Effective Dates: 04/14/2011 - Present Previous | Next

TN 15 (06-19)

PR 02905.025 Michigan

A. PR 18-110 Does Claimant Qualify for Disabled Widow's Benefits After Being Convicted of Manslaughter in Husband's Death

DATE: July 2018

1. SYLLABUS

This case involves the question of whether a claimant convicted of manslaughter in the State of Michigan can qualify for disabled widow’s benefits on the record of the deceased number holder. According to POMS GN 00304.065B, involuntary manslaughter creates a presumption of lack of intent that can be rebutted. Voluntary manslaughter carries no presumption and, therefore, requires a development of the facts surrounding the homicide to establish intent or lack thereof. Michigan law does not differentiate between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter; therefore, SSA developed the facts of this case to determine that the claimant met the intent requirement of 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b) that precludes her from entitlement to monthly benefits.

2. OPINION

This is with reference to your memorandum inquiring whether T~ can quality for disabled widow’s benefits on the record of number holder (NH) D~ after being convicted of manslaughter in his death. Specifically, whether the homicide was intentional, which would preclude an award of benefits. As discussed below, based on the documentation supplied, we conclude that T~ sufficiently met the intent requirement and is thus disqualified from receiving disabled widow’s benefits on the record of NH D~.

Background

T~ married D~ in December 1995. In October, 2005, D~ died from a facial gunshot wound. According to a Detroit Police Department Incident Report, officers first visited the home of D~ and T~ in October due to reports of a “family trouble disturbance.” Both D~ and T~ indicated they had had an argument related to downstairs tenants, but that the argument “had since been resolved.” D~ told the officers that he would leave the home for a few hours. At that time, the officers did not observe any signs of violence. About an hour later, officers returned to the home after reports of a shooting, and observed D~ lying face down on the staircase with his head facing toward the living room and his feet resting on the stairs. T~ initially asserted to officers that D~ had shot himself, claiming that she was asleep in the bedroom and that the gunshot had awoken her. The police observed that a shotgun was laying a few feet away from D~ body; there was a shot gun shell behind the door in the living room and a shot gun hole in the wall of the stairwell. One of the officers stated that he recognized the impossibility of T~ story, and that he took her into custody. The officer also stated that, at the request of the homicide section, T~ underwent a rape kit and treatment at a hospital. The results of the rape kit and details relating to any treatment T~may have received were not included with the supplied documentation.

The next day, T~was charged with first degree murder (premeditated), felony firearm and manslaughter. In December, 2006, T~ pled guilty to and was convicted of manslaughter and felony firearm.

A Presentence Investigation Report conducted by the Michigan Department of Corrections stated that according to a Detroit Police Department Investigator’s Report dated October, 2005, the investigation revealed T~ and D~ had been involved in a “domestic violence argument” on the day of the shooting that led to D~ raping T~. Following the rape, D~ reportedly “retrieved a shotgun and pointed it at [T~] stating, ‘. . . I ought to kill you.’” D~ then allegedly placed the shotgun on the floor, at which point T~ picked up the gun and pointed it at D~, firing a shot that struck the wall. T~ then purportedly fired a second shot that struck D~ in the mouth, killing him.

The Presentence Investigation Report also included a statement from T~ dated December, 2006, in which she asserted that D~ had been shot by his father-in-law in 1981 due to physically abusing his first wife. T~ indicated that the father-in-law reportedly “denied he ever shot D~ and would not testify on my behalf.” T~ further claimed that D~ physically abused his second wife and that both his first and second wives divorced him due to the abuse.

On February, 2007, T~ was sentenced to a minimum of nine years and six months and a maximum of fifteen years incarceration due to convictions of manslaughter and weapons felony firearm. The Michigan Department of Corrections paroled T~ May, 2017.

Following her parole, T~ applied for disabled widow’s benefits on the record of D~. In your memorandum dated November, 2017, you stated that T~ claimed she did not intentionally kill her husband. It is unknown when or to whom T~ made this statement.

