Arkansas courts consider DNA test reports in making paternity determinations. If the results of paternity tests establish a 95% or more probability of paternity, after corroborating testimony concerning the child’s conception and birth, such genetic test results shall constitute a prima facie case of paternity and the burden shifts to the putative father to rebut that proof. In order for the DNA evidence to constitute prima facie proof of paternity, the test report must satisfy Arkansas statutory requirements for genetic testing.

We believe Arkansas courts would find that the half-sibling DNA test report, along with the supportive statements from relatives, constitute clear and convincing evidence of a parent-child relationship between the Claimant and the NH such that the Claimant could inherit from the NH under Arkansas intestate succession law as his illegitimate child. The effective date of their parent-child relationship is March xx, 2020, the date of the DNA report.

You requested an opinion on whether the evidence submitted in this case establishes a parent-child relationship between the deceased number holder (NH) C~ and G~ (Claimant), a minor, for purposes of the Claimant’s application for child’s insurance benefits and the lump sum death payment (LSDP) on NH’s record under Title II of the Social Security Act (Act) as his child. Specifically, applying section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Act, you asked whether a half-sibling deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test report and several relatives’ statements constitute sufficient evidence to establish a parent-child relationship under Arkansas intestate succession law. If so, you inquired as to the effective date of their parent-child relationship. In the alternative, you asked whether the evidence established the requirements for a parent-child relationship under section 216(h)(3) of the Act.

We believe Arkansas courts would find that the half-sibling DNA test report, along with the supportive statements from relatives, constitute clear and convincing evidence of a parent-child relationship between the Claimant and the NH such that the Claimant could inherit from the NH under Arkansas intestate succession law as his illegitimate child. Thus, we believe there is legal support for the agency to find that the Claimant has proven a parent-child relationship under section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Act for purposes of his application for Title II benefits on the NH’s record as his child, and that the effective date of their relationship is March xx, 2020, the date of the half-sibling DNA test report.^[1]

The NH died June xx, 2019, in Arkansas

The NH died June xx, 2019, while domiciled in Arkansas. The NH’s Arkansas death certificate lists his married status at the time of death as divorced. The informant was S~, his daughter. We located the NH’s online obituary, which identified his survivors as including two daughters (S~ and A~) and one son (the Claimant), as well as four brothers (including T~) and two grandchildren.^[2]

The Applicant filed for Child’s Insurance Benefits and the LSDP on behalf of the Claimant on April xx, 2020

On April xx, 2020, A2~ (Applicant) filed an application for surviving child’s insurance benefits and the LSDP on behalf of her son, the Claimant, who was born on March xx 2017. The Claimant’s Arkansas birth certificate reflects that the Applicant is his mother but does not identify a father.

Relatives’ Statements in Support of the Application for Benefits

In support of the Claimant’s application for benefits, the Applicant completed the Form SSA-2519 Child Relationship Statement on June xx, 2020, in which she reported that the Claimant was the NH’s child. She reported that the NH admitted orally to others, including his family, that the Claimant was his child. She also explained that the NH was at the hospital the day the Claimant was born in 2017; that she and the NH lived together from 2016 until four days prior to the NH’s death on June xx, 2019; that the NH had not been allowed to sign anything at the hospital on the day the Claimant was born because he was on drugs that day; and that the NH did not work much and did not have income to contribute to the Claimant’s support.

The Applicant also provided her own handwritten (and undated) statement to the agency. She wrote that she and the NH began a relationship in April 2016, which continued for more than three years until the NH’s death in June 2019. She stated that she and the NH lived with her mom in Texas for a few months then moved to Arkansas when she was pregnant with the Claimant where they lived with her sister. She stated that the NH loved the Claimant and was present for his birth in 2017. She said that the NH was prevented from being on the Claimant’s birth certificate because she was married to another man, M~, even though they had been separated since December 2015 and M~ lived in California. She stated that she wished she had gotten her divorce from M~ before the Claimant was born in 2017 and that she had planned to do so, but said it was difficult because he lived in California and she did not have a lot of money. She and M~ eventually divorced in May 2020^[3] . She stated that both of the NH’s parents were deceased and that she obtained DNA testing from the NH’s daughter (S~) to confirm that the NH’s daughter and the Claimant were half-siblings (with different mothers). She wrote that everyone in the NH’s family and in her family knew that the Claimant was the NH’s child. She provided statements from some of these relatives, as described next.

