You asked whether, under California law, K~(Claimant) is currently married to the
number holder (NH), A~, or was married to him for more than 10 years, such that she
is entitled to spouse’s or divorced spouse’s benefits on the NH’s account.
No. Claimant remains married to her current spouse, who she married in 2005. The 2012
California state court order merely established the existence of her 1973 confidential
marriage to the NH as a matter of state record. Claimant has not produced sufficient
evidence to overcome the strong presumption that her three subsequent marriages were
valid. Even if Claimant’s current marriage ends, because Claimant remarried in 1980,
she cannot meet the duration requirement for entitlement to divorced spouse’s benefits
on the NH’s account.
Claimant was born on December. A table detailing the relevant chronology is available
at Appendix A.
According to Claimant’s November XX, 2005 and April XX, 2006 Applications for Retirement
Insurance Benefits (RIB), Claimant married R~ in 1961 and divorced him in 1965 in
Las Vegas, Nevada. On January XX, 2014, Claimant supplied the divorce decree, which
confirmed that her marriage to R~ was dissolved on February XX, 1965.
Claimant next married and divorced G~. In her initial statements to the agency, Claimant
stated that she had married G~ in 1968 and divorced him in 1969. However, according
to publically available records from the Church of Latter-Day Saints, Claimant married
G~ on August XX, 1967 in Ventura County. At the agency’s request, Claimant provided
the Final Judgment of Dissolution from the Superior Court of California, County of
Ventura, which showed that her marriage to G~ was dissolved on July XX, 1970.
According to Claimant’s April XX, 2013 declaration, on March XX, 1973, she married
the NH in a religious ceremony in Thousand Oaks, California, at the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints. Claimant stated that it was her understanding that no
license was necessary and that the Church would register the confidential marriage
with Ventura County. According to Claimant, the NH petitioned for adoption of Claimant’s
three children on February XX, 1975, allegedly submitting a verified petition confirming
that he had married Claimant on March XX, 1973, and asserting that they continued
to cohabitate as spouses since their marriage.
Claimant and the NH lived together until they separated in August 1980, at which time
they seem to have severed contact. In her RIB applications, Claimant initially averred
that she and the NH had obtained a divorce. However, in her subsequent statements,
Claimant confirmed that no formal dissolution of marriage was obtained.
When contacted telephonically by the agency, the NH reported that he had attempted
to obtain a divorce from Claimant, but the Ventura County Clerk told him that because
a marriage license was never filed with the county, their marriage was not valid.
The agency has contacted the NH, but has been unable to secure a signed statement
Thus, according to the NH and as confirmed by Claimant, the parties proceeded to remarry
under the belief that a divorce was unnecessary.
Claimant submitted a marriage certificate showing that she married M~ on October XX,
1980 in Clark County, Nevada. Claimant’s original statement to the agency indicated
that she married M~ in 1982.
According to the divorce judgment, Claimant and M~ had one biological child together,
born on. Claimant divorced M~ on August , 1990, in Ventura County.
Claimant married N~ in Ventura County in 1989 or 1990, and divorced N~ in Los Angeles
County in 1990.
Claimant married W~ in Las Vegas, Nevada in 1998, and divorced W~ on February XX,
2001, in Clark County, Nevada (Court Order provided).
Claimant married K2~ on April XX, 2005, in Las Vegas, Nevada (Marriage Certificate
provided). According to agency records, Claimant also changed her name a number of
times, some of which, but not all, coincided with her marriages. In 1959, Claimant’s
record reflects her use of K~ as her original surname. Claimant changed her surname
to A2~ in 1966; however, no associated marriage was reported. During the subsequent
years, Claimant changed her surname as follows: in 1969 to G~, in 1970 to H~, in 1982
to M~, in 1994 to K~, and in 1998 to W~. She does not appear to use the surname K2~.
As detailed below, we have received no documentation indicating that Claimant or
K2~ have taken action to secure an annulment or divorce, and they consider themselves
married. Nonetheless, Claimant subsequently filed for auxiliary spouse’s benefits
on the NH’s account on the theory that she remained married to the NH since 1973.