Discussion

SSA regulations prohibit the payment of survivor’s benefits on the earnings record of any person if the survivor has been “convicted of a felony or an act in the nature of a felony of intentionally causing that person’s death.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b). In addition, the POMS provides that an adult convicted of the felonious and intentional homicide of another person cannot be entitled to monthly benefits on the earnings record of that person. POMS GN 00304.060(A)(1).

Certain cases are excluded from intentional homicide: homicides that were the result of an accident; homicides that were the result of self-defense; and homicides where the person was insane or under the influence of drugs or alcohol to the extent that the person was unaware of the consequences of the act when he or she killed the number holder. POMS GN 00304.065(A).

For purposes of determining whether a homicide is intentional, SSA has established rules of intent for different categories of homicides. With respect to voluntary manslaughter, no presumption applies and facts relative to the slaying must be developed. POMS GN 00304.065(B). Involuntary manslaughter creates a rebuttable presumption of lack of intent. Id. If the state law does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, SSA follows the steps for evaluating a case involving voluntary manslaughter. Id.

The Michigan Penal Code does not define manslaughter or differentiate between voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.[1] See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.321; see also POMS PR 02905.025. In some cases, the distinction is made in the conviction. See, e.g., Nale v. Ford Motor Co., 703 F. Supp. 2d 714, 723 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (concluding conviction of voluntary manslaughter supported finding that the convicted claimant could not collect survivor’s benefits under ERISA); People v. Thinel, 417 N.W.2d 585 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (finding defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter). In T~ case, however, her conviction did not specify whether it was for voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. As such, SSA must make its own determination of intent based on the available facts, without any presumption as to intent. POMS GN 00304.065(B).

Initially, we note that there is not enough evidence to show that any of the exceptions to intentional homicide apply to T~. See POMS GN 00304.065(A). There have been no allegations that T~ accidentally shot D~ or that she was under the influence of any substances at the time he was killed. Nor did she explicitly provide self-defense as a reason for killing D~ in her statement or elsewhere in the provided documents. While allegations of D~ history of domestic violence appears in the records provided, there is no clear evidence or explicit statements to support a conclusion that T~shot D~ in self-defense.

Turning to the determination of intent, the POMS defines intent as “a wish or expectancy that an act will have a certain result (regardless of the actual likelihood of such a result).” POMS GN 00304.060(B)(1). In addition, intent is the presence of will in the commission of a criminal act where the individual is fully aware of the nature and probable consequences of the act that he or she plans to commit. Id. This applies whether the individual desires that such consequences occur or is indifferent as to their occurrence. Id. Moreover, intent is seldom established by direct proof, but must be inferred from facts. Id.

In Davis v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals examined whether a claimant convicted of second degree manslaughter in the shooting death of her husband satisfied the intent requirement of 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b). 867 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1989). The Sixth Circuit held that this regulation could reasonably be interpreted by the Secretary as applying to the claimant, even though she did not possess a specific intent to kill, but only acted recklessly or wantonly in discharging the gun at her husband. See id. at 339. In doing so, the court stated that the proper definition of “intentionally” as it appears in the regulation must be the definition given it by the administrative body drafting the regulation.[2] See id. The court considered the POMS, which construes intent as the performance of a voluntary act which the actor knows is potentially fatal to another, but does not require a death-desiring state of mind. See id. at 339-40. The court found that the Secretary’s interpretation of the regulation as applying to homicide convictions for crimes that do not involve a specific intent to kill was reasonable and consistent with both the regulation’s language and the agency’s policy. See id. at 337, 339.

Here, applying SSA’s definition of intent, we believe the evidence supports a finding that T~ met the intent requirement of 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b). Significantly, the evidence shows that T~ pointed a shotgun at D~ and fired a shot, but missed. She fired again and shot him in the face, killing him. T~, like the claimant in D~, had intent because she voluntarily fired the shotgun at D~, and she knew the nature and probable consequences of her act, i.e., that it could result in the death of her husband. Moreover, intent existed regardless of whether T~desired her husband’s death or whether she was indifferent as to its occurrence. POMS GN 00304.060(B)(1); see also D~, 867 F.2d at 340. As the POMS and D~ make clear, intent is in reference to the commission of the act, not the death of the victim. Therefore, because T~ had the requisite intent, she is precluded from entitlement to monthly benefitsunder 20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b).