The Applicant provided a handwritten (and undated) statement from her sister, M2~, to the agency in support of her application for benefits for the Claimant. M2~ wrote that the NH “was very aware that [the Claimant] belonged to him as well as he acknowledge[d] and said [the Claimant] was his and he was very proud to be [the Claimant’s] father.” She stated that the NH was at the hospital at the time the Claimant was born in 2017. She stated that the Applicant and the NH lived with her when the Claimant was born and that she had many videos and photos of him holding the Claimant.

The Applicant provided a handwritten (and undated) statement from A~, one of the NH’s daughters. A~ wrote: “My dad [the NH] was very aware of [the Claimant] being his son and acknowledged before and after [the Claimant’s] birth.”

The Applicant provided a handwritten (and undated) statement from T~, one of the NH’s brothers. T~ wrote that the NH acknowledged the Claimant as his son before and after his birth.

March xx, 2020 Half-Sibling DNA Relationship Report

The Applicant also submitted a half-sibling DNA Relationship Report from Laboratory Corporation of America (LabCorp). The DNA Relationship Report states that LabCorp is accredited by AABB. The DNA Relationship Report identifies specimens from three individuals were tested: the Applicant as the child’s mother, the Claimant as the child, and S~ (the NH’s biological daughter^[4] ) as the child’s alleged half-sibling. The DNA Relationship Report states that S~ has a different mother who was not tested. The Applicant and the Claimant provided their DNA specimen in February 2020 and S~ provided her DNA specimen in March 2020 to determine whether the Claimant and S~ were half-siblings or unrelated. The DNA Relationship Report’s conclusion states: “The likelihood ratio indicates that [the Claimant] and S~ are 257 times more likely to be half siblings as opposed to unrelated. Their probability of relatedness as half siblings is 99.61% as compared with the possibility that they are unrelated persons. These findings support the assertion that [the Claimant] and S~ are half siblings.” LabCorp laboratory representative M3~, PhD, D-ABC signed the DNA Relationship Report on March xx, 2020, “under penalties for perjury” and swore the facts and results therein to be true and correct before a notary public, who signed and certified the report as well.

Two chain of custody documents were provided with the DNA Relationship Report. S~'s chain of custody document contains her photograph, fingerprint, and signature; shows that N~ with Child Support Enforcement certified and affirmed under “penalties for perjury” that she collected and packaged the DNA specimen from S~ on March xx, 2020; and shows that a LabCorp representative certified and affirmed under “penalties for perjury” that she received the sealed container with S~'s specimen via Federal Express on March xx, 2020, and that there was no evidence that the package had been tampered with or opened.

The Claimant’s chain of custody document contains a photograph of the Claimant with the Applicant’s signature and a fingerprint from the Applicant and the Claimant; shows that someone from the County Courthouse certified and affirmed “under penalties for perjury” that she collected and packaged the DNA specimen from the Applicant and the Claimant on February xx, 2020; and shows that a LabCorp representative certified and affirmed under “penalties for perjury” that she received the sealed container with their specimen via Federal Express (the received date is stamped, but unclear on the copy we have) and that there was no evidence that the package had been tampered with or opened.

We believe Arkansas courts would find that the half-sibling DNA test report, along with the supportive statements from relatives, constitute clear and convincing evidence of a parent-child relationship between the Claimant and the NH such that the Claimant could inherit from the NH under Arkansas intestate succession law as his illegitimate child. Thus, we believe there is legal support for the agency to find that the Claimant has proven a parent-child relationship under section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Act for purposes of his application for Title II benefits on the NH’s record as his child and that the effective date of their relationship is March xx, 2020.

QUESTION PRESENTED

You have asked us to provide a legal opinion regarding whether the evidence in the claims file, including a home kit half-siblingship deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test report, is sufficient to establish a parent-child relationship between Larry, the deceased number holder (DNH), and Keirstyn

ANSWER

In our opinion, the evidence submitted does not establish that Keirstyn is entitled to child’s benefits on the DNH’s account. If Keirstyn submits additional relevant evidence, our office will evaluate the new evidence.

BACKGROUND

As we understand the facts, Keirstyn was born on January, to Anita (Anita). Keirstyn’s birth certificate does not identify a father. Anita told Keirstyn that she was not sure whether the DNH or a man named Stacy was her father. Keirstyn’s Numident record lists Stacy as her father. The DNH died in Arkansas on August XX, 2009.

On October XX, 2013, Kristina (Kristina), Keirstyn’s guardian, filed a surviving child’s benefit claim on Keirstyn’s behalf on the DNH’s record claiming that she is the DNH’s biological child. At the time of the application, Keirstyn was 14 years old. In support of establishing a biological parent-child relationship, Kristina submitted a certified half-siblingship DNA test report dated September XX, 2013, showing a 99.84 percent probability that Carl (Carl) and Keirstyn were half-biological siblings. A Certificate of Live Birth from the State of Illinois shows that Carl was born on January, and lists the DNH as his father. Carl stated that he thought Keirstyn might be the DNH’s child because of her appearance and because Carl was around Keirstyn when Keirstyn was young. Thus, Kristina’s claim is that Carl and Keirstyn are half-siblings and that the DNH is their father.