Based on statements provided by both Claimant and the NH, Ventura County apparently
had no record of Claimant’s 1973 confidential marriage. Under California law, the
parties could have registered the confidential marriage by filing a declaration at
any time. However, Claimant maintains that the NH refused to join in such a declaration.
Therefore, on December XX, 2011, Claimant filed a petition in the Los Angeles County
Superior Court to establish the fact and validity of the 1973 marriage. See Cal. Fam. Code § 309; Cal. Health & Safety Code § 103450. In documents submitted to
the agency, Claimant and her representative (her attorney for that proceeding) state
that the NH was present at the March XX, 2012 hearing, and admitted that the marriage
had occurred. A recent statement from K2~ indicates that he was also aware of and
present for the court proceedings.
On April XX, 2012, the Court issued an Order Establishing Fact of Marriage, which
establishes that Claimant and NH married on March XX, 1973 (Court Order provided),
and a Court Order Delayed Certificate of Marriage (Certificate provided). Claimant
has provided no evidence that she subsequently registered the court ordered marriage
as directed by the court and required by state law.
Claimant sent letters dated October XX, 2012, to the Superior Courts of Los Angeles,
Kern, and Ventura Counties—the three counties in which she believed that the NH may
have domiciled since 1973— requesting that each clerk search the county records for
a divorce between Claimant and the NH, which would have occurred between March 1973
and March 1983. All three counties reported that no records were found. Claimant provided
a notice from the Deputy Clerk of the Los Angeles County Superior Court dated November
XX, 2012. Claimant provided a notice from the Deputy Clerk of the Kern County Superior
Court dated December XX, 2012. Claimant provided an undated notice from the Court
Services Assistant of the Ventura County Superior Court.
Despite Claimant’s legal actions with respect to her marriage to the NH, she appears
to remain married to K2~. Claimant listed K2~ as her spouse when she applied for RIB
based on her own primary insurance amount in 2005. According to the Lancaster Field
Office, Claimant continues to refer to K2~ as her present spouse in communications
with the agency. Claimant and K2~ continue to use the same mailing address for their
RIB payments, indicating that they still live together.
K2~ did not list Claimant as his spouse when he filed for RIB in 2010. However, on
January XX, 2014, in response to the agency’s request for additional information,
K2~ presented at the Lancaster Field Office and completed a sworn statement declaring
that he did not list Claimant as his spouse on his RIB application because, at the
time he filed, Claimant was “going through the court process to find out if she was
still legally married” to the NH. K2~ further stated that “[his] wife would love to
be able to file under [his] Social Security Record because she would receive a higher
benefit amount. The reason she has not filed yet is [that they] do not know if her
marriage to [the NH] is valid or if [their] marriage is valid.” Although K2~ claims
that the court proceedings began prior to his RIB application in 2010, the agency
has only received documents regarding the December 2011 court petition. K2~ does not
explain the date discrepancy or indicate whether some other legal proceedings may
have preceded the Claimant’s 2011 petition.
The NH married B~ on November XX, 1985, and they remain married today. On February
XX, 2012, the NH applied for RIB, attesting that he was presently married to B~ and
had no prior marriages that lasted 10 years or more. B~ filed for and has received
RIB since January 2002 based on her own primary insurance amount.
The Social Security Act (Act) looks to state law to determine whether a spousal relationship
exists. Act § 216(h)(1)(A)(i); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.345; Program Operations Manual System (POMS) RS 00202.001.A.1 (“A legal spouse must be validly married to the NH under the laws of the State
of the NH’s domicile at the time the claimant files an application or during the life
of the application.”) If a spousal relationship cannot be established under state
law, a person may still be eligible for benefits based upon a “deemed valid marriage
. . . if, in good faith, [the claimant] went through a marriage ceremony with the
insured that would have resulted in a valid marriage except for a legal impediment.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.346; see also POMS RS 00202.001.A.2. To be entitled to benefits as the result of a deemed valid marriage, the purported
spouse must be cohabitating with the insured, if living, at the time that he or she
applies for spouses benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.346.
