This is in response to your request for an opinion regarding whether minors may own
                  property in the five states and one district in our region and, if so, regarding any
                  specific requirements on how the property must be titled. This issue has previously
                  been addressed by our region in a November 1992 memorandum. See Memorandum from Elinor Stoddard, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of the General
                  Counsel, Region III, to Larry Massanari, Regional Commissioner, Social Security Administration,
                  State Laws Regarding the Titling of Property in the Name of a Minor or Incompetent.
                  In response to your request, we rely mainly on our prior memorandum. This prior memorandum
                  did not address the issue of any titling requirements within our jurisdictions, but
                  we have found no authority specifically regarding either "restrictions as to the age
                  of the minor or the types of property that can be held" or "how the property should/must
                  be titled to show the minor as the titleholder" in any of our jurisdictions.
               
               This memorandum should serve as an addendum to our November 1992 memorandum, as it
                  provides further support for our position that a minor may hold title to property
                  in Pennsylvania, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Virginia, and West Virginia and
                  may hold title to property in Maryland, unless he has a guardian. Since we have determined
                  that a minor may hold title to property in all of our jurisdictions, there is no need
                  to address the fourth question concerning the preferred method of titling property
                  if a minor cannot hold title to property.
               
               Uniform Transfers to Minors Act
               Each of the states and the district in our region has a Uniform Transfers to Minors
                  Act (UTMA), which provides a mechanism for transferring property to a minor by will,
                  trust, gift, or payment of debt. 20 Pa. Cons. Star. Ann. §§ 5301(b), 5304-5306 (West
                  1998); Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, §§ 4504-4506 (1997); D.C. Code Ann. §§ 20-305 to -307
                  (1998); Va. Code Ann. §§ 31-40 to -42 (Michie 1998); W. Va. Code §§ 36-7-4 to -6 (1998);
                  Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts §§ 13-304 to -306 (1998). Although the UTMA does not
                  directly address the issue of whether a minor may acquire property with retroactive
                  benefit checks, it provides further support for the common law proposition that miners
                  may hold title to property. When property is transferred in accordance with the UTMA,
                  the custodial property is indefeasibly vested in the minor, but the custodian retains
                  the authority to take control of, register and record title to, collect, hold, manage,
                  invest, and reinvest the property. Pa. Cons. Star. Ann. §§ 5311(b), 5312(a) (West
                  1998); Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, §§ 4511(b), 4512(a) (1998); D.C. Code Ann. §§ 21-311(b),
                  -312 (1998); Va. Code Ann. §§ 31-47 to -48 (Michie 1998); W. Va. Code §§ 36-7-11(b),
                  -13 (1998); Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts §§ 13-311(b), -312 (1998). Under the UTMA
                  in each of our jurisdictions, a minor may hold title to property that is received
                  by gift, will, trust, or payment of debt, and none of our jurisdictions have authority
                  indicating that miners have lesser rights with respect to property acquired through
                  purchase or other conveyance. The UTMA in the District of Columbia and Virginia defines
                  "minor" as an individual under the age of eighteen, while the UTMA in the remaining
                  jurisdictions, Pennsylvania, Delaware, West Virginia, and Maryland, defines "minor"
                  as an individual under the age of twenty-one. D.C. Code Ann. § 20-301 (1998); Va.
                  Code Ann. § 31-37 (Michie 1998); Pa. Cons. Star. Ann. § 5301(b) (West 1998); Del.
                  Code Ann. tit. 12, § 4501(11) (1998); W. Va. Code § 36-7-1 (1998); Md. Code Ann.,
                  Est. & Trusts § 13-301(k) (1998).
               
               Virginia
               An additional provision of the Virginia Code further supports our position that a
                  minor may hold title to property in Virginia. According to Virginia law, an "infant"
                  is presumed to be a "person under a disability." Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-2(6) (b) (Michie
                  1998). Virginia circuit courts may, in the exercise of their equity jurisdiction,
                  order the sale, exchange, lease, encumbrance, or other disposition of the property
                  of an infant upon competent evidence that such disposition will promote the interests
                  of the minor owner. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-68 (Michie 1998). The proceeds of such sale
                  or other disposition will be invested at the discretion of the court for the use and
                  benefit of the minor. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-76 (Michie 1998). Therefore, a minor may
                  hold, but have limited control over, property in Virginia.
               
               CONCLUSION
               For the above reasons, in addition to the reasons outlined in our November 1992 memorandum,
                  we believe that a minor may own and acquire property in Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
                  Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia.
               