The agency developed the case to determine whether Keirstyn might be the DNH’s child. In reviewing the case, the agency was concerned, among other things, because the DNA testing was the result of a home kit, the results of the DNA analysis stated that they were “non-legally binding,” and the “photo IDs for the persons submitting these samples were not verified by the witness.”

ANALYSIS

A. Requirements for Child’s Insurance Benefits under the Social Security Act

The Social Security Act (Act) provides that the child of an individual number holder who is entitled to old-age or disability benefits or who dies a fully or currently insured individual is entitled to surviving child’s insurance benefits beginning with the first month in which the child meets certain criteria. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(1), 416(e); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.350(a)(1), 404.352(a). To be entitled to survivor’s benefits on an insured individual’s account, a child must show she:

(1) is that individual’s child,

(2) applies for benefits,

(3) is unmarried,

(4) is under the age of eighteen, and

(5) is dependent upon the individual in question.

See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(A)-(C); 20 C.F.R. § 404.350(a). Here, it is undisputed that Keirstyn applied for benefits, is unmarried, and is under the age of 18. Thus, our focus is only upon whether Keirstyn is the DNH’s child. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(1), 416(e)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.354.

(1) she could inherit property through intestate succession as the number holder’s natural child;

(2) she is the number holder's natural child, and the number holder and the claimant’s other parent participated in a ceremony that would have resulted in a valid marriage, except for a legal impediment;

(3) she is the number holder’s natural child and the number holder has acknowledged this in writing, a court has decreed the number holder to be the claimant’s parent, or a court has ordered the number holder to contribute to the claimant’s support because the claimant is the number holder’s child; or

(4) the number holder and the claimant’s other parent have not married, but the claimant has evidence, other than the evidence described in (3) above, to show that the number holder is the claimant’s natural parent and was either living with the claimant or contributing to her support when he died.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(h)(2)(A)-(B), 416(h)(3); 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a)(1)-(4).

Keirstyn does not qualify as the DNH’s natural child under tests two, three, or four, listed above. According to the information that we received, Anita, Keirstyn’s mother, and the DNH were never married and did not participate in a ceremony that would have resulted in a valid marriage. Before his death, the DNH never acknowledged Keirstyn as his child in writing, no court decreed him to be her parent or ordered him to contribute to her support, and he never lived with Keirstyn or contributed to her support. Therefore, under the remaining test, one, to prove that she is eligible for child’s benefits on the DNH’s account, Keirstyn must show that she could inherit property through intestate succession as the DNH’s child under Arkansas law, where he had his permanent home when he died. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a)(1), (b); 20 C.F.R. § 404.303 (defining permanent home as the true and fixed home (legal domicile) to which a person intends to return whenever he is absent).

B. Requirements for Inheritance as a Child Under Arkansas Intestate Succession Laws

Arkansas law states that a child is illegitimate when she is born to parents who are not married to each other. Willmon v. Hunter, 761 S.W.2d 924, 360 (Ark. 1988). Because the evidence does not show that Anita was married to the DNH when Keirstyn was born, Arkansas law considers Keirstyn an illegitimate child. See Ark. Code Ann. § 28-9-209(a)-(c) (identifying circumstances under which child should be considered legitimate).

Under section 28-9-209(d) of the Arkansas Inheritance Code, an illegitimate child may inherit property from her father through intestate succession under Arkansas intestacy law when the child has commenced an action or a claim against her father’s estate within 180 days of her father’s death and the illegitimate child meets at least one of certain conditions:

(1) A court of competent jurisdiction has established the child’s paternity pursuant to subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section;

(2) The man acknowledged in writing that he is the child’s father;

(3) The man’s name appears with his written consent on the birth certificate as the child’s father;

(4) The mother and father intermarry prior to the child’s birth;

(5) The mother and putative father attempted to marry each other prior to the child’s birth by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid;

(6) The putative father is obligated to support the child under a written voluntary promise or by court order. See Ark. Code Ann. § 28-9-209(d)(1)-(6).