If the courts in the state of domicile would not find the parties validly married,
the applicant may be deemed the spouse of the insured if she could inherit as a spouse
under the state laws for intestate distribution of personal property. Act § 216 (h)(1)(A)(ii);
20 C.F.R. § 404.345.
A spouse age 62 or older of an insured person who is entitled to old-age or disability
benefits is also entitled to benefits if the relationship has lasted at least one
year and the applicant is not entitled to an old-age or disability benefit based upon
a primary insurance amount that is equal to or larger than the full spouse’s benefit. Act
§ 202(b); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.330; POMS RS 00202.001; SSA Handbook § 305.
In the case of conflicting marriages, most states presume that the most recent marriage
is valid. SSA Handbook § 310 (“If all the information and evidence supplied still
leaves doubt as to whether your last marriage(s) ended, then your most recent marriage
will be presumed the valid one.”). If there is information indicating the applicant’s
marriage to the NH may have terminated, the agency requires statements from both parties
to establish that the marriage is not terminated. POMS RS 00202.070.B.
A divorced spouse is entitled to spouse’s benefits on the account of an insured person
who is entitled to old-age benefits if the divorced spouse was validly married to
the insured under state law, was married to the insured for at least 10 years immediately
before the divorce became final, is presently unmarried, is age 62 or older, and is
not entitled to old-age or disability benefits based upon a primary insurance amount
that is equal to or larger than the full spouse’s benefit. Act § 202(b); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.331, POMS RS 00202.005; SSA Handbook § 311.
Here, we apply the laws of California, the state in which the NH is domiciled, in
determining the validity and duration of Claimant’s marriage to the NH.
In California, “[a] ceremonial marriage is presumed to be valid.” Cal. Evid. Code
§ 663. In order to validate a marriage, the marriage “shall be licensed, solemnized,
and authenticated, and the authenticated marriage license shall be returned to the
county recorder of the county where the marriage license was issued, as provided in
this part.” Cal. Fam. Code § 306. However, “[n]oncompliance with this part by a nonparty
to the marriage does not invalidate the marriage.” Cal. Fam. Code § 306; see also Estate of D~, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 143, 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (explaining that “a failure by the
person solemnizing the marriage to return the certificate of registry would not invalidate
the marriage”). The POMS indicate that, in California, “where at least one of the
parties to an invalid [ceremonial] marriage . . . entered into the marriage in good
faith believing that it was valid, the spouse had status as a putative spouse and
inheritance rights as a spouse so long as such good faith belief continued.” POMS
GN 00305.085.B.1. If, after learning of the defect, “the parties undertook within a reasonable
time to legalize their marriage, then the status as a spouse continued.” POMS GN 00305.085.B.1.3.
California law provides for “confidential” marriages which have different licensing
and disclosure requirements. At the time of Claimant’s confidential marriage to the
NH, California Civil Code section 4213 (previously Section 79) did not require the
parties to obtain a license in advance of the marriage ceremony if the couple were
not minors, were already living together as husband and wife, and were married by
a member of the clergy. California amended its confidential marriage code provision
in 1977 to expand the group of persons authorized to solemnize such marriages, and
a 1981 revision substantially altered the procedures. See 11 WITSUM Ch. XV, § 48 (2005).
As section 4213 then provided, “[a] certificate of such [confidential] marriage shall
be made by the clergyman, delivered to the parties, and recorded upon the records
of the church of which the clergyman is a representative. No other record need be
made.” The state permits confidential marriages, a practice dating back to the 1800s,
“to shield the parties and their children, if any, from the publicity of a marriage
recorded in the ordinary manner, and thereby to encourage unmarried persons who have
been living together as man and wife to legalize their relationship.” Encinas v. Lowthian Freight Lines, 69 Cal. App. 2d 156, 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945).
