QUESTION PRESENTED
Claimant, C~, alleges a Quaker ceremonial marriage to the Number Holder, L~ (NH),
beginning in Pennsylvania on October XX, 1963, and ending on December XX, 2020, when
the NH died in Pennsylvania. Because the NH and Claimant have a Quaker Marriage Certificate,
but no Pennsylvania marriage license, you asked whether a valid marriage existed between
the NH and Claimant under Pennsylvania law for purposes of determining Claimant’s
entitlement to widow’s insurance benefits (WIB) under Title II of the Social Security
Act (Act) on the NH’s record.[1] [2]
ANSWER
Yes. We believe that the agency could find that Claimant and the NH were in a valid
marriage and that Claimant is thus the NH’s widow for purposes of determining her
entitlement to WIB on the NH’s record. Because Claimant and the NH did not obtain
a license, they did not meet the strict statutory requirements for a valid marriage.
However, the Pennsylvania courts might nevertheless find that Claimant and the NH
had a valid marriage despite the lack of a license. Prior to January 1, 2005, the
date after which Pennsylvania prospectively abolished common law marriage, some Pennsylvania
courts held that statutory marriage license requirements were “directory only” and
not mandatory. Thus, Pennsylvania courts are likely to find that Claimant and the
NH had a valid marriage even without a license.
Moreover, we believe that the Pennsylvania courts would likely find that Claimant
and the NH entered into a valid common law marriage under Pennsylvania law in October
1963 (i.e., before January 1, 2005, the date after which Pennsylvania prospectively
abolished common law marriage) that lasted until the NH’s death on December XX, 2020.
For this additional reason, we believe that the agency could find that Claimant and
the NH were in a valid marriage and that Claimant is the NH’s widow for purposes of
determining entitlement to WIB on the NH’s record.
BACKGROUND
The NH died on December XX, 2020, while domiciled in Pennsylvania. On September XX,
2021, Claimant filed an application for WIB on the NH’s record. In that application,
Claimant averred that she and the NH lived at the same address at the time of his
death.
Both Claimant and the NH are Quakers. On October XX, 1963, Claimant and the NH were
united in a Quaker Ceremonial Marriage before an officiant in Newtown Square, Pennsylvania.
In her application for benefits, Claimant averred that she and the NH were married
before a “clergyman or public official.” Claimant and the NH did not obtain a marriage
license from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Instead, as proof of her marriage to
the NH, Claimant submitted to the agency a Quaker Marriage Certificate containing
over 200 signatures of those who attended the ceremony. The Quaker Marriage Certificate
provides information including the date of the marriage, the names and signatures
of Claimant and the NH, and the signatures of the more than 200 attendees who witnessed
the marriage ceremony. The individuals who signed the marriage certificate were Quakers
and, by signing the certificate, they acknowledged that they witnessed the marriage,
which was in conformance with the Quaker marriage process.
In February 1964, the agency processed a name change for Claimant from her maiden
name (J~) to B~ to match the NH’s last name.
ANALYSIS
A. Entitlement to Widow’s Insurance Benefits Under the Social Security Act[3]
To be entitled to WIB under Title II of the Act, Claimant must establish, among other
things, that she is the widow of an insured individual. See Act §§ 202(e)-(f), 216(a),
(c), (g), 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e)-(f), 416(a), (c), (g); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.335.
To determine whether Claimant is an insured individual’s widow, the agency looks to
the laws of the state where the insured had a permanent home at the time of his death
to determine whether Claimant and the insured were validly married. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 416(h)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.344, 404.345. However, even if Claimant was not validly
married to the insured individual, the agency will deem Claimant to be the insured
individual’s widow if, under the laws of the state where the insured individual was
domiciled at the time of his death, Claimant would inherit intestate from the insured
as if she was the insured’s surviving spouse. See Act § 216(h)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. §
416(h)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.345.
B. Pennsylvania Law
At the time of his death, the NH resided in Pennsylvania. We therefore look to Pennsylvania
law to determine whether Claimant is the NH’s widow.
