] Program Operations Manual System (POMS) RS 00207.001.A.1; see also Act § 216(g) (defining the term “widower”). A claimant also may be eligible for a
lump sum death payment (LSDP) if the claimant is the widower of an individual who
died fully or currently insured and he was living in the same household as the deceased
at the time of her death or would be eligible for WIB. See Act § 202(i); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.390, 404.391; POMS RS 00210.001. However, agency regulations provide that a claimant may not become entitled to any
survivor’s benefits (e.g., WIB and LSDP) on the earnings record of a person if the
claimant was “convicted of a felony or an act in the nature of a felony of intentionally
causing that person’s death.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b); see POMS GN 00304.060.A.1 (referenced in POMS RS 00207.001.A.1 (discussing when WIB not payable) and POMS RS 00210.020.A, .C (discussing when LSDP not payable)).
In November 1993, pursuant to an amended indictment, Claimant pleaded guilty to manslaughter
in the Circuit Court of C~ County, Mississippi. Agency regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b)
does not define the term “convicted.” The United States Supreme Court has held that
a plea of guilty is, in and of itself, a conviction and, like a jury verdict, is conclusive.
See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927). Similarly, Mississippi law states, “a person indicted
for a criminal offense shall not be convicted thereof, unless by confession of his
guilt in open court or by admitting the truth of the charge against him by his plea,
or by the verdict of a jury accepted and recorded in court.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-3(1)
(West 2017).[2]
Mississippi law also establishes that manslaughter is a felony. In Mississippi, a
felony is any violation of law punished with death or confinement in the penitentiary.[3] See Miss. Code Ann. § 1-3-11. Mississippi law indicates a manslaughter conviction may
be punishable by imprisonment in county jail or placement in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-25(1). The court sentenced Claimant to serve eighteen years
in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Accordingly, Claimant’s
guilty plea to manslaughter is a felony conviction for purposes of 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b).
The evidence, however, does not indicate that Claimant was convicted of intentionally
causing NH’s death. The agency defines “intent” as:
A wish or expectancy that an act will have a certain result (regardless of the actual
likelihood of such a result).
The presence of will in the commission of a criminal act where the individual is fully
aware of the nature and probable consequences of the act that he or she plans to commit.
This applies whether the individual desires that such consequences occur or is indifferent
as to their occurrence.
POMS GN 00304.060.B.1. Under agency policy, there is a presumption of a lack of intent when a claimant
is convicted of involuntary manslaughter. See POMS GN 00304.065.B. There is no presumption when a claimant is convicted of voluntary manslaughter,
and facts relative to the slaying must be developed. See id. To determine intent, the agency looks to the laws of the state where the crime occurred.
See id.; see also Social Security Ruling (SSR) 89-6c (adopting as policy the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals’ decision in Davis v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 867 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1989), where the court held a conviction for second-degree
manslaughter was an intentional killing under agency policy given Kentucky’s definition
of second-degree manslaughter); SSR 87-23 (explaining the agency bases its decision
regarding intent on whether state law treats voluntary manslaughter as an intentional
homicide and examines the facts of the case if state law is inconclusive). Where state
law does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, the agency
follows the steps for voluntary manslaughter. See POMS GN 00304.065.B.
Mississippi law has at least eleven different statutes addressing manslaughter. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 97-3-27, 97-3-29, 97-3-31, 97-3-33, 97-3-35, 97-3-37, 97-3-39,
97-3-41, 97-3-43, 97-3-45, 97-3-47. The Mississippi Court of Appeals has explained,
however, that with regard to intentionality, Mississippi law has codified two different
types of manslaughter: “heat of passion” (i.e., voluntary) manslaughter under Miss.
Code Ann. § 97-3-35, and general (i.e., involuntary) manslaughter under Miss. Code
Ann. § 97-3-47. See Miller v. State, 733 So. 2d 846, 849-50 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998); see also Nolan v. State, 61 So. 3d 887, 899 (Miss. 2011) (Randolph, J., concurring) (stating that “the general
manslaughter statute . . . , being tied historically to common-law involuntary manslaughter,
does not require intent”). Thus, “heat of passion” manslaughter is defined as “[t]he
killing of a human being, without malice, in the heat of passion, but in a cruel or
unusual manner, or by the use of a dangerous weapon, without authority of law, and
not in necessary self-defense . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-35; see Miller, 733 So. 2d at 849. General manslaughter is defined as “[e]very other killing of
a human being, by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, and without
authority of law, not provided for in this title . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-47;
see Miller, 733 So. 2d at 850.
Although Mississippi has separate statutes for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter,
Claimant’s conviction does not indicate which statute applied to his conviction. Because
the evidence does not indicate whether Claimant was convicted under Mississippi’s
voluntary or involuntary manslaughter statute, no presumption of a lack of intent
applies to Claimant’s conviction, and the facts relative to the slaying must be developed.
See POMS GN 00304.065.B; see also SSR 87-23.
In Claimant’s statement dated March XX, 2017, he described NH’s slaying as accidental,
not intentional. There are no other records containing facts relative to NH’s slaying.
Agency regulations only preclude entitlement to survivor’s benefits if the claimant
was “convicted of a felony or an act in the nature of a felony of intentionally causing that person’s death.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b) (emphasis added). Because the
only available facts about NH’s slaying show Claimant did not intentionally cause
her death, her slaying based on the facts as presently known does not preclude him
from entitlement to survivor’s benefits as her widower. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b).
CONCLUSION
Based on the evidence provided, Claimant’s manslaughter conviction does not preclude
him from entitlement to survivor’s benefits as NH’s widower.