Pursuant to California Family Code section 309, the current confidential marriage
provision, “[i]f either party to a marriage denies the marriage, or refuses to join
in a declaration of the marriage, the other party may proceed, by action pursuant
to section 103450 of the Health and Safety Code, to have the validity of the marriage
determined and declared.” California’s Health and Safety Code section 103450, thus,
allows a beneficially interested person to file a petition with the clerk of the superior
court in and for the county in which the marriage is alleged to have occurred, or
the county of residence of the person whose marriage it is sought to establish, for
an order to judicially establish the fact of, and the time and place of, a marriage
that is not registered or for which a certified copy is not obtainable. Cal. Health
& Safety Code § 103450(a). Upon affirming such a petition, the superior court judge
issues an Order Establishing Fact of Marriage and a Court Order Delayed Certificate
of Marriage, which must be registered with the California Office of Vital Record. “Court
Order Delayed Certificate of Marriage”, California Department of Public Health, January
2012, available at http://www.cdph.ca.gov/certlic/birthdeathmar/Documents/CourtOrderDelayed MarriagePAMPHLET-(01-13)-MERGED.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). To do so, the petitioner
must submit a certified copy of the Order Establishing Fact of Marriage, the completed
Court Order Delayed Certificate of Marriage, and pay a $20 fee. Id. Once the request has been received and evaluated, estimated at approximately 6 weeks,
the Office of Vital records sends the petitioner a postcard notifying him or her that
the request was accepted. Id. Additional time is necessary for processing the registration. Id.
“California law provides, with limited exceptions, that an individual can only be
married to one person at a time.” Seaton v. Seaton, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 50, 52 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Cal. Fam. Code § 2201). California
Family Code section 2201 provides: “(a) A subsequent marriage contracted by a person
during the life of a former husband or wife of the person, with a person other than
the former husband or wife, is illegal and void from the beginning, unless: [¶] (1)
the former marriage has been dissolved or adjudged a nullity before the date of the
California, like most jurisdictions, employs the presumption that once a marriage
has been shown to exist, it is presumed to be legal and valid, even if it is a second
marriage. E.g., Vargas v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. Rptr. 281 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970). This presumption is said to be one of the
strongest presumptions known to the law. Marsh v. Marsh, 250 P. 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1926). Even a bigamist may be estopped from questioning
the validity of a second marriage. See 32 Cal. Jur. 3d Family Law § 79 (citing Rediker v. Rediker, 221 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1950) (holding that a person who sought a foreign divorce and remarried
was estopped from later asserting the invalidity of the foreign divorce to avoid obligations
to the second spouse); In finding that the plaintiff was estopped from asserting the
invalidity of a divorce because he had aided and counseled the defendant in getting
it so that she would marry him, the court in R~ notes that “To hold otherwise protects
neither the welfare nor the morals of society but, on the contrary, such holding is
a flagrant invitation to others to attempt to circumvent the law, cohabit in unlawful
state and when tired of such situation, apply to the courts for a release from the
indicia of the marriage status.” R~, 221 P.2d at 7 (quoting Harlan v. Harlan, 161 P.2d 490 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945)). In re Marriage of R~, 187 Cal. Rptr. 887 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a person who participates in
a formal marriage ceremony with a second person knowing that the second person had
not obtained a final divorce is estopped from asserting the invalidity of marriage
to the second person to avoid spousal support)). POMS GN 00305.175 similarly recognizes that a party may be estopped to deny the validity of the termination
of a marriage if she remarried or otherwise accepted or acted in recognition that
the termination was valid (e.g., knew of the termination of marriage and allowed it
to stand unchallenged for many years).
The validity of a second marriage arises as soon as the second marriage is proved,
and even where there is no proof regarding termination of the first marriage. Luckett v. La Tour, 9 P.2d 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932) (holding that “[e]ven without evidence of the divorce
proof of the second marriage would raise the presumption that it was valid and the
burden of proving the contrary was upon the appellant”). “The basis of the presumption
as applied to a subsequent marriage is a policy decision that a person entering into
a subsequent marriage will be presumed not to have committed bigamy.” 32 Cal. Jur.
3d Family Law § 74 (citing Estate of S~, 507 P.2d 78 (Cal. 1973), and Patillo v. Norris, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)). The presumption in favor of the second
marriage is stronger where there are children born of the later marriage, and increases
as time passes. 55 Corpus Juris Secondum Marriage § 55 (collecting cases).
