QUESTION
You asked whether the claimant was validly married to the number holder for purposes
of determining the claimant's eligibility for widow's insurance benefits on the number
holder's earnings record where the claimant is the biological daughter of the number
holder's deceased wife.
OPINION
The marriage between the claimant and the number holder was either valid or voidable. Because
we have no evidence that a court declared the marriage void before number holder died,
the outcome, for our purposes, is the same. That is, the marriage between the claimant
and the number holder was valid for purposes of determining the claimant's eligibility
for widow's insurance benefits on the number holder's earnings record, whether the
marriage was valid from its inception or voidable and not later voided by a court.
BACKGROUND
Lynda (Claimant) was born in Colorado on May, and named Lynda. A New Mexico marriage
license and certificate shows Claimant’s mother, Jacqueline, married Billie in 1945,
and Claimant reported her mother and Billie were married when she was born. Records
of the Social Security Administration (SSA) indicate that Claimant’s mother and Billie
apparently divorced, but SSA does not have proof of the divorce or the date of the
divorce.
Clyde, the number holder (NH), married Claimant’s mother in Texas on July 12, 1952,
when Claimant was three years old. According to Claimant, NH initiated proceedings
to adopt her in 1955, but she does not know whether the adoption was successful. A
certified copy, issued in 2005, of Claimant's Colorado birth certificate includes
her birth name and lists her mother and Billie as her parents. However, on March 15,
1965, when Claimant was sixteen, she requested a Social Security number and indicated
her last name was B~ (NH’s last name). On this request, she also listed NH as her
father. When Claimant requested a change of last name on her Social Security card
on December 20, 1977, she indicated NH was her father. On September 12, 2001, Claimant
requested a replacement Social Security card and again listed NH as her father.
According to SSA records, Claimant’s mother died on October 8, 2008. Claimant and
NH purportedly married on September 11, 2010, in South Carolina. NH's death certificate
indicates he died on September 26, 2011, while a resident of South Carolina.
Claimant applied for, and received, widow’s insurance benefits and the lump sum death
benefit on NH's earning record. SSA suspended her benefits after discovering NH was
her stepfather. Claimant reported she did not inform SSA that NH was her stepfather
when she filed her application because an attorney allegedly had told her that in
South Carolina it was legal to marry a member of her family as long as the person
was not of the same sex. Claimant said she married NH to prevent NH’s biological children
from placing him in a skilled nursing facility. She said she took care of NH for five
years preceding his death.
DISCUSSION
Under the Social Security Act (Act), a claimant may be eligible for widow’s insurance
benefits if she is the “widow” of an individual who died a fully insured individual. See Act § 202(e)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.335 (2011). “Widow” means the “surviving wife” of
an individual. See Act § 216(c)(1); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.335(a), 404.344 (2011). A claimant was the “wife”
of the insured if the courts of State in which the insured was domiciled when he died
would find the claimant and the insured were validly married when he died. A claimant
may be the insured’s “surviving wife” if she was married to the insured for at least
nine months immediately before the insured died. See Act § 216(c)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.335(a)(1). Claimant’s purported marriage to NH lasted
more than nine months immediately prior to his death. See Act § 216(h)(1)(A)(i); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.344, 404.345 (2011). NH's death certificate
indicates he was a resident of South Carolina when he died. Therefore, we look to
South Carolina law to determine if Claimant and NH were validly married when NH died.
In South Carolina, no man can marry his daughter or his wife's daughter and no woman
may marry her stepfather. S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10(B), (C) (2011). It is not clear,
in this case, whether NH adopted Claimant in 1955. Claimant reports NH initiated
adoption proceedings but she does not know whether the adoption was successful. A
2005 copy of Claimant’s Colorado birth certificate does not reflect an adoption; nor
does it prove that an adoption did not occur in another state.