Footnotes:

[1] The Presentence Investigation described the pleaded offenses as voluntary manslaughter and felony firearm, but court documents showed charges as manslaughter and weapons felony firearm.

[2] Michigan has adopted common law definitions of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Voluntary manslaughter is an intentional killing that is mitigated by the heat of passion, whereas involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional killing. See Hardaway v. Withrow, 147 F. Supp. 2d 697, 711 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 305 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing People v. Booker, 527 N.W.2d 42 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994)).

[3] The court noted that applying the Secretary’s single definition of intentional homicide also foreclosed the possibility that claimants from different states might receive non-uniform treatment by SSA. See Davis, 867 F.2d at 339.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that T~ does not quality for disabled widow’s benefits on the record of NH D~ after being convicted of manslaughter in his death. If you have any further questions, please contact Danielle Garcia at (877) 800-7578, ext. 19148.

K~ Regional Chief Counsel, Region V

By: /s/ D~ Assistant Regional Counsel

 

B. PR 00-368 Determination of Felonious and Intentional Homicide in Michigan- Deceased Wage Earner - Frank L. P~

DATE: March 2011

1. SYLLABUS

This case involves the question of whether a claimant convicted of manslaughter in the State of Michigan is entitled to the Lump Sum Death Payment (LSDP) on the record of a deceased wage earner (DWE). The claimant was convicted of killing the DWE on whose earnings record she is applying. Under regulations codified at 20 CFR 404.305(b), a person may not become entitled to benefits on the record of a DWE if he or she was convicted of a felony for intentionally killing the DWE.

According to POMS GN 00304.065B, involuntary manslaughter creates a presumption of lack of intent that can be rebutted. Voluntary manslaughter carries no presumption and, therefore, requires a development of the facts surrounding the homicide to establish intent or lack thereof. Michigan law does not differentiate between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter; therefore, SSA must develop the facts of this case to determine whether the claimant had the requisite intent that would prohibit an award of the LSDP.

2. OPINION

This is with reference to your memorandum inquiring whether Wynona P~, who pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the death of her spouse, is eligible on the earnings record of the deceased wage earner for the lump-sum death payment. SSA's regulations prohibit awarding widow's benefits to a person convicted of feloniously and intentionally killing a wage earner. According to the POMS provisions, involuntary manslaughter creates a rebuttable presumption of lack of intent. Voluntary manslaughter carries no presumption and therefore requires a development of the facts surrounding the homicide to establish intent or lack thereof. The Michigan penal code does not differentiate between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, and courts are not required to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter when convicting an individual of manslaughter. In cases, like this one, where the conviction does not specify whether the manslaughter was voluntary or involuntary, SSA must develop the facts of the case to determine whether the claimant had the requisite intent that would prohibit an award of benefits.

Background

Frank P~ died on September 22, 1989 from facial gunshot wounds. Wynona P~ admits that she shot Frank, but denies that she intended to kill him. She alleges that she merely wanted to frighten him by shooting above his head.

Frank and Wynona married on May 7, 1987 after almost a year of living together. This year of courtship and cohabitation witnessed no violent episodes between the two, but Wynona states that almost immediately after they were married Frank initiated a pattern of violent and abusive behavior towards her.

The abuse started with a slap, but by September 1987 when Wynona was in her third trimester of pregnancy, Frank tripped her, causing a foot injury. A few days after she had given birth by cesarean section, Frank hit her in the stomach which caused bleeding. A couple of months later, Frank broke Wynona's left arm when striking her arm with a board.

Frank engaged in psychological abuse as well. He told Wynona that he had stabbed his former wife six times during a violent affair which resulted only in a six-month jail sentence for him. When she planned to leave and visit her family in Oklahoma City, he threatened to kill her and the children if she attempted the trip.