SSA will not apply a state inheritance law requirement, such as section 28-9-209,See 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(b)(2); POMS GN 00306.075. In addition, agency regulations provide that if a state inheritance law requires a court determination of paternity, SSA will not require that the claimant obtain such a determination. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(b)(2). Instead, SSA will apply the same standard of proof that the state court would apply in making its own determination of paternity. See id. Consequently, for purposes of this analysis, SSA will not require an Arkansas court determination of paternity. Rather SSA will apply the standard of proof that an Arkansas court would apply in making a paternity determination, which is clear and convincing evidence. See id.; see also McFadden v. Griffith, 647 S.W.2d 432 (Ark. 1983) (implementing clear and convincing standard in paternity cases). Therefore, in order to inherit from the DNH, Keirstyn must prove her paternity by clear and convincing evidence.

C. The Evidence Does Not Satisfy the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard

Arkansas law provides that when a child alleges that she is a deceased person’s illegitimate offspring and, on that basis, claims the right to share in his or her estate, she must prove paternity by clear and convincing evidence. McFadden, 647 S.W.2d at 432; see Ark. Stat. Ann. § 9-10-103(f) (permitting courts to issue a temporary child support order in cases involving paternity disputes if there is clear and convincing genetic evidence of paternity). Clear and convincing evidence is “proof so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the fact finder to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the matter asserted.” Ross v. Moore, 758 S.W.2d 423, 424 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988).

Arkansas courts consider DNA test reports in determining whether a child has provided clear and convincing evidence of paternity. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-108; R~, 785 S.W.2d at 245 (“genetic testing can, with a high degree of certainty, identify the father of a child and, thus, be viewed as conclusive by the fact-finder in paternity suits”); see also Keahey v. Cox, No. 05-1415, 2006 WL 2687046, at *4, 6 (Ark. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2006) (unpublished) (applying DNA evidence to satisfy clear and convincing standard). Section 9-10-108(a(6)(A) specifically provides that “[i]f the results of the paternity tests establish a ninety-five percent (95%) or more probability of inclusion that the putative father is the biological father of the child after corroborating testimony of the mother in regard to access during the probable period of conception, it shall constitute a prima facie case of establishment of paternity, and the burden of proof shall shift to the putative father to rebut that proof.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-108(a)(6)(A). In order for the DNA evidence to constitute prima facie proof of paternity, however, the test report must satisfy Arkansas statutory requirements for genetic testing. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-108(a)(4),(5),(6) (setting out qualified expert, chain of custody, and percentage of probability requirements).

When a father, such as the DNH in this case, is deceased or unavailable, the trial court may order the mother and child to submit to scientific testing to determine whether paternity testing excludes the putative father as being the child’s biological father, and if the testing does not exclude the putative father, to establish the probability of paternity. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-108(a)(3)(A). If the putative father is unavailable, an Arkansas court may consider DNA test reports from other paternal relatives, including the putative father’s other children’s. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-108(a)(3)(B).

In this case, while the DNA evidence establishes a 99.84 percent probability that Keirstyn and Carl are half biological siblings, it does not comply with other Arkansas law requirements. Arkansas law requires that DNA tests “shall be made by a duly qualified expert or experts to be appointed by the court.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-108(a)(4). In addition, a written report of the test results prepared by the duly qualified expert conducting the test or by a duly qualified expert under whose supervision or direction the test and analysis have been performed certified by an affidavit duly subscribed and sworn to by him or her before a notary public may be introduced in evidence in paternity actions without calling an expert witness. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-108(a)(5)(A). If contested,R~, 785 S.W.2d at 245 (where the laboratory director signed the DNA report, but did not indicate that he performed the test or was a qualified expert, thus, court would not allow DNA report into evidence for lack of statutory foundation). Id. at 246.

The DNA test report dated September 12, 2013, showing a 99.84 percent probability that Carl and Keirstyn were half-biological siblings was a “home kit” DNA test. Carl’s mother-in-law witnessed the extraction, packing, and mailing of the samples to the laboratory. The DNA report states that it is “Non-Legally Binding” and that “Photo ID’s for the persons submitting these samples were not verified by witness.” Arkansas law requires that DNA tests “shall be made by a duly qualified expert or experts to be appointed by the court.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-108(a)(4). A written report of the test results prepared by the duly qualified expert conducting the test or by a duly qualified expert under whose supervision or direction the test and analysis have been performed certified by an affidavit duly subscribed and sworn to by him. Here, like in R~, the laboratory director and laboratory manager signed the document, but neither of them indicated on the report that they performed the test or that they were qualified experts. Furthermore, the report does not contain the chain of custody affidavits from the testing laboratory as required by Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-108(a)(5)(B)(i). Thus, the DNA report does not constitute prima facie evidence of paternity under Arkansas law. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-108(a)(6)(a).