California’s policy decision to presume the validity of the second marriage has significance
for any party seeking to prove the continuation of the first marriage. “The presumption
of the validity of the second marriage displaces the presumption of continuance of
the first relation.” 32 Cal. Jur. 3d Family Law § 78; see, e.g., M~, 250 P. at 413 (noting that “[i]t has been held time and again by the supreme court
of this state that mere proof of a prior marriage and the continued life of both spouses
is not sufficient to make a case against a second ceremonial marriage, that there
must be a further showing that the first marriage has not been set aside by judicial
decree”). “[T]he burden is cast upon the party asserting guilt or immorality to prove
the negative—that the first marriage had not ended before the second marriage.” M~, 250 P. at 413 (internal citation omitted); see also Estate of S~, 507 P.2d at 83 (relying on Estate of S~, 201 P.2d 539 (Cal. 1949) and V~, 88 Cal. Rptr. 281). Because of the strength of this presumption, courts have generally
required a high degree of proof to overcome it. See In re H~’s Estate, 160 P. 548 (Cal. 1916); Moran v. Superior Court, 100 P.2d 1096 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940).
A search of the public records in jurisdictions where the insured resided could rebut
the presumption that the second marriage was valid. See, e.g., Estate of S~, 201 P.2d at 541 (stating that, “had an annulment [of the first marriage] been secured[,]
the existence of such a decree would have been discovered in the search of [such]
records”); see also V~, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 283 (citing Cal. Evid. Code §§ 604, 606, 663) (holding that no search
need be performed in jurisdictions other than those where the decedent resided or
was domiciled); accord Cal. Evid. Code § 605. Other “cogent and compelling” evidence
could also rebut the presumption. See V~, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 285 (relying on rebuttal evidence such as decedent’s continued cohabitation
with his first wife).
California law also provides that a court may enter an order of dissolution of a marriage
retroactively, i.e., “nunc pro tunc,” Nunc pro tunc means “now for then” in Latin. It is a phrase applied to acts allowed to be done
after the time when they should have been done, with a retroactive effect. Black’s
Law Dictionary 964 (5th ed. 1979). if it determines that by “mistake, negligence,
or inadvertence, the judgment has not been signed, filed and entered.” Cal. Fam. Code
§ 2346(a). The history of nunc pro tunc dissolution of marriages in California is set forth in In re H~ Estate, 182 P.2d 253 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947). As the H~ court explained, when enacted by the California Legislature in 1935, the purpose
of then-Civil Code Section 133 (now Family Code Section 2346), was to “validate otherwise
void marriages and thus relieve the parties to such marriages from the stigma and
other consequences of bigamous relationships into which they might innocently fall
by reason of oversight or neglect to have a final decree entered. Mere entry of the
nunc pro tunc judgment acts retroactively to restore them to the status of single persons and at
the same time gives them and their later acquired spouses legal married status.” Id. at 553; see also Hurst v. Hurst, 39 Cal. Rptr. 162, (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (“entry of a final decree of divorce
nunc pro tunc usually has as its purpose the validation of a marriage which would otherwise be
bigamous”). Section 2346(b) provides that the court may act on its own motion or upon
the motion of either party to the proceeding. Upon entry of judgment, the parties
have the same rights that they would have had if the dissolution of marriage had been
entered on the date when it originally could have been entered. Cal. Fam. Code. §
2346(d); see also POMS PR 06205.006 (specifically PR 03-015) (discussing prior California law, and explaining rationale
for nunc pro tunc entry of judgment).
Although unpublished, the case of In re Marriage of L~, 2006 WL 697905 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. March 20, 2006), is helpful for analyzing how
a California court would view Claimant’s current marital status. Based on the advice
of the clerk of the court that she would automatically be divorced six months after
she served her husband with process, the appellant in L~ did not complete the necessary steps to obtain a final judgment of dissolution of
marriage to her first husband. Id. at *1. Upon realizing the oversight, appellant obtained a dissolution, but she had already
remarried. Id. When appellant and her second husband began having marital trouble, he sought to annul
the marriage on the ground that appellant had been married to her first husband at
the time of her second marriage. Id. at *2. The appellant then sought an ex parte application to have the dissolution of marriage entered nunc pro tunc to a date before her second marriage, which the court granted. Id. A court subsequently granted the second husband’s request to nullify the marriage,
explicitly disregarding the nunc pro tunc dissolution. Id. at *2. In reversing the judgment of nullity, the Court of Appeals found that “[a]s established
by long-standing case law, a nunc pro tunc dissolution judgment should be considered by a court in evaluating an annulment petition,
even when the nunc pro tunc judgment was obtained after the filing of an annulment action by a subsequent spouse.” Id. at *5 (collecting cases).
