DATE: July 2018
1. SYLLABUS
This case involves the question of whether a claimant convicted of manslaughter in
the State of Michigan can qualify for disabled widow’s benefits on the record of the
deceased number holder. According to POMS GN 00304.065B, involuntary manslaughter creates a presumption of lack of intent that can be rebutted.
Voluntary manslaughter carries no presumption and, therefore, requires a development
of the facts surrounding the homicide to establish intent or lack thereof. Michigan
law does not differentiate between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter; therefore,
SSA developed the facts of this case to determine that the claimant met the intent
requirement of 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b) that precludes her from entitlement to monthly
benefits.
2. OPINION
This is with reference to your memorandum inquiring whether T~ can quality for disabled
widow’s benefits on the record of number holder (NH) D~ after being convicted of manslaughter
in his death. Specifically, whether the homicide was intentional, which would preclude
an award of benefits. As discussed below, based on the documentation supplied, we
conclude that T~ sufficiently met the intent requirement and is thus disqualified
from receiving disabled widow’s benefits on the record of NH D~.
Background
T~ married D~ in December 1995. In October, 2005, D~ died from a facial gunshot wound.
According to a Detroit Police Department Incident Report, officers first visited the
home of D~ and T~ in October due to reports of a “family trouble disturbance.” Both
D~ and T~ indicated they had had an argument related to downstairs tenants, but that
the argument “had since been resolved.” D~ told the officers that he would leave the
home for a few hours. At that time, the officers did not observe any signs of violence.
About an hour later, officers returned to the home after reports of a shooting, and
observed D~ lying face down on the staircase with his head facing toward the living
room and his feet resting on the stairs. T~ initially asserted to officers that D~
had shot himself, claiming that she was asleep in the bedroom and that the gunshot
had awoken her. The police observed that a shotgun was laying a few feet away from
D~ body; there was a shot gun shell behind the door in the living room and a shot
gun hole in the wall of the stairwell. One of the officers stated that he recognized
the impossibility of T~ story, and that he took her into custody. The officer also
stated that, at the request of the homicide section, T~ underwent a rape kit and treatment
at a hospital. The results of the rape kit and details relating to any treatment T~may
have received were not included with the supplied documentation.
The next day, T~was charged with first degree murder (premeditated), felony firearm
and manslaughter. In December, 2006, T~ pled guilty to and was convicted of manslaughter
and felony firearm.
A Presentence Investigation Report conducted by the Michigan Department of Corrections
stated that according to a Detroit Police Department Investigator’s Report dated October,
2005, the investigation revealed T~ and D~ had been involved in a “domestic violence
argument” on the day of the shooting that led to D~ raping T~. Following the rape,
D~ reportedly “retrieved a shotgun and pointed it at [T~] stating, ‘. . . I ought
to kill you.’” D~ then allegedly placed the shotgun on the floor, at which point T~
picked up the gun and pointed it at D~, firing a shot that struck the wall. T~ then
purportedly fired a second shot that struck D~ in the mouth, killing him.
The Presentence Investigation Report also included a statement from T~ dated December,
2006, in which she asserted that D~ had been shot by his father-in-law in 1981 due
to physically abusing his first wife. T~ indicated that the father-in-law reportedly
“denied he ever shot D~ and would not testify on my behalf.” T~ further claimed that
D~ physically abused his second wife and that both his first and second wives divorced
him due to the abuse.
On February, 2007, T~ was sentenced to a minimum of nine years and six months and
a maximum of fifteen years incarceration due to convictions of manslaughter and weapons
felony firearm. The Michigan Department of Corrections paroled T~ May, 2017.
Following her parole, T~ applied for disabled widow’s benefits on the record of D~.
In your memorandum dated November, 2017, you stated that T~ claimed she did not intentionally
kill her husband. It is unknown when or to whom T~ made this statement.
Discussion
SSA regulations prohibit the payment of survivor’s benefits on the earnings record
of any person if the survivor has been “convicted of a felony or an act in the nature
of a felony of intentionally causing that person’s death.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b).
In addition, the POMS provides that an adult convicted of the felonious and intentional
homicide of another person cannot be entitled to monthly benefits on the earnings
record of that person. POMS GN 00304.060(A)(1).
Certain cases are excluded from intentional homicide: homicides that were the result
of an accident; homicides that were the result of self-defense; and homicides where
the person was insane or under the influence of drugs or alcohol to the extent that
the person was unaware of the consequences of the act when he or she killed the number
holder. POMS GN 00304.065(A).
For purposes of determining whether a homicide is intentional, SSA has established
rules of intent for different categories of homicides. With respect to voluntary manslaughter,
no presumption applies and facts relative to the slaying must be developed. POMS GN 00304.065(B). Involuntary manslaughter creates a rebuttable presumption of lack of intent.