Moreover, the totality of the other evidence does not constitute clear and convincing evidence of the DNH’s paternity. See R~, 758 S.W.2d at 424 (clear and convincing evidence is “proof so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the fact finder to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the matter asserted). The only other evidence submitted to support the paternity claim were: (1) Carl’s statement that he thought Keirstyn might be the DNH’s child because of her appearance and because Carl was around Keirstyn when Keirstyn was young; and, (2) that Anita told Keirstyn that she was not sure whether the DNH or a man named Stacy Hodges was her father. This evidence does not establish proof “so clear, direct, weighty and convincing to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation” that the DNH is Keirstyn’s father. Id. As such, we find, under the evidence submitted, that Keirstyn is not entitled to child’s benefits on the DNH’s account.

While the record arguably contains some supplemental testimony supporting the claim that the DNH is Keirstyn’s father.

CONCLUSION

Based on the evidence submitted, as the record is currently composed, Keirstyn is not entitled to child’s insurance benefits on the DNH’s record. The DNA report does not comply with Arkansas law and there is no corrobating evidence concerning Anita’s access to the DNH at the time of conception. As such, the evidence does not constitute prima facie proof of paternity under Arkansas law. In addition, Keirstyn has not presented clear and convincing evidence to establish paternity. If Keirstyn submits additional relevant information, our office will evaluate the additional evidence.

1. The original birth certificate identifies the child as Keirstyn. Keirstyn and her permanent guardian, Kristina J~, petitioned for a change of name, which the Circuit Court of Phillips County, Arkansas granted on January 23, 2013, thereby changing her name from Keirstyn to Keirstyn J~.

2. The agency will consider Keirstyn to be dependent upon the DNH if she is the DNH’s natural child. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.361(a).

3. We recognize that the agency “must explore all possibilities of entitlement before disallowing a child’s claim because the relationship requirements are not met.” Program Operations Manual System (POMS) GN 00306.001(D). To qualify as a child of an insured individual under section 216(e) of the Act, the applicant must be the natural child, legally adopted child, stepchild, grandchild, stepgrandchild, or equitably adopted child of the insured individual. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(e); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.354 – 404.359. Here, the claim is that Keirstyn is the DNH’s natural child. There is no claim or evidence of adoption or status as a stepchild. Thus, our focus is only upon whether Keirstyn is the DNH’s natural child.

4. Subsections (a)-(c) apply to a child’s legitimacy due to parents participating in a marriage ceremony, parents subsequently marrying, or a child’s conception following artificial insemination. See Ark. Code Ann. § 28-9-209(d)(1)-(6). However, those circumstances are not applicable to the facts of this case.

5. The Arkansas Supreme Court recently construed section 28-9-209(d) and held that an illegitimate child must both commence an action or file a claim against the putative father’s estate and also fully satisfy one of the six conditions establishing paternity within 180 days of the putative father’s death. See Bell v. McDonald, --- S.W.3d ----, 2014 Ark. 75, 2014 WL 662054, at *6-9 (Ark. Feb. 20, 2014). In Bell, the claimant had filed a claim against the estate and commenced a paternity action within 180 days, but she had not completed the paternity action within the 180 days and therefore, did not have order establishing that a court of competent jurisdiction had established the paternity of the child. See id. at *1-3. The Court noted that five of the six statutory conditions could only be satisfied prior to the putative father’s death, and that the remaining condition (a court order that has established paternity of the child) had to have also been commenced and completed within 180 days. See id. at *7.

6. Because we conclude herein that Keirstyn has not shown under Arkansas law that she is entitled to benefits on the DNH’s account, we do not further address the applicability of section 28-9-209.

7. The preamble to the 1998 amendment to 20 C.F.R. § 404.355 substantiates this interpretation. See 63 Fed. Reg. 57590, 57593 (Oct. 28, 1998) (recognizing that “[m]any State laws impose time limits within which someone must act to establish paternity for purposes of intestate succession. Such time limits are intended to provide for an orderly and expeditious settlement of estates. Since this is not the purpose of Social Security benefits for children . . . we will not apply a State’s time limits within which a child’s relationship must be established when we determine the child’s status under section 216(h)(2)(A). Not applying time limits is consistent with our belief that such a policy on applying State inheritance laws will best service the interests of children Congress sought to protect when it enacted section 216(h)(2)(A).”).

8. Agency policy is that all actions to establish paternity are considered contested actions and require affidavits to document the chain of custody from a person witnessing the extraction, packing, and mailing of the samples to the testing laboratory and a person signing for the samples at the testing laboratory. POMS GN 00306.425.

9. As noted above, the agency developed the case to determine whether Keirstyn might be the DNH’s child. In response, Keirstyn stated that her mother told her that her father was either the DNH or Stacy .