               Attachment
               SOCIAL SECURITY
               DATE: November 25, 1992 TITLE: State Laws Regarding the Titling of Property in the
                  Name of a Minor or Incompetent AUTHOR: Hardnett, Charlotte; Newman, James C.; Stoddard,
                  Elinor AUTHOR—POSITION: Acting Chief Counsel; Division Chief, Program Review; Assistant
                  AUTHOR—POSITION: Regional Counsel RGNDIV: R3 ADDRESSEE AND POSITION: Massanari, Larry
                  G.; Regional Commissioner ADDRESSEE—LOCATION (Region/Div): SSA
               
               TEXT
               This is in response to your memorandum in which you ask whether property in Region
                  III states can be titled in the name of a minor or an incompetent. You asked this
                  question in the context of evidencing a Supplemental Security Income (SSI) beneficiary's
                  ownership in property that representative payees purchase as a conservation or investment
                  of SSI benefits.
               
               In brief, our survey reveals that only Pennsylvania clearly allows minors and incompetents
                  to hold title to real and personal property. We believe that District of Columbia
                  law places title in minors and, unless they have conservators, incompetents as well.
                  Delaware law strongly indicates that both minors and incompetents can have title to
                  property. Among the remaining states, minors may have title in Virginia and West Virginia,
                  and lose title in Maryland if they are under guardianship. In those same states, incompetents
                  retain title in Virginia, may retain title in West Virginia, and lose title in Maryland
                  if they are under guardianship.
               
               BACKGROUND
               According to Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.), minors generally can have title to real
                  and personal property, and "insane" persons retain title to their real and personal
                  property. In researching the states in Region III, however, other than in Pennsylvania,
                  we can find no specific authority answering the question of whether title can rest
                  with a m/nor or incompetent. In these states one must rely on statutes and cases governing
                  the relation between guardian and minor or incompetent, or on statutes in other areas
                  of the law. Where the law is unclear, C.J.S. assertions may indicate that these states
                  would allow minors and/or incompetents to hold title to real and personal property.
                  C.J.S., however, merely describes its general findings among the states. It in no
                  way controls the law of any state.
               
               DISCUSSION
               V. Virginia: A. Minors Although Neither Case Law Nor Statutes Clearly Indicate Whether
                  Minors Can Have Title to Property, We Believe, Based on C.J.S., that the Better View
                  is that They Can.
               
               The "Guardian and Ward" statutes generally provide that a guardian of a minor's estate
                  shall have "the possession, care, and management of his estate, real and personal,
                  and out of the proceeds of such estate shall provide for his maintenance and education."
                  Va. Code Ann. Sec. 31-8 (Michie 1992). While the guardian has possession of the minor's
                  property, there is no evidence of the guardian's obtaining title to the property.
               
               An unrelated provision in Title 11, Contracts, appears to limit a minor's ability
                  to enter binding contracts to purchase real or personal property or otherwise transact
                  with regard to such property. Section 11-8 describes the special abilities of persons
                  under eighteen years of age who abide by the statute and qualify for a guaranty of
                  credit under various federal laws. These minors can "contract for and purchase any
                  real or personal property with respect to (the loan), execute the note or other evidence
                  of the loan indebtedness and . . . secure the debt by the execution of a deed of trust
                  or chattel mortgage, or other instrument, upon the real or personal property." Va.
                  Code Ann. Sec. 11-8 (Michie 1989).
               
               If the minor does so contract, he is bound by "such contracts or other instruments
                  entered into as though he or she were of full age." Va. Code Ann. Sec. 11-8 (emphasis
                  added). This could imply that under normal circumstances and absent specific authority
                  to do so, a minor would not be able to contract to purchase real or personal property
                  or to execute instruments to secure the resulting debt. This in turn would prevent
                  them from holding title.
               
               However, the C.J.S. analysis above may also apply in Virginia. That is, rather than
                  barring minors from transacting regarding property, section 11-8 may simply acknowledge
                  that minors outside the purview of the statute can disaffirm contracts. These minors
                  would have title to property until they disaffirmed the contract under which they
                  purchased it. Thus, section 11-8 does not necessarily indicate that minors generally
                  cannot hold title to property.
               
               The statutes do not clearly indicate that a minor can hold title to property. However,
                  as was the case in Delaware, if we read the statutes in light of C.J.S.'s general
                  provision that minors can hold title to property, the statutes become consistent.
                  Since the statutes do not clearly indicate otherwise, and since there is no case law
                  either way, we believe the best conclusion is that minors can hold title to property
                  in Virginia. B. Incompetents Case Law Establishes that Ownership of the Incompetent's
                  Property Remains with the Incompetent.
               