Here, Claimant has reached age 62, rendering her potentially entitled to spouse’s
or divorced spouse’s benefits; however, she has not sustained her burden of proof
for the remaining elements of either benefit on the NH’s account. Under California
law, Claimant cannot show that she is presently married to the NH. Even if the Claimant
has a good faith belief that she is presently married to the NH, she is not cohabitating
with him, so she cannot meet the regulatory requirement for a deemed marriage. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.346.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.330, 404.346. Alternatively, Claimant cannot show either that
she was married to the NH for 10 years or is presently unmarried; thus, she cannot
meet the requirement for divorced spouse benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.331.
Claimant apparently maintains that the 2012 Court Order Delayed Certificate of Marriage
means that her 1973 confidential marriage to the NH continues to exist. Based on the
factual background provided and the law as it existed in 1973, the California court
appears to have properly found that the NH and Claimant entered into a confidential
marriage as Claimant contends. As the POMS reflects, the agency has previously issued
opinions pertaining to the validity of confidential marriages in California. See POMS PR 05405.006 California. In PR 86-006, issued on February 13, 1986, the agency held that a couple
who exchanged vows in a ceremony presided over by an acquaintance who claimed to be
a self-ordained minister could meet the requirements to establish a confidential marriage
in accordance with California Civil Code section 4213 even though they had not obtained
a marriage license, were not issued a marriage certificate, and for whom no civil
record of marriage existed. As PR 86-006 found, as long as there is credible evidence
that the parties held themselves out as married prior to the confidential marriage
ceremony, “a confidential marriage can be made out despite the dubious credentials
of the officiating minister or the failure of this clergyman to issue a marriage certificate.” As
PR 86-006 further noted, “Section 4200 of the Civil Code provides that noncompliance
with procedural requirements such as these ‘by others than a party to a marriage does
not invalidate it.’” Similarly, PR 82-004, issued on March 19, 1982, found that a
confidential marriage solemnized in a private ceremony performed under section 4213
was neither void nor voidable despite the parties having allegedly misrepresented
that they were living together as husband and wife prior to the marriage. Here, Claimant’s
1970 surname change to B~ indicates that the parties were likely cohabitating and
presenting themselves as married prior to their alleged confidential marriage ceremony
PR 87-013, issued on August 14, 1987, concluded that although the participants in
a confidential marriage ceremony had misrepresented that they had both obtained the
age of consent prior to entering a confidential marriage pursuant to Civil Code Section
4213, voluntary cohabitation after attaining the age of consent negated any defects
in the marriage ceremony. Therefore, the agency held that because the marriage was
not legally terminated prior to the number holder’s death, the claimant (and not the
number holder’s subsequent wife) was his widow under California law and, consequently,
for purposes of Social Security benefits. This case is, however, distinguishable from
the instant matter because the number holder in PR 87-013 could have obtained a divorce
and in not doing so, knowingly entered into a bigamist marriage that was void or voidable
(based on the unclear timing of the separation and subsequent marriage and birth of
an additional offspring, the second wife could have also been aware that she was entering
into a bigamist marriage). Further, here, unlike in Opinion B, Claimant has not sufficiently
proven that the NH has not sought to terminate the marriage or alternatively that
a court would not enter a nunc pro tunc divorce as discussed in the text.
However, Claimant misunderstands the legal significance of that court order.