Pennsylvania law expressly recognizes two forms of marriage: 1) ceremonial marriage,
i.e., a marriage performed by a religious or civil authority in accordance with the
requirements of Pennsylvania’s Marriage Act, 23 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. §§ 1101, et seq.,
and 2) prior to January 1, 2005, common law marriage.[4]
1. Pennsylvania’s Marriage Act
Under Pennsylvania’s Marriage Act, 23 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. §§ 1101, et seq., a valid
Pennsylvania marriage requires a license issued by any county in the Commonwealth
and a ceremony that takes place anywhere in the Commonwealth. See 23 Pa. Con. Stat.
Ann. §§ 1104, 1301(b). Pennsylvania’s Marriage Act expressly provides that “[n]o person
shall be joined in marriage in this Commonwealth until a marriage license has been
obtained.” 23 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. § 1301 Likewise, 23 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. § 1501(c)
states, “[n]o person or religious organization qualified to perform marriages shall
officiate at a marriage ceremony without the parties having obtained a marriage license
issued under this part.”
2. Pennsylvania Common Law Marriage
Common law marriages formed on or before January 1, 2005, are considered valid under
Pennsylvania law. See 23 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 1103 (2005). See Elk Mountain Ski
Resort, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, 114 A.3d 27, 33 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2015); In re Estate of Carter, 159 A.3d 970, 977 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (considering
the validity of Pennsylvania same-sex common law marriage pre-dating 2005); see also
Dugan v. Greco, 2020 WL 1139061, at *6 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 2020).
To prove a common law marriage where both putative spouses are able to testify, a
party must provide clear and convincing evidence of an “exchange of words in the present
tense, spoken with the specific purpose that the legal relationship of husband and
wife is created by that.” Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016, 1020 (Pa. 1998)
(citing Commonwealth v. Gorby, 588 A.2d 902, 907 (Pa. 1991)); see also POMS GN 00305.075B. The clear and convincing evidence standard requires “‘proof greater than a mere preponderance,
but less than beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Estate of Vanoni, 798 A.2d 203, 209 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2002) (citations omitted). Where contradictory testimony is presented,
the party claiming a common law marriage may introduce evidence of constant cohabitation
and reputation of marriage to support his or her claim. See Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d
at 1021; In re Estate of Carter, 159 A.3d at 979. Pennsylvania courts disfavor common
law marriages, instructing that the doctrine is a “fruitful source of perjury and
fraud” that should be viewed with “hostility.” Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d at 1019 20.
When one spouse is deceased, and in the absence of available testimony that the couple
exchanged words in the present tense, Pennsylvania courts apply a rebuttable presumption
in favor of common law marriage where the living putative spouse proves (1) constant
cohabitation and (2) broad and general reputation of marriage. See Staudenmayer, 714
A.2d at 1020; POMS GN 00305.075B (“Where one party is deceased, or is otherwise unable to testify about the exchange
of words necessary to have created a common-law marriage, Pennsylvania courts presume
that a common-law marriage existed if there is sufficient proof that the parties lived
together as husband and wife on a constant basis and had a general and broad reputation
of being married.”). The requirement of a broad and general reputation, rather than
a reputation limited to close friends and family, is meant to deter fraud. See In
re Manfredi’s Estate, 159 A.2d 697, 700 (Pa. 1960) (citing In re Hilton’s Estate,
106 A. 69 (Pa. 1919)).
C. Discussion
1. Claimant and the NH Did Not Meet the Strict Statutory Requirements for Marriage.
Despite this, Pennsylvania Courts Would Likely Recognize the Validity of Their
Marriage.
As discussed above, a valid Pennsylvania marriage requires a license and a solemnizing
ceremony with witnesses. See 23 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. §§ 1104, 1301(b). Here, although
Claimant and the NH had a valid Quaker marriage ceremony with witnesses, they did
not obtain a marriage license prior to their marriage ceremony. Thus, they did not
meet the strict statutory requirements for a marriage under Pennsylvania’s Marriage
Act. See id.