The number holder (NH) was domiciled in Arkansas at the time of his death; therefore, we look to the Arkansas law to determine if the claimant could inherit from the NH. Under the Arkansas law, an illegitimate child may inherit from the NH when the child has commenced an action or a claim against the NH’s estate within 180 days of the NH’s death and meets at least one of six required conditions under the Arkansas law. In this case, the claimant’s mother did not provide clear and convincing evidence that the claimant is the NH’s child. The claimant is not entitled to child’s benefits on the NH’s record. However, if the field office obtains additional evidence from the claimant’s mother, we will evaluate the new evidence to determine if the claimant is the NH’s child.

QUESTION PRESENTED

You have asked us to provide a legal opinion regarding whether the evidence in the claims file is sufficient to establish a parent-child relationship between S~, the purported biological father and the deceased number holder (DNH), and L~^[12] (L~), the child claimant.

ANSWER

In our opinion, the record currently available does not contain clear and convincing evidence that the DNH is L~’s father. Consequently, L~ is not entitled to benefits on the DNH’s account at this time. If the agency receives additional evidence, we will evaluate the new evidence.

BACKGROUND

L~ was born on December, to S2~ (S2~). The birth certificate lists L~’s surname as G~, rather than L~, but does not identify a father. D~ (D~), L~’s adoptive mother and the DNH’s stepmother, explained that S2~ was angry with the DNH at the time of L~’s birth and thus used the surname (G~) of the individual with whom she was living at that time. S2~ and the DNH were never married. The DNH died on August XX, 2010.

On October XX, 2012, a probate judge for the Circuit Court of S3~ County, Arkansas, in case No. 63-XX-XX-XXX-X, entered an Amended Final Order of Adoption confirming the adoption of L~ to D~ and S4~ (S4~). ^[13] S2~, L~’s birth mother, completed and executed a form entitled Relinquishment and Termination with Power to Consent to Adoption (Relinquishment and Termination) in favor of D~ and S4~. The Relinquishment and Termination stated that L~’s father was “S~, the late son of S4~ and D~.” The court specifically found that D~ and S4~ were L~’s paternal grandparents, and that L~’s biological father’s consent was unnecessary because he was deceased. The Amended Final Order of Adoption confirming the adoption of L~ to D~ and S4~ directs that this “substituted” birth certificate “shall issue showing the adoptive parents as the child’s parents.” An amended birth certificate, filed November XX, 2012, as part of the adoption process, lists D~ as L~’s adoptive mother and S4~ as her adoptive father. ^[14] The evidence submitted also includes a Client Identification and Consent Form, which bears the caption, “Chain of Custody Documentation,” that A~, an employee of Cartersville Drug & Alcohol Testing, completed on May XX, 2013, certifying that she collected a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sample from D2 (D2~), ^[15] L~’s purported biological paternal grandmother (the DNH’s biological mother), on April XX, 2013, which she transmitted to DNA Diagnostics Center (DDC). DDC’s test report appears to cover both paternal grandparents; however, the evidence submitted includes DNA chain of custody documentation for D2~, but not for S4~. DDC’s DNA test report states that the probability of grandparentage between D2~ and L~ is 99.95%. The DNH’s original birth certificate lists D3~ (maiden name, H~) L~ as his mother, while an amended birth certificate, issued December XX, 1998, identifies D~ ^[16] as his mother.

The agency developed the case to determine whether L~ might be the child of a potential male sibling of the DNH. In response, D~ provided a statement (referenced above in connection with L~’s original surname) in which she indicated that the DNH had a paternal half-brother, J~ (J~), who was S4~’s, but not D2~’s, biological son, and two step-brothers. D~ indicated that S3~ never “dated” J~.

ANALYSIS

A. The Agency Applies State Intestacy Laws to Determine Status as a Child.

To be entitled to survivor’s benefits on an insured individual’s account, a child must show she (1) is that individual’s child for purposes of the Act, (2) files for benefits, (3) is unmarried, (4) is under the age of eighteen, and (5) is dependent upon the individual in question. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(A)-(C); 20 C.F.R. § 404.350(a). Here, our focus is only upon whether L~ is the DNH’s child. ^[17] The term “child” includes a natural child. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(e)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.354. ^[18] L~ would be entitled to benefits as the DNH’s child if the evidence shows that state law would determine her to be the DNH’s child for purposes of intestate succession. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a). ^[19] The agency applies the intestacy laws of the state in which the DNH had his permanent home at the time of his death. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(b). Thus, we look to whether L~ could inherit the NH’s property under Arkansas law, the state where the DNH maintained his primary domicile at the time of his death. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.303 (defining permanent home as the true and fixed home (legal domicile) to which a person intends to return whenever he is absent).