               Like the District of Columbia, Virginia appoints both guardians, to manage the ongoing
                  maintenance of the incompetent, and "fiduciaries", to manage the incompetent's property.
                  Neither the guardianship provisions nor the fiduciary provisions indicate that title
                  vests in the guardian or fiduciary. Va. Code Ann. Sec. 37.1-128.01 to -147 (Michie
                  1990 & Supp. 1992). However, case law clearly establishes that title remains in the
                  incompetent. Shands v. Shands, 175 Va. 156, 7 S.E. 2d 112, (1940) states that "(t)he ownership of the property remains
                  in the incompetent; its management alone is transferred to another for preservation
                  and such wise expenditure as may be most beneficial to the incompetent owner." Id. at 113. A line of cases has adopted this holding, the most recent being Layton  v. Pribble, 200 Va. 405, 105 S.E. 2d 864, 867 (1958).
               
               CONCLUSION
               Viewing Region III as a whole, we believe the uncertain results of our survey demonstrate
                  the difficulty with SSI's approach to handling representative payee purchases of real
                  and personal property with SSI funds. Another, perhaps more logical, approach to the
                  problem of tying the purchases in question to the minors or incompetents would be
                  to treat the purchase of the assets or improvements/additions thereto as "use" of
                  the benefits, rather than conservation of the benefits. We believe this approach is
                  consistent with the regulations and avoids what could be an awkward, if not exceedingly
                  complicated, means of ensuring that the beneficiary actually collect upon the eventual
                  sale of the "investment" asset.
               
               The SSI regulations on "Use of benefit payments" for SSI recipients states that "(w)
                  e will consider that payments we certify to a representative (sic) payee to have been
                  used for the use and benefit of the beneficiary if they are used for the beneficiary's
                  current maintenance. Current maintenance includes costs incurred in obtaining food,
                  shelter, clothing, medical care and personal comfort items." 20 C.F.R. Sec. 416.640
                  (1992).
               
               The regulations regarding "Conservation and investment of benefit payments" state:
                  If payments are not needed for the beneficiary's current maintenance or reasonably
                  foreseeable needs, they shall be conserved or invested on behalf of the beneficiary.
                  Conserved funds should be invested in accordance with the rules followed by trustees.
                  . . . . . Preferred investments for excess funds are U.S. Savings Bonds and deposits
                  in an interest or dividend paying account in a bank, trust company, credit union,
                  or savings and loan association. . . . 20 C.F.R. Sec. 416.645 (1992).
               
               The types of assets most frequently in question here are houses, additions and/or
                  improvements to existing real estate, automobiles, mobile homes, trucks, vans, and/or
                  special equipment added to motor vehicles. While the purchase of a home is to some
                  extent an investment, the additions/improvements to homes or motor vehicles that representative
                  payees make to benefit the beneficiary may not add market value to the underlying
                  asset. Furthermore, the purchase of vehicles such as automobiles, vans, and trucks,
                  or even mobile homes, whose value decreases rapidly in time, does not seem to fit
                  the type of conservation or investment of funds envisioned in the regulations at Sec.
                  416.645, which list deposits in savings account or the purchase of U.S. Savings Bonds
                  as acceptable or preferred investments. In fact, the purchase of depreciating assets
                  like automobiles hardly qualifies as an "investment" in any context.
               
               We believe that in most instances the purchases of homes, vehicles, or additions/improvements
                  thereto will qualify under the "Use of Benefits" provision of Sec. 416.640. These
                  purchases appear to directly serve the needs of beneficiaries and meet the definition
                  of "current maintenance" as shelter, personal comfort items, or reasonably foreseeable
                  needs. Therefore, deeming the purchases as use, rather than conservation, of benefits
                  is both a more accurate description of the transactions and a way to avoid the necessity
                  of developing ownership or titling of property as the means to ensure that the beneficiary's
                  benefit upon the sale of the asset. The true benefit to the beneficiary of an automobile
                  or even a house is the daily use or availability of the asset, and not its resale
                  value.
               
               Finally, we ask that if a beneficiary or his representative has information contrary
                  to what we have concluded in this memorandum concerning title, please forward it to
                  us and we will consider it. Also, if you have any questions about this memorandum,
                  please call the undersigned at 596-1246.
               
               FN2 "'Committee' includes any reorganization or protective committee formed for the
                  purpose of formulating, proposing, or carrying out any plan of reorganization or to
                  act in any other manner for the protection of the interests of the holders of any
                  class or classes of securities, or persons performing a similar function, and any
                  corporation formed or acting for any such purpose."