Similarly, it is not certain that Claimant would qualify as NH’s “wife’s daughter”
or that NH would qualify as Claimant’s “stepfather” under S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10. The
marriage between NH and Claimant’s mother ended with the death of Claimant’s mother. See Jannino v. Jannino, 108 S.E.2d 572, 575 (S.C. 1959); State v. Sellers, 134 S.E. 873, 874 (S.C. 1926). Consequently, one could assert that, after that marriage
ended, Claimant was no longer NH’s “wife’s daughter” and that NH was no longer Claimant’s
“stepfather.” On the other hand, one could interpret S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10 to mean
the “wife’s daughter” and “stepfather” relationship persists after the mother’s death. Since
bigamy laws would prohibit the husband’s marriage to his stepdaughter (or to anyone
else) while he is married to the mother, the State legislature would not have needed
to make the same marriage illegal under S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10.
South Carolina law provides little guidance on whether a man’s marriage to his ex-wife’s
daughter is prohibited under S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10. However, we do not need to
resolve that question here, or the question of whether NH adopted Claimant in 1955,
because a marriage that violates S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10 is voidable, rather than
void. A voidable marriage is deemed valid “to all intents and for all civil purposes”
if the marriage is not avoided or annulled while both parties to the marriage are
still living. Bennett v. Bennett, 10 S.E.2d 23, 24 (S.C. 1940); see also Smith v. State, 85 S.E. 958 (S.C. 1915); Tyson v. Weatherly, 52 S.E.2d 410 (S.C. 1949). A court must declare the prohibited marriage void in
an action directly attacking the validity of the marriage. See S.C. Code Ann § 20-1-510 (2011); see generally State v. Sellers, 134 S.E. 873, 877 (S.C. 1926).
Although South Carolina courts apparently have not directly addressed the issue of
the validity of a marriage between a stepchild and stepparent, the South Carolina
Supreme Court, considered the issue tangentially in a case involving the construction
of the terms of a deed of property. In T~, the court held that the contingencies in the deed had not occurred and, therefore,
the property did not pass to the grantee under the terms of the deed but instead to
the decedent's devisees under his will. 52 S.E.2d at 410-12. In attempting to undermine the rights of the will's devisees, the plaintiffs
made a cursory argument that, because the decedent's widow married the decedent's
son, i.e., her stepson, she and her heirs were precluded from inheriting under the
decedent's will. See id. at 412. The court noted the decedent's widow and his son had both died and no action
or proceeding was ever brought to avoid their marriage, and the plaintiffs' brief
provided no further argument regarding the issue. See id. Nevertheless, the court considered the issue and stated the precursor to S.C. Code
Ann. § 20-1-10 prohibited the marriage. See id.; S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10(B) & (C) (prohibiting a man from marrying his stepmother
and a woman from marrying her husband's son). Though this conclusion could provide
some support for interpreting S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10 as prohibiting a man’s marriage
to the daughter of his ex-wife (the second alternative interpretation, above), that
support would be weak, because the parties did not fully brief the issue and the conclusion
was not essential to the decision of the court.
More important for our purposes, however, is the court’s indication that the marriage
between the decedent’s wife and son was voidable but not void, and because the parties
had died without avoidance or annulment of the marriage, the marriage was valid. See id. See generally B~, 10 S.E.2d at 24 (finding a marriage between half-blood siblings voidable); S~, 85 S.E. at 960 (same).
Consequently, if NH adopted Claimant in 1955, or if a South Carolina court would interpret
S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10 as prohibiting a marriage between a woman and her mother’s
ex-husband, the marriage between NH and Claimant was voidable. Since we have no evidence
that any court voided the marriage before NH died, that marriage was valid under South
Carolina law. If, on the other hand, NH never adopted Claimant and S.C. Code Ann.
§ 20-1-10 is better read to presume a stepparent/stepchild relationship dissolves
when the marriage between a man and the child’s biological mother ends, the marriage
between NH and Claimant would appear to be valid under South Carolina law. In either
case, we believe the marriage between Claimant and NH was valid as of NH’s
CONCLUSION
We believe Claimant and NH were validly married under South Carolina law for the purposes
of determining whether Claimant is eligible for widow's insurance benefits on NH's
earnings record.
Mary Ann Sloan
Acting Regional Chief Counsel,
By: Arthurice T. Brundidge
Assistant Regional Counsel