Arkansas law states that a child who is born at the time that her parents are not married to each other is an “illegitimate child.” Willmon v. Hunter, 761 S.W.2d 924, 360 (Ark. 1988). The evidence does not show that S3~ was married to the DNH. Thus, Arkansas law considers L~ an illegitimate child. See Ark. Code Ann. § 28-9-209(a)-(c) (identifying circumstances under which child should be considered legitimate).

Under section 28-9-209(d) of the Arkansas Inheritance Code, an illegitimate child may inherit property from her father through intestate succession under Arkansas intestacy law when the child has commenced an action or a claim against her father’s estate within 180 days of her father’s death and the illegitimate child meets at least one of certain conditions:

A court of competent jurisdiction has established the child’s paternity pursuant to subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section;^[20]

(2) The man acknowledged in writing that he is the child’s father;

(3) The man’s name appears with his written consent on the birth certificate as the child’s father;

(4) The mother and father intermarry prior to the child’s birth;

(5) The mother and putative father attempted to marry each other prior to the child’s birth by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid; (6) The putative father is obligated to support the child under a written voluntary promise or by court order. See Ark. Code Ann. § 28-9-209(d)(1)-(6). The Arkansas Supreme Court very recently construed section 28-9-209(d) and held that an illegitimate child must both commence an action or file a claim against the putative father’s estate and also fully satisfy one of the six conditions establishing paternity within 180 days of the putative father’s death. See Bell v. McDonald, --- S.W.3d ----, 2014 Ark. 75, 2014 WL 662054, at *6-9 (Ark. Feb. 20, 2014) ^[21] (“[W]e find under a plain reading of the language in the statute that one of the six conditions must have been satisfied and an action commenced or a claim asserted against the estate prior to the expiration of the 180-day time period.”). Here, L~ did not commence any action or file a claim against the DNH’s estate within 180 days of his death. Furthermore, the evidence does not suggest that any of the conditions listed in section 28-9-209(d)(1) through (6) apply to this case. As stated above, no court properly found that the DNH was L~’s father, there is no evidence that the DNH ever acknowledged L~ in writing, and his name does not appear on her birth certificate. The evidence does not show that the DNH and S3~ ever married, or attempted to marry. Finally, the record does not include any promise or order of support with respect to the DNH and L~.

SSA will not apply a state inheritance law requirement, such as the 180-day requirement of section 28-9-209, that an action to establish paternity must be taken with a specified period of time required from a numberholder’s death or a child’s birth, or that an action must have been started or completed before the numberholder’s death, if doing so would impose an absolute bar to the child’s ability to prove paternity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(b)(2); POMS GN 00306.075.^[22] In addition, agency regulations provide that if a state inheritance law requires a court determination of paternity, SSA will not require that the claimant obtain such a determination. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(b)(2). Instead, SSA will apply the same standard of proof that the state court would apply in making its own determination of paternity. See id. Consequently, for purposes of this analysis, SSA does not require an Arkansas court determination of paternity, but applies the standard of proof that an Arkansas court would apply in making a paternity determination, which is clear and convincing evidence. See id.; see also McFadden v. Griffith, 647 S.W.2d 432 (Ark. 1983) (implementing clear and convincing standard in paternity cases).

Arkansas law provides that when a child alleges that she is a deceased person’s illegitimate offspring and, on that basis, claims the right to share in his or her estate, she must prove paternity by clear and convincing evidence. M~, 647 S.W.2d at 432; see also Ark. Stat. Ann. § 9-10-103(f) (permitting courts to issue a temporary child support order in cases involving paternity disputes if there is clear and convincing genetic evidence of paternity). Clear and convincing evidence is “proof so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the fact finder to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the matter asserted.” Ross v. Moore, 758 S.W.2d 423, 424 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988).

Furthermore, Arkansas courts consider DNA test reports in making paternity determinations, both as prima facie evidence of paternity and as evidence to satisfy the clear and convincing standard of proof. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-108(a)(6)(A); R~, 785 S.W.2d at 245 (“genetic testing can, with a high degree of certainty, identify the father of a child and, thus, be viewed as conclusive by the fact-finder in paternity suits”); see also Keahey v. Cox, No. 05-1415, 2006 WL 2687046, at *4, 6 (Ark. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2006) (unpublished) (applying DNA evidence to satisfy clear and convincing standard). Courts will not determine that the evidence constitutes prima facie proof of paternity unless the DNA evidence, along with corroborating testimony, shows a 95% or greater probability that the child is the offspring of the purported father. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-108(a)(6)(A). Although Arkansas courts have not articulated what at percentage DNA evidence satisfies the clear and convincing standard, one court has suggested that it might lie beneath the 95 percent standard that section 9-10-108(6)(A) delineates. See K~, 2006 WL 2687046 at *4-6 (holding that DNA evidence falling short of 95% threshold, coupled with other evidence, satisfied clear and convincing standard).