Id. If the state law does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter,
SSA follows the steps for evaluating a case involving voluntary manslaughter. Id.
The Michigan Penal Code does not define manslaughter or differentiate between voluntary
or involuntary manslaughter.[1] See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.321; see also POMS
PR 02905.025. In some cases, the distinction is made in the conviction. See, e.g., Nale v. Ford
Motor Co., 703 F. Supp. 2d 714, 723 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (concluding conviction of voluntary
manslaughter supported finding that the convicted claimant could not collect survivor’s
benefits under ERISA); People v. Thinel, 417 N.W.2d 585 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (finding
defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter). In T~ case, however, her conviction
did not specify whether it was for voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. As such,
SSA must make its own determination of intent based on the available facts, without
any presumption as to intent. POMS GN 00304.065(B).
Initially, we note that there is not enough evidence to show that any of the exceptions
to intentional homicide apply to T~. See POMS GN 00304.065(A). There have been no allegations that T~ accidentally shot D~ or that she was under
the influence of any substances at the time he was killed. Nor did she explicitly
provide self-defense as a reason for killing D~ in her statement or elsewhere in the
provided documents. While allegations of D~ history of domestic violence appears in
the records provided, there is no clear evidence or explicit statements to support
a conclusion that T~shot D~ in self-defense.
Turning to the determination of intent, the POMS defines intent as “a wish or expectancy
that an act will have a certain result (regardless of the actual likelihood of such
a result).” POMS GN 00304.060(B)(1). In addition, intent is the presence of will in the commission of a criminal
act where the individual is fully aware of the nature and probable consequences of
the act that he or she plans to commit. Id. This applies whether the individual desires
that such consequences occur or is indifferent as to their occurrence. Id. Moreover,
intent is seldom established by direct proof, but must be inferred from facts. Id.
In Davis v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals examined whether a claimant convicted of second
degree manslaughter in the shooting death of her husband satisfied the intent requirement
of 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b). 867 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1989). The Sixth Circuit held that
this regulation could reasonably be interpreted by the Secretary as applying to the
claimant, even though she did not possess a specific intent to kill, but only acted
recklessly or wantonly in discharging the gun at her husband. See id. at 339. In doing
so, the court stated that the proper definition of “intentionally” as it appears in
the regulation must be the definition given it by the administrative body drafting
the regulation.[2] See id. The court considered the POMS, which construes intent as
the performance of a voluntary act which the actor knows is potentially fatal to another,
but does not require a death-desiring state of mind. See id. at 339-40. The court
found that the Secretary’s interpretation of the regulation as applying to homicide
convictions for crimes that do not involve a specific intent to kill was reasonable
and consistent with both the regulation’s language and the agency’s policy. See id.
at 337, 339.
Here, applying SSA’s definition of intent, we believe the evidence supports a finding
that T~ met the intent requirement of 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b). Significantly, the evidence
shows that T~ pointed a shotgun at D~ and fired a shot, but missed. She fired again
and shot him in the face, killing him. T~, like the claimant in D~, had intent because
she voluntarily fired the shotgun at D~, and she knew the nature and probable consequences
of her act, i.e., that it could result in the death of her husband. Moreover, intent
existed regardless of whether T~desired her husband’s death or whether she was indifferent
as to its occurrence. POMS GN 00304.060(B)(1); see also D~, 867 F.2d at 340. As the POMS and D~ make clear, intent is in
reference to the commission of the act, not the death of the victim. Therefore, because
T~ had the requisite intent, she is precluded from entitlement to monthly benefitsunder
20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b).
Footnotes:
[1] The Presentence Investigation described the pleaded offenses as voluntary manslaughter
and felony firearm, but court documents showed charges as manslaughter and weapons
felony firearm.
[2] Michigan has adopted common law definitions of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.
Voluntary manslaughter is an intentional killing that is mitigated by the heat of
passion, whereas involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional killing. See Hardaway v. Withrow, 147 F. Supp. 2d 697, 711 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 305 F.3d 558
(6th Cir. 2002) (citing People v. Booker, 527 N.W.2d 42 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994)).
[3] The court noted that applying the Secretary’s single definition of intentional
homicide also foreclosed the possibility that claimants from different states might
receive non-uniform treatment by SSA. See Davis, 867 F.2d at 339.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that T~ does not quality for disabled widow’s
benefits on the record of NH D~ after being convicted of manslaughter in his death.
If you have any further questions, please contact Danielle Garcia at (877) 800-7578,
ext. 19148.
K~ Regional Chief Counsel, Region V
By: /s/ D~ Assistant Regional Counsel