Despite the lack of a marriage license, the marriage between Claimant and the NH can
nonetheless be considered valid because Pennsylvania courts have recognized marriages
contracted prior to 2005 as valid even where a couple did not have a valid marriage
license.
For example, in DeMedio v. DeMedio, 215 Pa. Super. 255, 277, 257 A.2d 290, 302 (1969)[5] , the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that a marriage contracted by the parties
was valid despite allegations of a defective marriage license. 215 Pa. Super. at 281-82.
There, the husband instituted an annulment action against his wife alleging that she
was not competent to enter into a marriage contract and had falsely sworn as to her
mental condition when applying for the marriage license. Id. at 257. In rejecting
the husband’s request for an annulment, the court held that “[e]ven if such false
swearing had been proved, it would be immaterial to the validity of an otherwise valid
marriage contract. The validity of a marriage is not affected by the fact that the
marriage license may have been so fraudulently obtained.” Id. at 277. The court further
explained, “Pennsylvania law also follows the rule that the marriage licensure act
is directory only and not mandatory and therefore a valid marriage can be contracted
without such license or pursuant to a defective or improperly obtained license. We
can find no valid reason in law, therefore, to hold the ceremonial marriage contracted
by plaintiff and defendant . . . to be null and void.” Id. at 277 (emphasis added).
Likewise, in Cordora v. Cordora, 58 Pa. D. & C. 87, 90 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1946), the
parties sought an annulment for an allegedly void marriage that was performed after
signing a marriage license application, but without waiting the requisite three days
to obtain the license. Id. at 88. The court stated, “[W]e believe [the earlier marriage
license acts’] provisions to be directory rather than mandatory, since it contains
no express provision making marriages void if the statute is not complied with.” Id.
at 91. The court further stated, “[t]he courts of this Commonwealth have held on many
occasions that marriage license acts are directory only and not mandatory unless they
express words of nullity.” Id. (citing Sahutsky v. E.G. Budd Mfg. Co., 58 Pa. D. &
C. 446, 470, 1947 WL 2742 (1945)) (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Shouey v. Shouey, two minors obtained a license and got married without
parental consent. 16 Pa. D. & C. 693, 694 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1931). The pair subsequently
attempted to annul their marriage “as if said alleged marriage had never been contracted.”
Id. at 694. The court refused to annul the marriage. Id. at 697. The court explained,
“[i]t is true that no justice of the peace or minister may marry a minor without the
consent of the parent, but that does not affect the validity of the marriage itself
. . . The issuing of a license under such circumstances may be visited with the penalty
provided by law, but the marriage is not thereby avoided.” Id. While a penalty may
be imposed upon those who violate the statutory requirements, “nowhere in the act
is it stated that such a marriage shall be void.” Id. Indeed, “[i]n the absence of
a positive statute declaring that all marriages not celebrated in the manner therein
prescribed shall be void, any marriage regularly made according to the common law,
without observing the statutory regulations, is a valid marriage . . . Acts which provide for the obtaining of licenses are directory and not
a declaration of what shall constitute a legal marriage and what not.” Id. at 696 (emphasis added).
Given this body of case law, we believe that a Pennsylvania court would likely find
that Claimant and the NH had a valid marriage despite their lack of a marriage license.
See Shouey, 16 Pa. D. & C. at 696; DeMedio, 215 Pa. Super. at 277; Cordora, 58 Pa.
D. & C. at 92.
2. The Pennsylvania Courts Would Likely Find that Claimant and the NH Satisfied the
Requirements for a Common Law Marriage in Pennsylvania.
Even assuming that the Pennsylvania courts would find that the absence of a license
rendered the marriage between Claimant and the NH invalid under the Pennsylvania Marriage
Act, we believe that the Pennsylvania courts would likely find that Claimant has established
that she and the NH had a valid Pennsylvania common law marriage.