When the father, such as the DNH in this case, is deceased or unavailable, the trial court may order the mother and child to submit to scientific testing to determine whether paternity testing excludes the putative father as being the child’s biological father, and if the testing does not exclude the putative father, to establish the probability of paternity. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-108(a)(3)(A). If the putative father is unavailable, an Arkansas court may consider other paternal relatives’ DNA evidence. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-108(a)(3)(B). If the results of the DNA testing establish a 95% or more probability of inclusion that the putative father is a child’s biological father, and the mother’s corroborating testimony establishes that she had access to the putative father during the probable period of conception, such evidence “shall constitute a prima facie case of establishment of paternity,” thus shifting the burden of proof to the adverse party to disprove paternity. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-108(a)(6)(A).

Arkansas is silent regarding whether supplemental testimony suffices as prima facie proof of paternity in cases which both the mother and father are deceased or otherwise unavailable. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-108(a)(6)(b) (permitting supplemental testimony from other witnesses where mother is unavailable and father furnished DNA sample). In this case, the DNH, the putative father, is obviously unable to provide testimony. S3~ is also apparently unavailable, as she has relinquished her parental rights and not participated in the application process. D~ submitted scientific DNA testing from samples taken from D2~, the DNH’s biological mother, and L~’s purported biological paternal grandmother. The DNA evidence establishes a 99.95% chance that L~ is D3~’s grandchild. However, the evidence does not exclude the possibility that D3~ had a male child, other than the DNH, who could be L~’s father. In other words, the evidence does not exclude the possibility that D2~ had another biological son (in addition to the DNH) that S3~ had access to during the period of L~’s conception.

We conclude that the evidence provided does not show, either by the prima facie method established by the Arkansas paternity testing statute, or by the clear and convincing evidence standard that the Arkansas courts historically employed, that L~ is the DNH’s child. ^[23] The Arkansas paternity statute does not permit a prima facie inference of paternity under the facts of this case because the record lacks corroborative testimony from S3~ regarding whether she had access to the DNH or any currently unknown maternal, male siblings (other biological sons D2~ may have had) at the time of L~’s conception. See Memorandum from Regional Chief Counsel, Dallas, to Ass’t Reg. Comm.—MOS, Dallas, Arkansas State Law Status of Child Based on Single Grandparentage Deoxyribonucleic Acid Test (NH Wendell), at p. 2 & n.3 (March 27, 2009) (explaining that mother must negate possibility that paternal siblings may have fathered child).

We acknowledge that the record arguably contains some evidence negating the possibility that L~ is the child of a brother of the DNH.^[24] However, D~’s statements regarding the DNH’s half-brother and step-brothers may be insufficient. At the threshold, § 9-10-108(a)(6)(A) clearly contemplates that the child’s biological mother will provide evidence regarding “access” during the period of conception. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-108(a)(6)(A). S3~ has not provided evidence of access to the DNH during the probable period of L~’s conception. Furthermore, assuming a court could legitimately consider D~’s statements pursuant to § 9-10-108(a)(6)(B), D2~ (the DNH’s biological mother), not D~ (the DNH’s stepmother), would be the best source of information regarding the DNH’s biological, maternal, male siblings, and S3~ would be the best source of whether she had access to the DNH or to any of the DNH’s brothers during the period of L~’s conception.

Given the lack of corroborating evidence concerning the conception, birth, and history of the child, we do not think that the clear and convincing standard of proof has been satisfied here, where there is no evidence from the child’s biological mother, S3~, regarding access and where D2~ has not provided information regarding whether she gave birth to any other male children. If the claimant submits additional relevant evidence regarding whether the DNH had access to S3~ during the probable time of conception and regarding whether the DNH had other biological, maternal and paternal, male siblings who had access to S3~ during the relevant period?, our office will, at that time, evaluate the additional evidence.

CONCLUSION

In summary, we conclude that the record, as currently composed, does not contain prima facie or clear and convincing evidence that L~ is the DNH’s child. Therefore, at this time, L~ is not entitled to child’s insurance benefits on the DNH’s record. We recommend, however, that SSA obtain additional evidence from S3~ and D2~, which our office will evaluate to determine if L~ is the DNH’s child.