Claimant maintains that her 1973 marriage continues to exist because neither party
sought dissolution of this marriage. Claimant provided notices from November and December
2012 from the three counties in which the NH was believed to have domiciled since
1973, all stating that no records were found for a divorce between Claimant and the
NH occurring between March 1973 and March 1983. The NH does not claim to have sought
a divorce; rather, he claims that he relied on advice that a divorce was not necessary. Claimant’s
theory that the marriage continues fails for two reasons: First, while the court order
establishes the fact of the 1973 marriage, Claimant has failed to show that she properly
registered the court ordered marriage. If the marriage is not registered with the
state, neither she nor the NH will be afforded an opportunity to initiate an action
to dissolve the marriage (e.g., a nunc pro tunc divorce). Notably, a search of divorce records prior to the 2012 court order (as
Claimant provided here) could not provide information about whether the NH sought
or obtained a dissolutation after that order.
Second, Claimant has not supplied any evidence to refute the strong presumption that
her subsequent marriages were valid and she would be estopped (prevented) from doing
so under California law based on her conduct in remarrying three more times. See 32 Cal. Jur. 3d Family Law § 79 (collecting cases); POMS GN
00305.175. Any argument that Claimant would make regarding putative spouse status would similarly
not refute the strong presumption that her subsequent marriages were valid, most notably
her current marriage to K2~.
Further, Claimant admitted being separated from the NH for over 30 years, and having
entered into and ending several marriages before she sought the Court Order Delayed
Certificate of Marriage. She, thus, obtained a legal benefit from not having the 1973
confidential marriage registered – ease of remarriage – and could not credibly claim
lack of knowledge with respect to divorce proceedings. Because Claimant divorced several
times before marrying the NH, she was aware and knowledgeable of divorce proceedings. California
courts will look to the equities and entirety of circumstances in making determinations
on the existence or continuation of marriages. See Estate of S~, 201 P.2d at 540 (“In any particular case, the question must be determined, like any
other question of fact, upon a consideration of the attending facts and circumstances,
and such inferences as fairly and reasonably flow therefrom.”). Were Claimant to assert
any current spousal rights under California law in relation to the NH, a California
court would likely conclude that her marriage to the NH ended in 1980 when she married
M! and could order a formal nunc pro tunc dissolution of Claimant’s marriage to the NH. See Cal. Fam. Code § 2346.
In sum, a California court is unlikely to consider Claimant and the NH currently married
and would not find her eligible to inherit from the NH’s intestate estate. Claimant
and the NH provided consistent statements regarding their separation and each has
subsequently remarried. Claimant’s subsequent marriages are presumptively valid under
California law and Claimant has not submitted any contrary evidence; rather, she has
submitted valid marriage and divorce records for all of her other marriages. Her 1980
marriage to M~ (which lasted 9 years and produced biological offspring) served to
effectively terminate her marriage to the NH and her 2005 marriage to K2~ continues
to date. Similarly, the NH is still married to the spouse he married in 1985 and,
as set forth above, the law provides a strong presumption that parties acting in good
faith are not bigamists.
Claimant bears the burden of establishing all eligibility requirements. As such, because
Claimant failed to rebut the presumption that her marriage to the insured ended at
the latest when she married M~ in October 1980 and that her 2005 marriage to K2~ remains
valid, she is not entitled to spouse’s or divorced spouse’s benefits on the NH’s record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.330, 404.331, 404.345, 404.346.
Claimant was born
Claimant listed her surname as K~
Claimant married R~
Claimant divorced R~
Claimant changed her surname to A2~
Claimant married G~
Claimant changed her surname to G~
Claimant divorced G~
Claimant changed her surname to B~
Claimant allegedly married the NH
The NH allegedly adopted Claimant’s children
Claimant and the NH separated
Claimant married M~
Claimant changed her surname to M~
Claimant had a biological child with M~
The NH married B~
Claimant divorced M~
Claimant married and divorced N~. Claimant has provided disputing accounts regarding
when she married N~.
Claimant changed her surname to K~
Claimant married W~ and changed her surname to W~
Claimant divorced W~
Claimant married K~
Claimant filed for RIB
Claimant filed a petition to establish the fact of her marriage to the NH
The NH applied for RIB
A hearing was held regarding Claimant’s petition to establish the fact of marriage
The court issued an order establishing fact of Claimant’s 1973 marriage to the NH
Claimant sent letters to three counties regarding divorce records