The physical abuse continued. After Wynona had returned from the Interim House, a shelter for abused women, Frank again subjected her to the cycle of abuse and threats. He hit her in the chest with an axe and broke her right arm with a baseball bat. Though Wynona was pregnant with their second child, Frank seemingly intensified his abuse. In her fourth month of pregnancy, he kicked her in the stomach and beat her about the face, causing severe injuries that required Wynona's hospitalization. On subsequent occasions Frank battered Wynona with a brick, repeatedly struck her over the head with an iron pot, and beat her with a stick and a crate.

The day of the fatal shooting was not much different from previous ones. Frank and Wynona were both drinking and began to argue with one another. Frank complained about the amount of money that Wynona spent. This argument ended momentarily, and the two then joked and watched television. Frank, however, returned to the earlier argument's topic although Wynona implored him to stop talking about it. Instead, he picked up a two-by-four and struck her across the back. At that point, Wynona retrieved a gun from the bedroom, returned and shot Frank in the face. She then went to a neighbor's home and called the police, explaining that she had shot her husband.

Wynona claimed that she did not intend to kill Frank but instead wanted to "scare him and shoot over his head." She states that the gun accidentally discharged before she had the barrel pointed above his head.

She was charged with first degree murder and possession of a weapon. After a preliminary hearing, she was bound over on both charges. Instead of facing the prospects of trial, Wynona agreed to a plea bargain in which she pleaded guilty to manslaughter and the felony weapon charge. She was sentenced to one to fifteen years.

Discussion

Part 404.305 of Subpart D of Title 20 of SSA's regulations provides as follows:

(b) Person's death caused by an intentional act. You may not become entitled to or continue to receive any survivor's benefits or payments on the earnings record of any person, or receive any underpayment due to a person, if you were convicted of a felony or an act in the nature of a felony of intentionally causing that person's death.

20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b).

The POMS states that "[a]n adult convicted of the felonious and intentional homicide of another person cannot be entitled to monthly benefits or the LSDP on the earnings record of that person or receive any underpayment due the deceased person." POMS GN 00304.060(A)(1)(a). The POMS provisions create a rebuttable presumption of lack of intent in involuntary manslaughter cases, and they establish no presumption in voluntary manslaughter convictions. POMS GN 00305.065(B). If the State law does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, SSA follows the steps for evaluating a case involving voluntary manslaughter (i.e., no presumption applies). Id. Certain cases are excluded from intentional homicide: those that were the result of an accident; those that were the result of self defense; or those where the claimant was insane or under the influence of drugs or alcohol to the extent that she was unaware of the consequences of the act when she killed the number holder. POMS GN 00304.065(A).

The Michigan penal code does not define manslaughter or differentiate between voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.321 (West 2011). Michigan has adopted common law definitions of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, and in some cases, the distinction is made in the conviction. See, e.g., Nale v. Ford Motor Co., 703 F. Supp. 2d 714 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (conviction of voluntary manslaughter supported finding that the convicted claimant could not collect survivor’s benefits under ERISA); People v. Thinel, 417 N.W.2d 585 (Mich. App. 1987) (defendant convicted of involuntary manslaughter); People v. Allan, 404 N.W.2d 266 (Mich. App. 1987) (same). The Supreme Court of Michigan has explained that:

Involuntary manslaughter is the killing of another without malice and unintentionally, but in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony nor naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm, or in negligently doing some act lawful in itself, or by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty.

People v. Townes, 218 N.W.2d 136, 141 (1974) (quoting People v. Ryczek, 194 N.W. 609, 611 (1923)). The court has explained that voluntary manslaughter involves “intent to kill or an intent to do serious bodily harm,” but does not involve malice. Id. at 140. Rather, “[a] defendant properly convicted of voluntary manslaughter is a person who has acted out of a temporary excitement induced by an adequate provocation and not from the deliberation and reflection that marks the crime of murder.” Id. at 141.

However, not all courts make the distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Wynona's case was one of those that did not specify whether the conviction was for voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. In cases where the state court does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, SSA must make its own determination of intent, without any presumptions as to whether or not there was intent to kill. POMS GN 00305.065(B).

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PR 02905.025 - Michigan - 04/14/2011
Batch run: 06/05/2019
Rev:04/14/2011