Prior to January 1, 2005, Pennsylvania courts recognized common law marriages in finding
that a defect with a marriage license or the failure to obtain a marriage license
would not affect the validity of the marriage. See, e.g., DeMedio, 215 Pa. Super.
at 277; Shouey, 16 Pa. D. & C. at 696; In re Larry’s Estate, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 44,
49-50 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1979) (holding that marriage license acts are “directory only”).
Rather, “a valid marriage can be contracted without such license or pursuant to a
defective or improperly obtained license.” DeMedio, 215 Pa. Super. at 277. Indeed,
as the court in DeMedio explained, “[i]f the evidence was such that the law would
require us to declare the ceremonial marriage void, we would still be constrained
to hold that under the facts and the law of this state a common law marriage exists.”
See DeMedio, 215 Pa. Super. at 278; see also In re Larry’s Estate, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d
at 49-50 (“Since marriage license acts are directory only and since this Commonwealth
recognizes the validity of common law marriages, the only elements necessary for the
creation of marital status are the clearly evidenced intention of the parties to create
that status and the clearly evidenced expressions of assent to the immediate creation
of that status.”).
Here, based on the evidence presented and a review of relevant Pennsylvania case law,
we believe that the Pennsylvania courts would likely find that Claimant and the NH
had a valid common law marriage beginning with the couple’s ceremonial marriage in
October 1963 and ending with the NH’s death in December 2020.
The evidence provided sufficiently demonstrates that Claimant and the NH entered into
a common law marriage in 1963 based on their Quaker marriage ceremony, and that they
constantly cohabitated and had a broad and general reputation of being married. See,
e.g., POMS GN 00305.075B (“Where one party is deceased, or is otherwise unable to testify about the exchange
of words necessary to have created a common-law marriage, Pennsylvania courts presume
that a common-law marriage existed if there is sufficient proof that the parties lived
together as husband and wife on a constant basis and had a general and broad reputation
of being married.”); Hornbake v. Hornbake, 72 Pa. Super. 605, 607 (1919); DeMedio,
215 Pa. Super. at 278-79.
First, with respect to evidence of constant cohabitation, Claimant averred in her
application for WIB that she and the NH lived together continuously since 1963, when
they entered into a marital relationship, until the NH’s death in December 2020. Moreover,
the agency processed a name change for Claimant in February 1964, when she changed
from her maiden name (J~) to B~, to match the NH’s last name. Further, Claimant and
the NH had at least one child together, A~.
Second, with respect to the broad and general reputation of marriage, Claimant and
the NH were married in 1963 in a Quaker ceremony that was presided over by an officiant
and witnessed by more than 200 people. See, e.g., In re Estate of Carter, 159 A.3d
970, 981 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (in finding a common law marriage, the court considered
that the couple and their families considered them married and that they were generally
known as married); Caporali v. Zunic, 2016 WL 6946219, at *2-3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov.
28, 2016) (upholding a trial court’s reliance on statements from friends and neighbors
indicating a general belief that the couple was married). Indeed, in support of her
application for WIB, Claimant presented a Quaker marriage certificate containing the
names of the couple, location of the marriage, statement of vows exchanged, and the
signatures of the couple and over 200 witnesses. In February 1964, the agency processed
a name change for Claimant from her maiden name (J~) to B~, to match the NH’s last
name. Moreover, Claimant and the NH had at least one child together, A~. Accordingly,
we believe the evidence is sufficient to show that the NH and Claimant shared the
ties that typically bind married couples.
In sum, we believe that the relationship between Claimant and the NH meets the requirements
of a common law marriage under Pennsylvania law, and, therefore, that Claimant is
entitled to benefits under the NH’s record.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we believe that the Pennsylvania courts would likely find that
Claimant and the NH were married in a ceremonial Quaker marriage in 1963 and remained
married until the NH’s death in December 2020, despite the lack of a license. In the
alternative, we believe that the Pennsylvania courts would likely find that Claimant
and the NH met the requirements of a valid common law marriage under Pennsylvania
law. Therefore, we believe the agency would be justified in finding that Claimant
is the NH’s widow for purposes of determining entitlement to WIB on the NH’s record.